@article {edsrep.v77y2010i308p775.78420100101,
	title = {Environmental Protection and the Private Provision of International Public Goods.},
	journal = {Economica},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {775},
	abstract = {International environmental protection like the combat of global warming exhibits properties of public goods. In the international arena, no coercive authority exists that can enforce measures to overcome free-rider incentives. Therefore decentralized negotiations between individual regions serve as an approach to pursue efficient international environmental protection. We propose a scheme which is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. The negotiating entities offer side-payments to counterparts in order to influence their taxation of polluting consumption. Side-payments, in turn, are self-financed by means of externality-correcting taxes. As we show, a Pareto-efficient outcome can be attained. Copyright (c) The London School of Economics and Political Science 2009.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.v77y2010i308p775.784\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Martin, Altemeyer-Bartscher and Dirk T. G., R?bbelke and Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
