@article {2180,
	title = {Online Concealed Correlation and Bounded Rationality},
	journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
	year = {2014},
	pages = { 71 - 89},
	abstract = {Correlation of players{\textquoteright} actions may evolve in the common course of the play of a repeated game with perfect monitoring ({\textquotedblleft}online correlation{\textquotedblright}). In this paper we study the concealment of such correlation from a boundedly rational player. We show that {\textquotedblleft}strong{\textquotedblright} players, i.e., players whose strategic complexity is less stringently bounded, can orchestrate the online correlation of the actions of {\textquotedblleft}weak{\textquotedblright} players, where this correlation is concealed from an opponent of {\textquotedblleft}intermediate{\textquotedblright} strength. The feasibility of such {\textquotedblleft}online concealed correlation{\textquotedblright} is reflected in the individually rational payoff of the opponent and in the equilibrium payoffs of the repeated game. This result enables the derivation of a folk theorem that characterizes the set of equilibrium payoffs in a class of repeated games with boundedly rational players and a mechanism designer who sends public signals. The result is illustrated in two models, bounded recall strategies and finite automata.},
	author = {Abraham Neyman and Gilad Bavly}
}
