@proceedings {4864,
	title = {Assigning more students to their top choices: a tiebreaking rule comparison},
	journal = {EC{\textquoteright}15},
	year = {2015},
	abstract = {School choice districts that implement stable matchings face various design issues that impact students{\textquoteright} assignments to schools. We study properties of the rank distribution of students with random preferences, when schools use different tiebreaking rules to rank equivalent students. We find that under a multiple tiebreaking rule a vanishing fraction of students match to one of their top choices, in contrast to a single tiebreaking rule under which a constant fraction of students are assigned to one of their top choices. We find that when students can submit only a relatively short preference list, the multiple tiebreaking rule allows a constant fraction of students to match to one of their top choices, with only a {\textquotedblleft}small{\textquotedblright} fraction of students remaining unmatched.},
	author = {Ashlagi, Itai and Nikzad, Afshin and Romm, Assaf}
}
