@article {19373,
	title = {Games of Threats.},
	journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
	volume = {108},
	year = {2018},
	month = {2018},
	pages = {139--145.},
	abstract = {A game of threats on a finite set of players,\&nbsp;N, is a function\&nbsp;d\&nbsp;that assigns a real number to any coalition,\&nbsp;S⊆N, such that\&nbsp;d(S)=-d(N\S). A game of threats is not necessarily a coalitional game as it may fail to satisfy the condition\&nbsp;d(∅)=0. We show that analogs of the classic Shapley axioms for coalitional games determine a unique value for games of threats. This value assigns to each player an average of\&nbsp;d(S)\&nbsp;across all the coalitions that include the player. Games of threats arise naturally in\&nbsp;value theory\&nbsp;for strategic games, and may have applications in other branches\&nbsp;of game theory.},
	url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825617301902},
	author = {Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman}
}
