@article {edsrep._205820070101,
	title = {Policies to Internalize Reciprocal International Spillovers.},
	journal = {CESifo Working Paper Series},
	year = {2007},
	abstract = {An effective policy scheme to overcome the suboptimal low provision levels of global public goods is developed in this paper. By suggesting a decentralized approach to raise environmental public good provision levels we take account of the lack of a coercive global authority that is able to enforce efficient international environmental regulations. In our model individual regions voluntarily commence international negotiations on public good provision, which are accompanied by side-payments. These side-payments are financed by means of regional externality-correcting taxes. Side-payments and national tax rates are designed in a mutually dependent way. The decentralized scheme we recommend for approaching Pareto efficient Nash equilibria is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. As it is implementable for a wide class of Nash solutions, it is applicable to various international externality problems.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep._2058\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Martin, Altemeyer-Bartscher and Dirk T. G., R{\"u}bbelke and Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
