Publications by Type: Journal Article

1999
Kohlberg E, Neyman A. A strong law of large numbers for nonexpansive vector-valued stochastic processes. Israel Journal of Mathematics. 1999;111 :93-108. Paper
Neyman A. Cooperation in Repeated Games when the Number of Stages is not Commonly Known. Econometrica. 1999;67 :45--64.Abstract

It is shown that an exponentially small departure from the common knowledge assumption on the number T of repetitions of the prisoners’ dilemma already enables cooperation. More generally, with such a departure, any feasible individually rational outcome of any one-shot game can be ap

Paper
Neyman A, Okada D. Strategic entropy and complexity in repeated games. Games and Economic Behavior. 1999;29 :191--223.Abstract

We introduce the entropy-based measure of uncertainty for mixed strategies of repeated games-strategic entropy. We investigate the asymptotic behavior of the maxmin values of repeated two-person zero-sum games with a bound on the strategic entropy of player 1's strategies while player 2 is unrestricted, as the bound grows to infinity. We apply the results thus obtained to study the asymptotic behavior of the value of the repeated games with finite automata and bounded recall.

Paper
1998
Neyman A, Sorin S. Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: The General Symmetric Case. International Journal of Game Theory. 1998;27 : 201--210.Abstract

Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.

Paper
Neyman A. Finitely Repeated Games with Finite Automata. Mathematics of Operations Research. 1998;23 :513--552.Abstract

Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.

Paper
1997
Neyman A. Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games. International Journal of Game Theory. 1997;26 : 223--227.Abstract

Any correlated equilibrium of a strategic game with bounded payoffs and convex strategy sets which has a smooth concave potential, is a mixture of pure strategy profiles which maximize the potential. If moreover, the strategy sets are compact and the potential is strictly concave, then the game has a unique correlated equilibrium.

Paper
Neyman A, Sorin S. Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: The Deterministic Symmetric Case. Kluwer Academic Publishers . 1997 :129--131.
1994
Value of Games with a Continuum of Players. Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis. 1994;77 :67--79.
Neyman A, Dubey P. An Equivalence Principle for Perfectly Competitive Economies. Journal of Economic Theory. 1994;75 :314-344.Abstract

Four axioms are placed on a correspondence from smooth, non-atomic economies to their allocations. We show that the axioms categorically determine the (coincident) competitive-core-value correspondence. Thus any solution is equivalent to the above three if, and only if, it satisfies the axioms. In this sense our result is tantamount to an "equivalence principle." At the same time, our result implies that the three solutions themselves are determined by the axioms and so serves as an axiomatic characterization of the well-known competitive (or core, or value) correspondence.

Paper
1991
Neyman A. The Positive Value of Information. Games and Economic Behavior. 1991;3 :350-355.Abstract

It has been remarked that in rational interactions more information to one player, while all others' information remains the same, may reduce his payoff in equilibrium. This classical observation relies on comparing equilibria of two different games. It is argued that this analysis is not tenably performed by comparing equilibria of two different games. Rather, one is compelled to perform the analysis in an interaction without complete information, and to compare equilibria of two interactions that are embedded in some compounded game. It is then shown that the player whose information is unilaterally refined cannot be worse off at equilibrium. 

Paper
1990
Neyman A, Ezra.Einy. On Non-Atomic Weighted Majority Games. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 1990;19 :391-403.
1989
E.Einy, Neyman A. Large Symmetric Games are Characterized by Completeness of the Desirability Relation. Journal of Economic Theory. 1989;148 :369-385. large.pdf
Neyman A. Uniqueness of the Shapley Value. Games and Economic Behavior. 1989;1 :116-118.Abstract

It is shown that the Shapley value of any given game v is characterized by applying the value axioms -- efficiency, symmetry, the null player axiom, and either additivity or strong positivity -- to the additive group generated by the subgames of v.

Paper
1988
Neyman A, sergiu hart. Values of Vector Measure Games: Are They Linear Combinations of the Measures?. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 1988;17 :31-40. Paper
Neyman A. Weighted Majority Games have an Asymptotic Value. Mathematics of Operations Research. 1988;13 :556-580. weighted.pdf
Neyman A, Dubey P. Payoffs in Non-Atomic Games: An Axiomatic Approach. The Shapley Value, A. Roth (ed.), Cambridge Univ. Press. 1988 :207-216. Paper
Neyman A, Monderer D. Values of Smooth Non-Atomic Games: The Method of Multilinear Approximation. The Shapley Value, A. Roth (ed.), Cambridge Univ. Press. 1988 :217-234. Paper
1987
Aumann RJ, Kurtz M, Neyman A. Power and Public Goods. Journal of Economic Theory. 1987;42 :108-127. power.pdf
1986
Forges F, Mertens JF, Neyman A. A Counter-Example to the Folk Theorem with Discounting. Economic Letters. 1986;19 :227-229. folk_theorem.pdf

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