@article {S004727270700052720070101,
	title = {Optimum commodity taxation in pooling equilibria.},
	journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
	volume = {91},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {1565 - 1573},
	abstract = {This paper extends the standard model of optimum commodity taxation (Ramsey, F., 1927. A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation. Economic Journal 37, 47{\textendash}61; Diamond, P., Mirrlees, J., 1971. Optimal Taxation and Public Production, II: "Tax Rules". American Economic Review 61, 261{\textendash}278) to a competitive economy in which markets are inefficient due to asymmetric information. Insurance markets are prime examples: consumers impose varying costs on suppliers but firms cannot associate costs with individual customers and consequently all are charged equal prices. In such a competitive pooling equilibrium, the price of each good is equal to the average of individual marginal costs weighted by equilibrium quantities. We derive modified Ramsey{\textendash}Boiteux Conditions for optimum taxes in such an economy and show that, in addition to the standard formula, they include first-order effects which reflect the deviations of prices from marginal costs and the response of equilibrium quantities to the taxes},
	issn = {0047-2727},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edselp\&AN=S0047272707000527\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
