@workingpaper {27242,
	title = {Long Term Effects of Political Violence on Attitudes: Evidence from the Second Intifada},
	year = {Working Paper},
	abstract = {This paper studies the long-term effects of politically motivated violence on individuals{\textquoteright} political attitudes focusing on the Second Intifada (2000 {\textendash} 2005). We conduct a large-scale survey that measures Israelis{\textquoteright} attitudes today and elicits their places of residence since 1985. The survey allows us to measure individuals{\textquoteright} direct exposure to terrorism and to account for potential selective migration. This, in combination with the fact that individuals{\textquoteright} characteristics are balanced with respect to their exposure to terrorism, enables us to overcome identification concerns and provide credible estimates of the causal effects of the Intifada on attitudes. The results indicate that exposure to terrorism during the Second Intifada caused a persistent and substantial shift toward right-wing attitudes that is still observable two decades later. Thus, our analysis provides systematic empirical evidence supporting the view that the Second Intifada soured a generation of Israelis on the idea of peace.},
	author = {Esteban F. Klor, Asaf Zussman}
}
@workingpaper {21327,
	title = {Mostly Deterred: An Episodic Analysis of The Israel-Gaza Conflict},
	year = {Working Paper},
	abstract = {This paper assesses the validity of narrow deterrence theory between a State and a Non-State actor in the context of the Israel and Gaza conflict. \&nbsp;We build the most comprehensive data set on this conflict between 2007 and 2014 using original security reports from the United Nations, which capture over 16,000 Palestinian projectile launches and over 8,800 Israeli airstrikes, recorded with precise timing. We show that this conflict is characterized by short-lived episodes of violence separated by quiet interludes. Episodes tend to last less than one day and are followed by 3.5 days of calm, on average. Most episodes have no retaliation and consist only of provocations that go unanswered. Moreover, counter-retaliation does not induce subsequent episodes. We find that Israeli retaliation strongly correlates with Gazans{\textquoteright} initial number of attacks and type of rockets fired. Yet, rather than provoking an immediate increase in violence or de-escalation, retaliation seems to have no short-term effect. These findings support the concept of narrow deterrence and weigh heavily against the argument that retaliation perpetuates this conflict.},
	author = {Alexei Abrahams and Eli Berman and Prabin Khadka and Esteban F. Klor and John Powell}
}
@article {26108,
	title = {When Deterrence Backfires: House Demolitions, Palestinian Radicalization, and Israeli Fatalities},
	journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
	volume = {67},
	number = {7},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Select Media Coverage:\&nbsp;The Washington Post\&nbsp;},
	pages = {1592-1617},
	abstract = {Conflict points around the world involve government forces fighting terrorist groups. In this type of warfare, there is a danger that counterterrorist efforts may backfire, providing ammunition for additional cycles of violence. We study this issue focusing on selective and indiscriminate house demolitions employed by Israel during the Second Intifada. We exploit the temporal and spatial variation of this policy to assess its impact on Palestinians{\textquoteright} political views. We find that the civilian population does not react to punitive house demolitions, a selective form of counterterrorism. On the contrary, Palestinians are more likely to adopt more radical political opinions in response to precautionary house demolitions, an indiscriminate form of counterterrorism. We also show that political radicalization induced by indiscriminate counterterrorism leads to an increase in future terror attacks. Overall, our analysis provides explicit empirical support to the mechanism behind the positive correlation between indiscriminate counterterrorism and future levels of violence.},
	author = {Freedman, Michael and Esteban F. Klor}
}
@article {10394,
	title = {Cronyism in State Violence: Evidence from Labor Repression During Argentina\&$\#$39;s Last Dictatorship},
	journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
	volume = {19},
	number = {3},
	year = {2021},
	month = {2021},
	pages = {1439-1487},
	abstract = {This paper studies whether crony governance affects the logic behind governments{\textquoteright} targeting of violence, and how the deployment of violence allows politically connected firms to benefit from crony governance.\&nbsp; We address these issues in the context of the Argentine military junta that took power on March 24, 1976.\&nbsp; Specifically, we examine the logic driving the choice of firm level union representatives who were subjected to violence following the coup. \&nbsp;Using an original dataset assembled and digitized by us, we find that political, business and social connections to the regime are associated with an increase of 2 to 3 times in the number of firm level union representatives arrested and/or disappeared. \&nbsp;This is the case even after controlling for a battery of firms{\textquoteright} characteristics that capture alternative explanations for the targeting of violence. \&nbsp;The effect is particularly pronounced in privately owned (as opposed to state-owned) firms, suggesting that the correlation is driven by cronyism for financial gain rather than ideology or information transmission.\&nbsp; We also show that connected firms benefited from violence against union representatives by subsequently having less strikes and a higher market valuation. \&nbsp;Our findings highlight the pervasiveness of ties to the government, even in cases where one of the main stated goals of the regime is to curb cronyism.},
	author = {Esteban F. Klor and Sebastian Saiegh and Shanker Satyanath}
}
@inbook {24230,
	title = {Defense and the Economy in Israel, 1990-2016},
	booktitle = {The Israeli Economy in the Last Twenty Years: Lights and Shadows in a Market Economy},
	year = {2021},
	pages = {168-202},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	organization = {Cambridge University Press},
	address = {New York},
	author = {Esteban F. Klor, Asaf Zussman}
}
@article {7345,
	title = {What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS?},
	journal = {Terrorism and Political Violence},
	volume = {32},
	number = {7},
	year = {2020},
	note = {Select Media Coverage:\&nbsp;Bloomberg, The Atlantic\&nbsp;},
	pages = {1458-1481},
	abstract = {This paper provides the first systematic analysis of the link between economic, political, and\&nbsp;social conditions and the global phenomenon of ISIS foreign fighters. We find that poor\&nbsp;economic conditions do not drive participation in ISIS. In contrast, the number of ISIS foreign\&nbsp;fighters is positively correlated with a country{\textquoteright}s GDP per capita and Human Development Index\&nbsp;(HDI). In fact, many foreign fighters originate from countries with high levels of economic\&nbsp;development, low income inequality, and highly developed political institutions. Other factors\&nbsp;that explain the number of ISIS foreign fighters are the size of a country{\textquoteright}s Muslim population and\&nbsp;its ethnic homogeneity. Although we cannot directly determine why people join ISIS, our results\&nbsp;suggest that the flow of foreign fighters to ISIS is driven not by economic or political conditions\&nbsp;but rather by ideology and the difficulty of assimilation into homogeneous Western countries. These conclusions are consistent with those of the related qualitative literature that relies on the personal profiles of a small and selected sample of ISIS foreign fighters.},
	author = {Efraim Benmelech and Esteban F. Klor}
}
@article {4806,
	title = {Party Hacks and True Believers: The Effect of Party Affiliation on Political Preferences},
	journal = {Journal of Comparative Economics},
	volume = { 47},
	number = { 3},
	year = {2019},
	month = {2019},
	pages = { 504-524},
	abstract = {This paper examines the effect of party affiliation on an individual{\textquoteright}s political views.\&nbsp; To do this, we exploit the party realignment that occurred in the U.S. due to abortion becoming a more prominent and highly partisan issue over time. \&nbsp;We show that abortion was not a highly partisan issue in 1982, but a person{\textquoteright}s abortion views in 1982 led many to switch parties over time as the two main parties diverged in their stances on this issue. \&nbsp;We find that voting for a given political party in 1996, due to the individual{\textquoteright}s initial views on abortion in 1982, has a substantial effect on a person{\textquoteright}s political, social, and economic attitudes in 1997. \&nbsp;These findings are stronger for highly partisan political issues, and are robust to controlling for a host of personal views and characteristics in 1982 and 1997.\&nbsp; As individuals realigned their party affiliation in accordance with their initial abortion views, their other political views followed suit.},
	author = {Eric D. Gould and Esteban F. Klor}
}
@article {5227,
	title = {On Public Opinion Polls and Voters\&$\#$39; Turnout},
	journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
	volume = {20},
	number = {2},
	year = {2018},
	note = {Select Media Coverage:\&nbsp;Science News\&nbsp;},
	pages = {239-256},
	abstract = {This paper studies the effects that the revelation of information on the electorate{\textquoteright}s preferences has on voters{\textquoteright} turnout. The experimental data show that closeness in the division of preferences induces a significant increase in turnout. Moreover, for closely divided electorates (and only for these electorates) the provision of information significantly raises the participation of subjects supporting the slightly larger team relative to the smaller team. We show that the heterogeneous effect of information on the participation of subjects in different teams is driven by the subjects{\textquoteright} (incorrect) beliefs of casting a pivotal vote. Simply put, subjects overestimate the probability of casting a pivotal vote when they belong to the team with a slight majority, and choose the strategy that maximizes their utility based on their inflated probability assessment. Empirical evidence on gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1990 and 2005 is consistent with our main experimental result. Namely, we observe that the difference in the actual vote tally between the party leading according to the polls and the other party is larger than the one predicted by the polls only in closely divided electorates. We provide a behavioral model that explains the main findings of our experimental and empirical analyses.},
	author = {Esteban F. Klor and Eyal Winter}
}
@article {4807,
	title = {Is Centralization a Solution to the Soft Budget Constraint Problem?},
	journal = {European Journal of Political Economy},
	volume = {45},
	number = {1},
	year = {2016},
	pages = {57-75},
	abstract = {This paper focuses on the centralization program implemented in Israel in 2004 to analyze whether the administrative subordination of municipalities is an effective policy to deal with problems related to soft-budget constraint of lower level governments.\&nbsp; The results consistently show, for different specifications and samples of municipalities, that this program brought a substantial decrease of municipalities{\textquoteright} expenditures (mostly because of decreases on salary payments), and an increase of local property tax collection.\&nbsp; Our analysis shows that all of the fiscal impact of the program is due to the appointment of an accountant that reports directly to the central government, a relatively mild form of administrative subordination.\&nbsp; In contrast, more intrusive forms of subordination, like the central imposition of a recovery program, do not result in any substantial improvement of municipalities{\textquoteright} fiscal situation. \&nbsp;This leads us to conclude that a mild form of administrative subordination is an effective tool to cope with problems related to soft-budget constraints, whereas political subordination is not an effective tool to reach that goal.},
	author = {Avi Ben-Bassat and Momi Dahan and Esteban F. Klor}
}
@article {4800,
	title = {The Long-Run Effect of 9/11: Terrorism, Backlash, and the Assimilation of Muslim Immigrants in the West},
	journal = {Economic Journal},
	volume = {126},
	number = {597},
	year = {2016},
	note = {Select Media Coverage:\&nbsp;The Wall Street Journal,\&nbsp;NPR,\&nbsp;Pacific Standard,\&nbsp;VOX.},
	month = {2015},
	pages = {2064-2114},
	abstract = {This paper investigates whether the 9/11 attacks affected the assimilation rate of Muslims in the United States.\&nbsp; Terror attacks by Islamic groups are likely to induce a backlash against Muslims, thereby raising their costs of assimilation. We find that Muslim immigrants living in states with the sharpest increase in hate crimes also exhibit: (i) greater chances of marrying within their own ethnic group; (ii) higher fertility; (iii) lower female labour force participation; and (iv) lower English proficiency. These findings shed light on the increasing use of terror and concurrent rise in social tensions surrounding Muslim immigrants in the West.},
	author = {Eric D. Gould and Esteban F. Klor}
}
@article {4755,
	title = {Can Militants use Violence to Win Public Support? Evidence from the Second Intifada},
	journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution,},
	volume = {59},
	number = {3},
	year = {2015},
	pages = {528-549},
	abstract = {This paper investigates whether attacks against Israeli targets help Palestinian factions gain public support.\&nbsp; We link individual level survey data to the full list of Israeli and Palestinian fatalities during the period of the Second Intifada (2000-2005), and estimate a flexible discrete choice model for faction supported.\&nbsp; We find some support for the {\textquotedblleft}outbidding{\textquotedblright} hypothesis, the notion that Palestinian factions use violence to gain prestige and influence public opinion within the community.\&nbsp; In particular, the two leading Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, gain in popularity following successful attacks against Israeli targets.\&nbsp; Our results suggest, however, that most movement occurs within either the secular groups or within the Islamist groups, but not between them.\&nbsp; That is, Fatah{\textquoteright}s gains come at the expense of smaller secular factions while Hamas{\textquoteright} gains come at the expense of smaller Islamic factions and the disaffected.\&nbsp; In contrast, attacks by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad lower support for that faction.},
	author = {David Jaeger and Esteban F. Klor and Sami Miaari and M. Daniele Paserman}
}
@article {4756,
	title = {Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evidence from House Demolitions},
	journal = {Journal of Politics},
	volume = {77},
	number = {1},
	year = {2015},
	note = {Select Media Coverage:\&nbsp;The New Republic,\&nbsp;The Forward, The Supreme Court of Israel,\&nbsp;The Washington Post\&nbsp;Link to replication materials},
	pages = {27-43},
	abstract = {This paper examines whether house demolitions are an effective counterterrorism tactic against suicide terrorism. We link original longitudinal micro-level data on houses demolished by the Israeli Defense Forces with data on the universe of suicide attacks against Israeli targets. By exploiting spatial and time variation in house demolitions and suicide attacks during the second Palestinian uprising, we show that punitive house demolitions (those targeting Palestinian suicide terrorists and terror operatives) cause an immediate, significant decrease in the number of suicide attacks. In contrast, Palestinian fatalities do not have a consistent effect on suicide terror attacks, while curfews and precautionary house demolitions (demolitions justified by the location of the house but unrelated to the identity of the house{\textquoteright}s owner) cause a significant increase in the number of suicide attacks. The results support the view that selective violence is an effective tool to combat terrorist groups and that indiscriminate violence backfires.},
	author = {Efraim Benmelech and Claude Berrebi and Esteban F. Klor}
}
@article {4754,
	title = {Does Campaign Spending Affect Electoral Outcomes?},
	journal = {Electoral Studies},
	volume = {40},
	number = {1},
	year = {2015},
	pages = {102-114},
	abstract = {This study investigates the effect of candidates{\textquoteright} expenditure on elections{\textquoteright} results focusing on run-off elections{\textquoteright} data. Our analysis, based on all run-off municipal elections in Israel between 1993 and 2008, shows that candidates{\textquoteright} share of the vote is not substantially affected by their campaign spending. This outcome contradicts recent results showing that, in a developing country where voting is compulsory, campaign expenditures have a significant effect on vote shares. Yet, it is in line with the evidence of earlier studies based on developed countries showing that the effect of campaign spending is limited. This leads us to suggest that campaign spending may be effective in developing countries with consolidating democracies because compulsory voting forces the relative poor population to turn out and vote, and this population is relatively more impressionable by campaign spending on media advertisements.\&nbsp;},
	author = {Avi Ben-Bassat and Momi Dahan and Esteban F. Klor}
}
@article {4799,
	title = {Can Higher Bonuses Lead to Less Effort? Incentive Reversal in Teams},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour \& Organization},
	volume = {97},
	number = {1},
	year = {2014},
	pages = {72-83},
	abstract = {Conventional wisdom suggests that a global increase in monetary rewards should induce agents to exert higher effort. In this paper we demonstrate that this may not hold in team settings. In the context of sequential team production with positive externalities between agents, incentive reversal might occur, i.e., an increase in monetary rewards (either because bonuses increase or effort costs decrease) may induce agents that are fully rational, self-centered money maximizers to exert lower effort in the completion of a joint task. Incentive reversal happens when increasing one agent{\textquoteright}s individual rewards alters her best-response function and, as a result, removes other agents{\textquoteright} incentives to exert effort as their contributions are no longer required to incentivize the first agent. Herein we discuss this seemingly paradoxical phenomenon and report on two experiments that provide supportive evidence.},
	author = {Esteban F. Klor and Sebastian Kube and Eyal Winter and Ro{\textquoteright}i Sultan}
}
@book {4798,
	title = {Representativeness and Efficiency in Local Government},
	year = {2013},
	note = {(in Hebrew)},
	publisher = {The Israel Democracy Institute},
	organization = {The Israel Democracy Institute},
	address = {Jerusalem},
	author = {Avi Ben-Bassat and Momi Dahan and Esteban F. Klor}
}
@article {4795,
	title = {Economic Conditions and the Quality of Suicide Terrorism},
	journal = {Journal of Politics},
	volume = {74},
	number = {1},
	year = {2012},
	note = {Select Media Coverage:\&nbsp;LA Times,\&nbsp;The Economist
Link to replication materials},
	pages = {113-128},
	abstract = {This article analyzes the link between economic conditions and the quality of suicide terrorism.\&nbsp; While the existing empirical literature shows that poverty and economic conditions are not correlated with the quantity of terror, theory predicts that poverty and poor economic conditions may affect the quality of terror.\&nbsp; Poor economic conditions may lead more able and better-educated individuals to participate in terror attacks, allowing terror organizations to send better-qualified terrorists to more complex, higher-impact terror missions.\&nbsp; Using the universe of Palestinian suicide terrorists who acted against Israeli targets in 2000{\textendash}2006, we provide evidence of the correlation between economic conditions, the characteristics of suicide terrorists, and the targets they attack.\&nbsp; High levels of unemployment enable terror organizations to recruit better educated, more mature, and more experienced suicide terrorists, who in turn attack more important Israeli targets.\&nbsp;},
	author = {Efraim Benmelech and Claude Berrebi and Esteban F. Klor}
}
@article {4797,
	title = {The Impact of the Economic Costs of Conflict on Individuals{\textquoteright} Political Attitudes},
	journal = {Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy},
	volume = {18},
	number = {2},
	year = {2012},
	note = {Special issue on "Political Economy Studies of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."},
	pages = {Article 4},
	abstract = {A large number of studies show that war and terrorism have a significant effect on individuals{\textquoteright} political attitudes.\&nbsp; Yet, this extensive literature does not inspect the mechanisms behind this effect.\&nbsp; This paper concentrates on one possible mechanism, by differentiating between the human toll of terror and war and the economic costs they cause. \&nbsp;For these purposes we focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and use variation in the level of violence across time and space together with localities{\textquoteright} different exposure to the tourism sector to estimate their respective effects on political attitudes.\&nbsp; Our results suggest that whereas fatalities from the conflict make Israelis more willing to grant territorial concessions to the Palestinians, the associated economic costs of conflict do not have a consistent significant effect on individuals{\textquoteright} political attitudes.\&nbsp;},
	author = {Avi Ben-Bassat and Momi Dahan and Esteban F. Klor}
}
@article {4796,
	title = {The Struggle for Palestinian Hearts and Minds: Violence and Public Opinion in the Second Intifada},
	journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
	volume = {96},
	number = {3-4},
	year = {2012},
	note = {Select Media Coverage:\&nbsp;The Washington Post},
	pages = {354-368},
	abstract = {This paper examines how violence influences the political preferences of an aggrieved constituency that is purportedly represented by militant factions. Using longitudinal public opinion poll micro data of the Palestinian population linked to data on fatalities from the Second Intifada, we find that although local Israeli violence discourages Palestinians from supporting moderate political positions, this {\textquotedblleft}radicalization{\textquotedblright} is fleeting, and vanishes completely within 90 days. We do, however, find evidence suggesting that collateral violence affecting Palestinian civilians has a stronger effect on the populations{\textquoteright} political preferences relative to individuals directly targeted by the Israeli military.\&nbsp; In addition, we observe that major political events in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict have had a longer-term impact on political preferences. Individuals who were teenagers during the period of the Oslo negotiations tend to have relatively moderate preferences, while those who were teenagers during the First Intifada tend to be relatively radical.},
	author = {David Jaeger and Esteban F. Klor and Sami Miaari and M. Daniele Paserman}
}
@article {4778,
	title = {The Economic Cost of Harboring Terrorism},
	journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
	volume = {54},
	number = {2},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {331-353},
	abstract = {The literature on conflict and terrorism has paid little attention to the economic costs of terrorism for the perpetrators. This paper aims to fill that gap by examining the economic costs of harboring suicide terror attacks. Using data covering the universe of Palestinian suicide terrorists during the second Palestinian uprising, combined with data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, we identify and quantify the impact of a successful attack on unemployment and wages. We find robust evidence that terror attacks have important economic costs. The results suggest that a successful attack causes an increase of 5.3 percent in unemployment, increases the likelihood that the district{\textquoteright}s average wages fall in the quarter following an attack by more than 20 percent, and reduces the number of Palestinians working in Israel by 6.7 percent relative to its mean. Importantly, these effects are persistent and last for at least six months after the attack.},
	author = {Efraim Benmelech and Claude Berrebi and Esteban F. Klor}
}
@article {4779,
	title = {The Impact of Terrorism on the Defense Industry},
	journal = {Economica},
	volume = {77},
	number = {307},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {518-543},
	abstract = {This paper analyzes the impact of terrorism on Israeli companies related to\&nbsp;the defense, security or anti-terrorism industries, relative to its impact\&nbsp;on the rest of the companies. We match every Israeli company to the American\&nbsp;company with the closest expected return among all the companies that belong\&nbsp;to the same industry and trade in the same market in order to isolate the\&nbsp;effect of terrorism from other common industry shocks. The findings show\&nbsp;that whereas terrorism had a significant negative impact of 5\% on non\&nbsp;defense-related companies, it had a significantly positive overall effect of\&nbsp;7\% on defense-related companies.},
	author = {Claude Berrebi and Esteban F. Klor}
}
@article {4777,
	title = {Social Identity and Preferences over Redistribution},
	journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
	volume = {94},
	number = {3-4},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {269-278},
	abstract = {We design an experiment to study the effects of social identity on\&nbsp;preferences over redistribution. The experiment highlights the trade-off\&nbsp;between social identity concerns and maximization of monetary payoffs.\&nbsp;Subjects belonging to two distinct natural groups are randomly assigned\&nbsp;gross incomes and vote over alternative redistributive tax regimes, where\&nbsp;the regime is chosen by majority rule. We find that a significant subset of\&nbsp;the subjects systematically deviate from monetary payoff maximisation\&nbsp;towards the tax rate that benefits their group when the monetary cost of\&nbsp;doing so is not too high. These deviations cannot be explained by efficiency\&nbsp;concerns, inequality aversion, reciprocity, social learning or conformity.\&nbsp;Finally, we show that behavior in the lab helps explain the relationship\&nbsp;between reported income and stated preferences over redistribution observed\&nbsp;in survey data.},
	author = {Esteban F. Klor and Moses Shayo}
}
@article {4753,
	title = {Does Terrorism Work?},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	volume = {125},
	number = {4},
	year = {2010},
	note = {Select Media Coverage:\&nbsp;Vox,\&nbsp;The New Republic},
	pages = {1459-1510},
	abstract = {This paper examines whether terrorism is an effective tool to achieve political goals.\&nbsp; By exploiting geographic variation in terror attacks in Israel from 1988 to 2006, we show that local terror attacks cause Israelis to be more willing to grant territorial concessions to the Palestinians.\&nbsp; These effects are stronger for demographic groups that are traditionally right-wing in their political views.\&nbsp; However, terror attacks beyond a certain threshold cause Israelis to adopt a less-accommodating position. In addition, terror induces Israelis to vote increasingly for right-wing parties, as the right-wing parties move to the left in response to terror. Hence, terrorism appears to be an effective strategy in terms of shifting the entire political landscape to the left.\&nbsp;},
	author = {Eric D. Gould and Esteban F. Klor}
}
@article {4772,
	title = {Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate},
	journal = {American Political Science Review},
	volume = {102},
	number = {3},
	year = {2008},
	note = {\&nbsp;Select Media Coverage: The New York Times},
	pages = {279-301},
	abstract = {This paper relies on the variation of terror attacks across time and space as an instrument to identify the causal effects of terrorism on the preferences of the Israeli electorate. We find that the occurrence of a terror attack in a given locality within three months of the elections causes an increase of 1.35 percentage points on that locality{\textquoteright}s support for the right bloc of political parties out of the two blocs vote. This effect is of a significant political magnitude because of the high level of terrorism in Israel and the fact that its electorate is closely split between the right and left blocs. Moreover, a terror fatality has important electoral effects beyond the locality where the attack is perpetrated, and its electoral impact is stronger the closer to the elections it occurs. Interestingly, in left-leaning localities, local terror fatalities cause an increase in the support for the right bloc whereas terror fatalities outside the locality increase the support for the left bloc of parties. Given that a relatively small number of localities suffer terror attacks we demonstrate that terrorism does cause the ideological polarization of the electorate. Overall, our analysis provides strong empirical support for the hypothesis that the electorate shows a highly sensitive reaction to terrorism.},
	author = {Claude Berrebi and Esteban F. Klor}
}
@article {4771,
	title = {The Welfare Effects of Public Opinion Polls},
	journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
	volume = {35},
	number = {3},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {379-394},
	abstract = {This paper presents an experimental study of the effects of polls on\&nbsp;voters{\textquoteright} welfare. The analysis shows that polls have a different effect on closely\&nbsp;divided and lopsided divided electorates. The data show that in closely divided\&nbsp;electorates (and only for these electorates) the provision of information on the\&nbsp;voters{\textquoteright} distribution of preferences significantly raises the participation of subjects\&nbsp;supporting the slightly larger team relative to the smaller team. This causes\&nbsp;a substantial increase on the frequency of electoral victories of the larger team.\&nbsp;As a consequence, we observe a steep decrease in the welfare of the members of\&nbsp;the smaller team because they vote more often and yet they loose the elections\&nbsp;more frequently. Polls are detrimental to aggregate welfare in closely divided\&nbsp;electorates because the decrease in the payoffs of the minority is stronger than\&nbsp;the increase in the payoffs of the majority. In lopsided divided electorates polls\&nbsp;don{\textquoteright}t have a significant different effect on the voters{\textquoteright} turnout conditional on\&nbsp;their team size. We do observe an increase on the frequency of electoral victories\&nbsp;of the larger team after the provision of information, but this is in part due\&nbsp;to smaller teams{\textquoteright} members voting less frequently and saving the participation\&nbsp;costs. As a consequence, while polls have a negative effect on the relative payoffs\&nbsp;of the minority for these electorates as well, they have a positive effect on\&nbsp;total welfare.},
	author = {Esteban F. Klor and Eyal Winter}
}
@article {4769,
	title = {A Positive Model of Overlapping Income Taxation in a Federation of States},
	journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
	volume = {90},
	number = {4-5},
	year = {2006},
	pages = {703-723},
	abstract = {This paper develops a positive theory of overlapping income taxation in a federation of states. The\&nbsp;analysis provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium federal and states tax rates as\&nbsp;functions of the level of total productivity dispersion between the states. The federal rate is increasing\&nbsp;in the level of total productivity dispersion between the states, even if the income of the decisive voter\&nbsp;at the federal level is above the mean income. Given that the individuals{\textquoteright} income is endogenously\&nbsp;determined there exists a negative trade-off between the implemented federal tax rate and the resulting\&nbsp;states{\textquoteright} tax rates, regardless of the pre-tax income of the decisive voter at the state level. Thus, high\&nbsp;levels of productivity dispersion between the states cause a higher than optimal federal tax rate\&nbsp;together with low states{\textquoteright} tax rates. It is also shown that a system of overlapping income taxation is not\&nbsp;efficient. The resulting inefficiency might be exacerbated by the implementation of a federal matching\&nbsp;grants program, contradicting previous results in the related normative literature.},
	author = {Esteban F. Klor}
}
@article {4770,
	title = {On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict},
	journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
	volume = {50},
	number = {6},
	year = {2006},
	pages = {899-925},
	abstract = {This article investigates the interaction between terror attacks and electoral outcomes in Israel. The\&nbsp;authors analyze a dynamic model of reputation that captures the salient characteristics of this conflict. The\&nbsp;equilibrium of the theoretical model generates two precise empirical predictions about the interaction between\&nbsp;terrorism and electoral outcomes. First, the relative support for the right-wing party is expected to increase\&nbsp;after periods with high levels of terrorism and to decrease after periods of relative calm. Second, the expected\&nbsp;level of terrorism is higher when the left-wing party is in office than it is during the term of the right-wing\&nbsp;party. The authors test these hypotheses by using a newly created data set on terrorist attacks in Israel between\&nbsp;1990 and 2003. The first hypothesis is strongly supported by data culled from public opinion polls about the\&nbsp;Israeli electorate{\textquoteright}s political preferences. The second theoretical hypothesis is strongly supported by the three\&nbsp;Israeli governments to which the theory can be applied that served during the studied time period.},
	author = {Claude Berrebi and Esteban F. Klor}
}
@article {4766,
	title = {On the Popular Support for Progressive Taxation},
	journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
	volume = {5},
	number = {4},
	year = {2003},
	pages = {593-604},
	abstract = {This paper develops a political economy model that is consistent with the fact that \&nbsp;democracies have a preference for increasing marginal tax rates on income. We present a\&nbsp;model in which there is an exogenous set of political parties with preferences over the set of\&nbsp;admissible tax schedules. This set contains virtually any increasing and piecewise linear\&nbsp;continuous function. Each party decides whether or not to present a candidate for election.\&nbsp;There is a fixed cost of running. The elected candidate implements one of her preferred tax\&nbsp;policies. Our main results provide conditions under which a Strong Nash Equilibrium exists,\&nbsp;and a tax schedule with increasing marginal tax rates is implemented in some Nash\&nbsp;Equilibria and in any Strong Nash Equilibrium.},
	author = {Esteban F. Klor}
}
@article {4767,
	title = {Representative Democracy and Marginal Rate Progressive Income Taxation},
	journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
	volume = {87},
	number = {87},
	year = {2003},
	pages = {5-6},
	abstract = {This paper develops a political economy model that is consistent with the fact that\&nbsp;democracies have a preference for increasing marginal tax rates on income. We present a\&nbsp;model in which there is an exogenous set of political parties with preferences over the set of\&nbsp;admissible tax schedules. This set contains virtually any increasing and piecewise linear\&nbsp;continuous function. Each party decides whether or not to present a candidate for election.\&nbsp;There is a fixed cost of running. The elected candidate implements one of her preferred tax\&nbsp;policies. Our main results provide conditions under which a Strong Nash Equilibrium exists,\&nbsp;and a tax schedule with increasing marginal tax rates is implemented in some Nash\&nbsp;Equilibria and in any Strong Nash Equilibrium.},
	author = {Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Esteban F. Klor}
}
@article {4765,
	title = {Family Size and Income Inequality in Israel},
	journal = {Economic Quarterly (in Hebrew)},
	volume = {46},
	number = {3},
	year = {1999},
	pages = {492-511},
	author = {Esteban F. Klor}
}
