Hansen KA, Ibsen-Jensen R, Neyman A. The Big Match with a clock and a bit of memory. Mathematics of Operations Research .  In Press.

Neyman A. Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that obey the time value of money principle: Characterization and robust optimization.  Submitted.

Hansen KA, Ibsen-Jensen R, Neyman A. Absorbing games with a clock and two bits of memory. Games and Economic Behavior.  Forthcoming.

Kohlberg E, Neyman A. Cooperative Strategic Games. Theoretical Economics .  2021;16 :825--851.

ZELENY MIROSLAV, Levinsky R, Neyman A. Should I Remember more than you?? ? on the best response to factored based strategies. International Journal of Game Theory [Internet].  2020;49 (6) :1105--1124.

Kohlberg E, Neyman A. Games of Threats. Games and Economic Behavior [Internet].  2018;108 :139--145.

Neyman A, Kohlberg E. Cooperative Strategic Games. The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University.  2017;DP 706.

Neyman A. Continuous-Time Stochastic Games. Games and Economic Behavior [Internet].  2017;104 :92-130.

Neyman A, Bavly G. Online Concealed Correlation and Bounded Rationality. Games and Economic Behavior.  2014 : 71 - 89.

Neyman A. Stochastic Games with Short-Stage Duration. Dyn Games Appl.  2013;3 :236-278.

Neyman A. The Maximal Variation of Martingales of Probabilities and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information. Journal of Theoretical Probability.  2013 :557-567.

Neyman A. The Value of Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Uncertain Duration. International Journal of Game Theory.  2012;41 :195-207.

Neyman A. Singular Games in bv'NA. Journal of Mathematical Economics.  2010 :384 - 387.

Neyman A, Spencer J. Complexity and Effective Prediction. Games and Economic Behavior.  2010 :165-168.

Neyman A, Sorin S. Repeated Games with Public Uncertain Duration Process. International Journal of Game Theory.  2010 :29-52.

Neyman A, Mertens JF, Rosenberg D. Absorbing Games with Compact Action Spaces. Mathematics of Operations Research.  2009;34 :257-262.

Neyman A, Okada D. Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall. Games and Economic Behavior.  2009 :404-425.

Neyman A. Existence of Optimal Strategies in Markov Games with Incomplete Information. International Journal of Game Theory.  2008 :581 - 596.

Neyman A. Aumann Awarded Nobel Prize. Notices of the AMS.  2006;53 :44 - 46.

Neyman A, Gossner O, Hernandez P. Optimal Use of Communication Resources. Econometrica.  2006 :1603 - 1636.

Neyman A, Smordinsky R. Asymptotic Values of Vector Measure Games. Mathematics of Operations Research.  2004 :739 - 775.

Neyman A, Olivier G, Hernandez P. Dynamiques de Communication. Dynamiques de Communication.  2004;55 :509 - 516.

Neyman A, Mertens JF. A value on `AN. International Journal of Game Theory.  2003 : 109-120.

Neyman A. Values of Non-Atomic Vector Measure Games. Israel Journal of Mathematics.  2001;124 :1-27.

Neyman A, Okada D. Repeated games with bounded entropy. Games and Economic Behavior.  2000;30 :228--247.

Neyman A, Okada D. Two-person repeated games with finite automata. International Journal of Game Theory.  2000;29 :309--325.

Kohlberg E, Neyman A. A strong law of large numbers for nonexpansive vector-valued stochastic processes. Israel Journal of Mathematics.  1999;111 :93-108.

Neyman A. Cooperation in Repeated Games when the Number of Stages is not Commonly Known. Econometrica.  1999;67 :45--64.

Neyman A, Okada D. Strategic entropy and complexity in repeated games. Games and Economic Behavior.  1999;29 :191--223.

Neyman A, Sorin S. Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: The General Symmetric Case. International Journal of Game Theory.  1998;27 : 201--210.

Neyman A. Finitely Repeated Games with Finite Automata. Mathematics of Operations Research.  1998;23 :513--552.

Neyman A. Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games. International Journal of Game Theory.  1997;26 : 223--227.

Neyman A, Sorin S. Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: The Deterministic Symmetric Case. Kluwer Academic Publishers .  1997 :129--131.

 Value of Games with a Continuum of Players. Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis.  1994;77 :67--79.

Neyman A, Dubey P. An Equivalence Principle for Perfectly Competitive Economies. Journal of Economic Theory.  1994;75 :314-344.

Neyman A. The Positive Value of Information. Games and Economic Behavior.  1991;3 :350-355.

Neyman A, Ezra.Einy. On Non-Atomic Weighted Majority Games. Journal of Mathematical Economics.  1990;19 :391-403.

E.Einy, Neyman A. Large Symmetric Games are Characterized by Completeness of the Desirability Relation. Journal of Economic Theory.  1989;148 :369-385.

Neyman A. Uniqueness of the Shapley Value. Games and Economic Behavior.  1989;1 :116-118.

Neyman A, sergiu hart. Values of Vector Measure Games: Are They Linear Combinations of the Measures?. Journal of Mathematical Economics.  1988;17 :31-40.

Neyman A. Weighted Majority Games have an Asymptotic Value. Mathematics of Operations Research.  1988;13 :556-580.

Neyman A, Dubey P. Payoffs in Non-Atomic Games: An Axiomatic Approach. The Shapley Value, A. Roth (ed.), Cambridge Univ. Press.  1988 :207-216.

Neyman A, Monderer D. Values of Smooth Non-Atomic Games: The Method of Multilinear Approximation. The Shapley Value, A. Roth (ed.), Cambridge Univ. Press.  1988 :217-234.

Aumann RJ, Kurtz M, Neyman A. Power and Public Goods. Journal of Economic Theory.  1987;42 :108-127.

Forges F, Mertens JF, Neyman A. A Counter-Example to the Folk Theorem with Discounting. Economic Letters.  1986;19 :227-229.

Neyman A. Bounded Complexity Justifies Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Economic Letters.  1985;19 :227-229.

Mirman LJ, Neyman A. Diagonality of Cost Allocation Prices. Mathematics of Operations Research.  1984;9 :66-74.

Dubey P, Neyman A. Payoffs of Non-Atomic Markets: An Axiomatic Approach. Econometrica.  1984;52 :1129-1150.

Neyman A. Representation of Lp-Norms and Isometric Embedding in Lp-Spaces. Israel Journal of Mathematics.  1984;48 :129-138.

Neyman A. Semi-Values of Political Economic Games. Mathematics of Operations Research.  1984;10 :390-402.

Kohlberg E, Neyman A. Convergence in Hilbert's Metric and Convergence in Directions. Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications.  1983;93 :104-108.

Mirman LJ, Neyman A. Prices for Homogeneous Cost Functions. Journal of Mathematical Economics.  1983;12 :257-273.

Aumann RJ, Kurtz M, Neyman A. Voting for Public Goods. Review of Economic Studies.  1983;50 :677-693.

Gale D, Neyman A. Nim-Type Games. International Journal of Game Theory.  1982;11 :17-20.

Neyman A, Hildenbrand W. Integrals of Production Sets with Restricted Substitution. Journal of Mathematical Economics.  1982;9 :71-82.

Mertens JF, Neyman A. Stochastic Games have a Value. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.  1982;79 :2145-2146.

Neyman A. Renewal Theory for Sampling without Replacement. Annals of Probability [Internet].  1982;10 (2) :464--481.

Mertens J-F, Neyman A. Minimax Theorems for Undiscounted Stochastic Games. Game Theory and Mathematical Economics.  1981 :83-87.

Neyman A. Decomposition of Ranges of Vector Measures. Israel Journal of Mathematics.  1981;40 :54-64.

Kohlberg E, Neyman A. Asymptotic Behavior of Nonexpansive Mappings in Normed Linear Spaces. Israel Journal of Mathematics.  1981;38 :269-275.

Kohlberg E, Neyman A. Asymptotic Behavior of Nonexpansive Mappings in Uniformly Convex Banach Spaces. American Mathematical Monthly.  1981;88 :698-700.

Neyman A. Singular Games have Asymptotic Values. Mathematics of Operations Research.  1981;6 :205-212.

Mertens JF, Neyman A. Stochastic Games. International Journal of Game Theory.  1981;10 :53-66.

Neyman A, Dubey P, Weber RJ. Value Theory without Efficiency. Mathematics of Operations Research.  1981;6 :122--128.

Neyman A, Tauman Y. The Partition Value. Mathematics of Operations Research.  1979;2 :236-267.

Neyman A. Continuous Values are Diagonal. Mathematics of Operations Research.  1977;2 :338-342.

Neyman A, Tauman Y. The Existence of Non-Diagonal Axiomatic Values. Mathematics of Operations Research.  1976;1 :246--250.