@article {2824,
	title = {The Positive Value of Information},
	journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
	volume = {3},
	year = {1991},
	pages = {350-355},
	abstract = {It has been remarked that in rational interactions more information to one player, while all others{\textquoteright} information remains the same, may reduce his payoff in equilibrium. This classical observation relies on comparing equilibria of two different games. It is argued that this analysis is not tenably performed by comparing equilibria of two different games. Rather, one is compelled to perform the analysis in an interaction without complete information, and to compare equilibria of two interactions that are embedded in some compounded game. It is then shown that the player whose information is unilaterally refined cannot be worse off at equilibrium.\&nbsp;},
	author = {Abraham Neyman}
}
