Kohlberg E, Neyman A. Demystifying the Math of the Coronavirus.; Working Paper.

Hansen KA, Ibsen-Jensen R, Neyman A. The Big Match with a Clock and a Bit of Memory.  Working Paper.

Hansen KA, Ibsen-Jensen R, Neyman A. The Big Match with a clock and a bit of memory. Mathematics of Operations Research .  In Press.

Neyman A. Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that obey the time value of money principle: Characterization and robust optimization.  Submitted.

Hansen KA, Ibsen-Jensen R, Neyman A. Absorbing games with a clock and two bits of memory. Games and Economic Behavior.  Forthcoming.

Kohlberg E, Neyman A. Cooperative Strategic Games. Theoretical Economics .  2021;16 :825--851.

ZELENY MIROSLAV, Levinsky R, Neyman A. Should I Remember more than you?? ? on the best response to factored based strategies. International Journal of Game Theory [Internet].  2020;49 (6) :1105--1124.

Kohlberg E, Neyman A. Games of Threats. Games and Economic Behavior [Internet].  2018;108 :139--145.

Neyman A, Kohlberg E. Cooperative Strategic Games. The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University.  2017;DP 706.

Neyman A. Continuous-Time Stochastic Games. Games and Economic Behavior [Internet].  2017;104 :92-130.

Neyman A, Kohlberg E. The Cooperative Solution of Stochastic Games.  2015.

Neyman A, Bavly G. Online Concealed Correlation and Bounded Rationality. Games and Economic Behavior.  2014 : 71 - 89.

Neyman A. Stochastic Games with Short-Stage Duration. Dyn Games Appl.  2013;3 :236-278.

Neyman A. The Maximal Variation of Martingales of Probabilities and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information. Journal of Theoretical Probability.  2013 :557-567.

Neyman A. Continuous-Time Stochastic Games.  2012.

Neyman A. The Value of Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Uncertain Duration. International Journal of Game Theory.  2012;41 :195-207.

Neyman A. Singular Games in bv'NA. Journal of Mathematical Economics.  2010 :384 - 387.

Neyman A, Spencer J. Complexity and Effective Prediction. Games and Economic Behavior.  2010 :165-168.

Neyman A, Sorin S. Repeated Games with Public Uncertain Duration Process. International Journal of Game Theory.  2010 :29-52.

Neyman A, Mertens JF, Rosenberg D. Absorbing Games with Compact Action Spaces. Mathematics of Operations Research.  2009;34 :257-262.

Neyman A, Okada D. Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall. Games and Economic Behavior.  2009 :404-425.

Neyman A. Existence of Optimal Strategies in Markov Games with Incomplete Information. International Journal of Game Theory.  2008 :581 - 596.

Neyman A. Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size. Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University.  2008;DP 476.

Neyman A. Lecture Notes: Mathematical Economics 2006/7.  2006.

Neyman A, Russo T. Public Goods and Budget Deficit. Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University.  2006.

Neyman A. Aumann Awarded Nobel Prize. Notices of the AMS.  2006;53 :44 - 46.

Neyman A, Gossner O, Hernandez P. Optimal Use of Communication Resources. Econometrica.  2006 :1603 - 1636.

Neyman A. Exam: Topics in game theory.  2005.

Neyman A. Stochastic Games: Take home exam 2004.  2004.

Neyman A. GT: Brouwer's FPT .  2004.

Neyman A. Exam Review.  2004.

Neyman A. Supplementary notes.  2004.

Neyman A, Smordinsky R. Asymptotic Values of Vector Measure Games. Mathematics of Operations Research.  2004 :739 - 775.

Neyman A, Olivier G, Hernandez P. Dynamiques de Communication. Dynamiques de Communication.  2004;55 :509 - 516.

Neyman A, Gossner O, Hernandez P. Online Information Transmission.  2003.

SHAPLEY LS. Chapter 1: Stochastic games.  2003.

Neyman A. Chapter 2: From Markov chains to stochastic games .  2003.

Sorin S. Chapter 3: Classification and basic tools.  2003.

VRIEZE OJ. Chapter 4: Stochastic games and stationary strategies.  2003.

Sorin S. Chapter 5: Discounted stochastic games: The finite case.  2003.

Neyman A. Chapter 6: Real algebraic tools in stochastic games.  2003.

NOWAK ANDRZEJS. Chapter 7: Zero-sum stochastic games with Borel state spaces.  2003.

NOWAK ANDRZEJS. Chapter 8: N-person stochastic games: Extensions of the finite state space case and correlation (2003) .  2003.

Mertens JF. Chapter 9: A measurable ``measurable choice'' theorem.  2003.

Mertens JF, PARTHASARATHY TES. Chapter 10: Equilibria for discounted stochastic games.  2003.

Neyman A. Chapter 11: Stochastic games: Existence of the minmax.  2003.

THUIJSMAN FRANK. Chapter 12: The big match and the paris match.  2003.

THUIJSMAN FRANK. Chapter 13: Repeated games with absorbing states.  2003.

VRIEZE OJ. Chapter 14: Stochastic games, practical motivation and the orderfield property for special classes.  2003.

RAGHAVAN TES. Chapter 15: Finite-step algorithms for single-controller and perfect information stochastic games.  2003.

THUIJSMAN FRANK. Chapter 16: Recursive games.  2003.

Solan E. Chapter 17: Perturbations of Markov chains with applications to stochastic games.  2003.

VIEILLE NICOLAS. Chapter 18: Two-player non-zero-sum games: A reduction.  2003.

VIEILLE NICOLAS. Chapter 19: On a class of recursive games    .  2003.

Solan E. Chapter 20: Uniform equilibrium: More than two players.  2003.

Sorin S. Chapter 21: Symmetric incomplete information games as stochastic games.  2003.

COULOMB JEAN-MICHEL. Chapter 22: Absorbing games with a signalling structure.  2003.

MAITRA A, SUDDERTH W. Chapter 23: Stochastic Games with lim sup Payoff.  2003.

MAITRA A, SUDDERTH W. Chapter 24: Stochastic Games with Borel Payoffs.  2003.

Sorin S. Chapter 25: Stochastic games with incomplete information.  2003.

Neyman A. Chapter 26: Stochastic games and nonexpansive maps.  2003.

Sorin S. Chapter 27: The operator approach to zero-sum stochastic games.  2003.

COULOMB JEAN-MICHEL. Chapter 28: Games with a recursive structure.  2003.

AMIR RABAH. Chapter 29: Stochastic games in economics: The lattice-theoretic approach.  2003.

AMIR RABAH. Chapter 30: Stochastic games in economics and related fields: An overview.  2003.

Neyman A. From Markov chains to stochastic games . In: Neyman A, Sorin S Kluwer Academic Publishers . 2003rd ed. Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer Academic Publishers ; 2003. pp. 9--25.

Neyman A. Stochastic games: Existence of the minmax . In: Neyman A, Sorin S Kluwer Academic Publishers. Kluwer Academic Publishers ; 2003. pp. 173--193.

Neyman A. Real algebraic tools in stochastic games . In: Neyman A, Sorin S Kluwer Academic Publishers. Kluwer Academic Publishers ; 2003. pp. 58--75.

Neyman A. Stochastic games and nonexpansive maps . In: Neyman A, Sorin S Stochastic Games. Kluwer Academic Publishers ; 2003. pp. 397--415.

Neyman A, Mertens JF. A value on `AN. International Journal of Game Theory.  2003 : 109-120.

Neyman A, Bavly G. Online Concealed Correlation by Boundedly Rational Players. Center for the Study of Rationality, DP336.  2003 :DP-336.

Gossner O, Hernandez P, Neyman A. Online Matching Pennies. Center for the Study of Rationality, Discussion Paper 316 .  2003.

Neyman A, Sorin S. Stochastic Games and Applications. NATO ASI series. Kluwer Academic Publishers; 2003.

Neyman A. Values of Games with Infinitely Many Players. In: Aumann RJ, sergiu hart Handbook of Game Theory, with Economic Applications. Vol. 3. Amsterdam: North-Holland ; 2002. pp. 2121--2167.

Neyman A. Values of Non-Atomic Vector Measure Games. Israel Journal of Mathematics.  2001;124 :1-27.

Neyman A, Okada D. Repeated games with bounded entropy. Games and Economic Behavior.  2000;30 :228--247.

Neyman A, Okada D. Two-person repeated games with finite automata. International Journal of Game Theory.  2000;29 :309--325.

Kohlberg E, Neyman A. A strong law of large numbers for nonexpansive vector-valued stochastic processes. Israel Journal of Mathematics.  1999;111 :93-108.

Neyman A. Cooperation in Repeated Games when the Number of Stages is not Commonly Known. Econometrica.  1999;67 :45--64.

Neyman A, Okada D. Strategic entropy and complexity in repeated games. Games and Economic Behavior.  1999;29 :191--223.

Neyman A, Sorin S. Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: The General Symmetric Case. International Journal of Game Theory.  1998;27 : 201--210.

Neyman A. Finitely Repeated Games with Finite Automata. Mathematics of Operations Research.  1998;23 :513--552.

Neyman A. Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games. International Journal of Game Theory.  1997;26 : 223--227.

Neyman A. Cooperation, Repetition and Automata. In: sergiu hart, Mas-Colell A Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches, NATO ASI Series. Vol. 155. ; 1997. pp. 233--255.

Neyman A, Sorin S. Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: The Deterministic Symmetric Case. Kluwer Academic Publishers .  1997 :129--131.

Neyman A, sergiu hart. Games and Economic Theory: Selected Contributions in Honor of Robert J. Aumann. Michigan : The University of Michigan Press; 1995.

Neyman A. Values of Games with a Continuum of Players. In: Mertens J-F, Sorin S Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis. Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishers ; 1994. pp. 67--79.

 Value of Games with a Continuum of Players. Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis.  1994;77 :67--79.

Dubey P, Neyman A. An Axiomatic Approach to the Equivalence Phenomenon. In: Mertens J-F, Sorin S Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis. Vol. 77. Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer Academic Publishers ; 1994. pp. 137--143.

Neyman A, Dubey P. An Equivalence Principle for Perfectly Competitive Economies. Journal of Economic Theory.  1994;75 :314-344.

Neyman A. The Positive Value of Information. Games and Economic Behavior.  1991;3 :350-355.

Neyman A, Ezra.Einy. On Non-Atomic Weighted Majority Games. Journal of Mathematical Economics.  1990;19 :391-403.

Neyman A, Ichiishi T, Tauman Y. Game Theory and Applications. Academic Press. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,; 1990.

E.Einy, Neyman A. Large Symmetric Games are Characterized by Completeness of the Desirability Relation. Journal of Economic Theory.  1989;148 :369-385.

Neyman A. Uniqueness of the Shapley Value. Games and Economic Behavior.  1989;1 :116-118.

Neyman A, sergiu hart. Values of Vector Measure Games: Are They Linear Combinations of the Measures?. Journal of Mathematical Economics.  1988;17 :31-40.

Neyman A. Weighted Majority Games have an Asymptotic Value. Mathematics of Operations Research.  1988;13 :556-580.

Neyman A, Dubey P. Payoffs in Non-Atomic Games: An Axiomatic Approach. The Shapley Value, A. Roth (ed.), Cambridge Univ. Press.  1988 :207-216.

Neyman A, Monderer D. Values of Smooth Non-Atomic Games: The Method of Multilinear Approximation. The Shapley Value, A. Roth (ed.), Cambridge Univ. Press.  1988 :217-234.

Aumann RJ, Kurtz M, Neyman A. Power and Public Goods. Journal of Economic Theory.  1987;42 :108-127.

Forges F, Mertens JF, Neyman A. A Counter-Example to the Folk Theorem with Discounting. Economic Letters.  1986;19 :227-229.

Neyman A. Bounded Complexity Justifies Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Economic Letters.  1985;19 :227-229.

Mirman LJ, Neyman A. Diagonality of Cost Allocation Prices. Mathematics of Operations Research.  1984;9 :66-74.

Dubey P, Neyman A. Payoffs of Non-Atomic Markets: An Axiomatic Approach. Econometrica.  1984;52 :1129-1150.

Neyman A. Representation of Lp-Norms and Isometric Embedding in Lp-Spaces. Israel Journal of Mathematics.  1984;48 :129-138.

Neyman A. Semi-Values of Political Economic Games. Mathematics of Operations Research.  1984;10 :390-402.

Kohlberg E, Neyman A. Convergence in Hilbert's Metric and Convergence in Directions. Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications.  1983;93 :104-108.

Mirman LJ, Neyman A. Prices for Homogeneous Cost Functions. Journal of Mathematical Economics.  1983;12 :257-273.

Aumann RJ, Kurtz M, Neyman A. Voting for Public Goods. Review of Economic Studies.  1983;50 :677-693.

Gale D, Neyman A. Nim-Type Games. International Journal of Game Theory.  1982;11 :17-20.

Neyman A, Hildenbrand W. Integrals of Production Sets with Restricted Substitution. Journal of Mathematical Economics.  1982;9 :71-82.

Mertens JF, Neyman A. Stochastic Games have a Value. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.  1982;79 :2145-2146.

Neyman A. Renewal Theory for Sampling without Replacement. Annals of Probability [Internet].  1982;10 (2) :464--481.

Mertens J-F, Neyman A. Minimax Theorems for Undiscounted Stochastic Games. Game Theory and Mathematical Economics.  1981 :83-87.

Neyman A. Decomposition of Ranges of Vector Measures. Israel Journal of Mathematics.  1981;40 :54-64.

Kohlberg E, Neyman A. Asymptotic Behavior of Nonexpansive Mappings in Normed Linear Spaces. Israel Journal of Mathematics.  1981;38 :269-275.

Kohlberg E, Neyman A. Asymptotic Behavior of Nonexpansive Mappings in Uniformly Convex Banach Spaces. American Mathematical Monthly.  1981;88 :698-700.

Neyman A. Singular Games have Asymptotic Values. Mathematics of Operations Research.  1981;6 :205-212.

Mertens JF, Neyman A. Stochastic Games. International Journal of Game Theory.  1981;10 :53-66.

Neyman A, Dubey P, Weber RJ. Value Theory without Efficiency. Mathematics of Operations Research.  1981;6 :122--128.

Neyman A. Asymptotic Values of Mixed Games. Game Theory and Related Topics.  1979 :71-81.

Neyman A, Tauman Y. The Partition Value. Mathematics of Operations Research.  1979;2 :236-267.

Neyman A. Continuous Values are Diagonal. Mathematics of Operations Research.  1977;2 :338-342.

Neyman A. The Limiting Behavior of the Shapley Value in a Class of Games with Many Players, in   Cahiers du Centre d'Etudes de Recherche Operationelle. Vol 18. ; 1976 :161.

Neyman A, Tauman Y. The Existence of Non-Diagonal Axiomatic Values. Mathematics of Operations Research.  1976;1 :246--250.