@article {25173,
	title = {Cooperative Strategic Games},
	journal = {Theoretical Economics },
	volume = {16},
	year = {2021},
	month = {2021},
	pages = {825--851},
	abstract = {The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash,Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economicworth of the position of each player, reflecting the players{\textquoteright} strategic possibilities,including their ability to make threats against one another. Applications\&nbsp;of the value in economics have been rare, at least in part because the existing definition\&nbsp;(for games with more than two players) consists of an ad hoc scheme that\&nbsp;does not easily lend itself to computation. This paper makes three contributions:\&nbsp;We provide an axiomatic foundation for the value; exhibit a simple formula for\&nbsp;its computation; and extend the value{\textemdash}its definition, axiomatic characterization,\&nbsp;and computational formula{\textemdash}to Bayesian games. We then apply the value in simple\&nbsp;models of corruption, oligopolistic competition, and information sharing.},
	author = {Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman}
}
