@article {24433,
	title = {Absorbing games with a clock and two bits of memory},
	journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
	year = {Forthcoming},
	abstract = {\&nbsp;An absorbing game is a two-person zero-sum repeated game. Some of the entries are {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}absorbing{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright} in the sense that, following the play of an absorbing entry, with positive probability all future payoffs are equal to that entry{\textquoteright}s payoff. The outcome of the game is the long-run average payoff.\&nbsp;We prove that a two-person zero-sum absorbing game, with either finite or compact action sets, has, for each e\&gt;0, e-optimal strategies with finite memory. In fact, we show that there is an e-optimal strategy that depends on the clock and three states of memory.},
	author = {K. A. Hansen and R. Ibsen-Jensen and A. Neyman}
}
