@article {11536963320160512,
	title = {Anl{\"a}sslich der Verabschiedung von Hans-Werner Sinn.},
	journal = {ifo Schnelldienst},
	volume = {69},
	year = {2016},
	pages = {45},
	issn = {0018974X},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=bth\&AN=115369633\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {S109094431530023520160301,
	title = {A note on income taxation and occupational choice.},
	journal = {Research in Economics},
	volume = {70},
	year = {2016},
	pages = {20 - 23},
	abstract = {This note shows that, in case of suboptimal occupational choice, labor taxation can generate a relevant deadweight loss. With varying aptitudes in different occupations, individuals typically maximize income by specializing in one occupation which promises the highest income, but various labor market imperfections and uncertainties imply that the choice of the best occupation is accomplished with partial success. We use the multinomial Logit approach to evaluate the magnitude of the distortions due to errors in occupational choice caused by income taxation. Under plausible parameterization, we snow that the deadweight loss can be as high as a third of total income.},
	issn = {1090-9443},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edselp\&AN=S1090944315300235\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.528.230420150101,
	title = {Incorporating Affirmative Action into the Welfare State.},
	year = {2015},
	abstract = {In this paper, we discuss a novel aspect of affirmative action policy. We examine its redistributive role, asking whether in an egalitarian society, supplementing the tax-transfer system with an affirmative action policy would enhance social welfare. We demonstrate that affirmative action could be a desirable policy tool even if racial discrimination does not exist in the labor market. JEL Classification: H2, D6 [...]},
	keywords = {Affirmative Action, Eytan Sheshinski, Hans, Key Words, Optimal Taxation, Oren Bar-Gil, Roger Gordon, Tagging. ? The authors wish to thank Alan Auerbach},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.528.2304\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Tomer, Blumkin and Yoram, Margalioth and Efraim, Sadka}
}
@article {edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.528.230420150101,
	title = {Incorporating Affirmative Action into the Welfare State.},
	year = {2015},
	abstract = {In this paper, we discuss a novel aspect of affirmative action policy. We examine its redistributive role, asking whether in an egalitarian society, supplementing the tax-transfer system with an affirmative action policy would enhance social welfare. We demonstrate that affirmative action could be a desirable policy tool even if racial discrimination does not exist in the labor market. JEL Classification: H2, D6 [...]},
	keywords = {Affirmative Action, Eytan Sheshinski, Hans, Key Words, Optimal Taxation, Oren Bar-Gil, Roger Gordon, Tagging. ♣ The authors wish to thank Alan Auerbach},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.528.2304\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Tomer, Blumkin and Yoram, Margalioth and Efraim, Sadka}
}
@article {S109094431530023520150516,
	title = {A note on income taxation and occupational choice.},
	journal = {Research in Economics},
	year = {2015},
	abstract = {This note shows that, in case of suboptimal occupational choice, labor taxation can generate a relevant deadweight loss. With varying aptitudes in different occupations, individuals typically maximize income by specializing in one occupation which promises the highest income, but various labor market imperfections and uncertainties imply that the choice of the best occupation is accomplished with partial success. We use the multinomial Logit approach to evaluate the magnitude of the distortions due to errors in occupational choice caused by income taxation. Under plausible parameterization, we snow that the deadweight loss can be as high as a third of total income.},
	issn = {1090-9443},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edselp\&AN=S1090944315300235\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.362.105020130101,
	title = {Optimal policy to influence individual choice probabilities, working paper.},
	year = {2013},
	abstract = {This paper presents a model in which government may affect outcomes by manipulating individual choice probabilities through the design of the domain of choice or the use of fiscal instruments. Such manipulations are ineffective when individuals are perfectly rational, provided all alternatives are permitted. However, even a small deviation from perfect rationality is shown to call for policy that substantially manipulates choice probabilities. This policy aims to lend weight to alternatives preferred by individuals who are prone, more than others, to make mistakes. At very low levels of rationality, when choices are largely random, it is always socially optimal to [...]},
	keywords = {D11, D63, D81, default rules, H1. Keywords, JEL Code, logit model, private information},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.362.1050\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.269.626820130101,
	title = {The Promise of Positive Optimal Taxation: A Generalized Theory Calibrated to Survey Evidence on Normative Preferences Explains Puzzling Features of Policy.},
	year = {2013},
	abstract = {At the heart of modern optimal tax research is the assumption that the objective of taxation is Utilitarian. I present new survey evidence that most people disagree with this assumption, preferring tax policies based at least in part on a classic alternative objective: the principle of Equal Sacrifice. I generalize the standard model to accommodate this preference for a mixed objective. Then, I show that optimal policy in this generalized model, calibrated to the survey evidence, quantitatively matches several features of existing tax policy that are incompatible in the conventional model but widely endorsed in reality, including the coexistence of [...]},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.269.6268\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Matthew, Weinzierl and Meg, Rithmire and Julio, Rotemberg and Emmanuel, Saez and Bernard, Salanie and Florian, Scheuer and Eytan, Sheshinski and Ali, Shourideh}
}
@article {edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.335.986020130101,
	title = {Voting on pensions with endogenous.},
	year = {2013},
	abstract = {retirement age 1},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.335.9860\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Georges, Casamatta and Helmuth, Cremer and Pierre, Pestieau and Grateful To Mathias, Kifmann and Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.361.967120130101,
	title = {Bounded Rationality and Socially Optimal Limits on Choice in a SelfSelection Model.},
	year = {2013},
	abstract = {When individuals choose from whatever alternatives available to them the one that maximizes their utility then it is always desirable that the government provide them with as many alternatives as possible. Individuals, however, do not always choose what is best for them and their mistakes may be exacerbated by the availability of options. We analyze self-selection models, when individuals know more about themselves than it is possible for governments to know, and show that it may be socially optimal to limit and sometimes to eliminate individual choice. As an example, we apply Luce{\textquoteright}s (1959) model of random choice to a [...]},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.361.9671\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.333.868320130101,
	title = {{\textbullet} from the CESifo website: www.CESifo-group.deCESifo Working Paper No. 1572 RISK MANAGEMENT OF PENSION SYSTEMS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF LOSS AVERSION.},
	year = {2013},
	abstract = {An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded},
	keywords = {HARA preferences, income heterogeneity, loss aversion, pension system, portfolio choice},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.333.8683\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Johannes, Binswanger and Cesifo, Working and Paper, No and Johannes, Binswanger and Ernst, Fehr and Reto, F{\"o}llmi and Dennis, G{\"a}rtner and Volker, Grossmann and Manuel, Oechslin and Panu, Poutvaara and Eytan, Sheshinski and Andreas, Wagener and Richard, Zeckhauser and Josef, Zweim{\"u}ller}
}
@article {edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.319.548520130101,
	title = {OS{\textemdash}612). OPTIMAL INCOME REDISTRIBUTION WHEN INDIVIDUAL WELFARE.},
	year = {2013},
	abstract = {Preliminary; not for quotation. NBER working papers are distributed informally and in limited number for comments only. They should not be quoted without written permission of the author. This report has not undergone the review accorded official NBER publications; in particular, it has not yet been submitted for approval by the Board of Directors. This research was supported by a contract with NBER from the [...]},
	keywords = {Income, J. Duesenberry, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behavior},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.319.5485\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Michael J., Boskin and Eytan, Sheshinski and Michael J., Boskin and Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.320.348720130101,
	title = {Refundable Annuities (Annuity Options) by.},
	year = {2013},
	abstract = {Individuals can insure themselves perfectly against uncertainty about the length of life by purchasing deferred annuities early in life. In the absence of other uninsurable uncertainties (e.g. income), there will be no residual purchases or sales of annuities later in life, thereby avoiding any adverse-selection. In contrast, the presence of such uncertainties creates an active residual annuity market based on the arrival of new information. We characterize the equilibrium in the residual annuity market and propose a new {\textellipsis}nancial instrument, refundable annuities with a guaranteed refund price, which enables individuals who hold a portfolio of such annuities to better adjust [...]},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.320.3487\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.192.629520110101,
	title = {Longevity and Aggregate Savings by.},
	year = {2011},
	abstract = {Two salient features of modern economic growth are the rise in aggregate savings rates and the steady increase in life expectancy. This paper links these processes, showing that under certain conditions economic theory supports the hypothesis that increased longevity leads to higher aggregate savings in steady state. The analysis is based on a lifecycle model with uncertain longevity in which individuals choose an optimum consumption path and a retirement age. Conditions on the age-speci{\textellipsis}c pattern of improvements in survival probabilities are shown to ensure that individual savings rise with longevity and that aggregation preserves this result. Population theory (Coale (1972)) [...]},
	keywords = {Aggregate Savings, Annuities, D1, D6, E2, H0. Key Words, JEL Classi{\textellipsis}cation, Lifecycle Savings, Longevity, Population Age Density Function, Retirement Age, Steady-State},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.192.6295\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.194.679420110101,
	title = {WORKING PAPER N{\textdegree} Mots cl{\'e}s: Codes JEL: Comments Welcome Why Should the Portfolios of Mandatory Private Pension Funds be Captive? ( the Foreign Investment Question).},
	year = {2011},
	abstract = {Velasco. All the opinions expressed are strictly my own. Anna Afshar has provided admirable research assistance. Thierry Tressel has kindly made some of his financial data available. Stephanie Ford helped with the typing. Any remaining errors are my own. Should the portfolios of mandatory, private pension funds in developing countries be invested exclusively in the home country? Or should their managers be free to make prudent investments anywhere in the world? Traditional portfolio analysis gives a clear answer from the point of view of the beneficiaries of the funds: Lifting geographic restraints expands the riskreward frontier, and unequivocally enhances their [...]},
	keywords = {development JEL Classifications, foreign investment limits, H55, J14, J26, O16 RESUME, pension reform},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.194.6794\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Georges De, Menil and Ricardo, Hausmann and Stefan, Kawalec and Jose, Pinera and Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.197.358220110101,
	title = {JEL Codes.},
	year = {2011},
	abstract = {Zachariades. The macroeconomics literature heavily relies on stylized facts stemming from the assumption that actual economies operate near balanced growth paths. This paper investigates whether five such stylized facts do indeed characterize the US economy well and thus whether US growth can be reasonably characterized as approximately balanced. Evidence is found that US growth has been approximately balanced during the postwar period. By contrast, a large transition occurred between 1929 and 1946 during which the capital-output ratio plummeted while the net rate of return paid on capital soared. Notwithstanding these huge changes, the average growth rate of per capita output [...]},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.197.3582\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Paul, Evans and From Peter, Howitt and Masao, Ogaki and Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.200.411920110101,
	title = {Annuities and Retirement.},
	year = {2011},
	abstract = {This paper examines the interaction between the market for annuities and retirement and consumption decisions in the presence of lifetime uncertainty. We focus on two aspects of the demand for annuities: the timing of annuitization and the information available to the issuers of annuities with regard to purchasers {\textquoteright} survival probabilities. The First-Best is attained by continuous annuitization of savings, with a guaranteed lump-sum payment to beneficiaries upon death. Annuitization of savings at retirement, and a-fortioti no annuitization, are inferior and lead to distortions in retirement and consumption decisions. Applying a {\textquoteleft}Stochastic Dominance {\textquoteright} approach, we show how these decisions [...]},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.200.4119\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski and Department Of, Economics}
}
@article {5782772520110104,
	title = {Israel Sets Steep Rise In Taxes On Oil, Gas.},
	journal = {Wall Street Journal - Eastern Edition},
	volume = {257},
	year = {2011},
	pages = {A10},
	abstract = {The article reports on the plan of the Israeli government to increase taxes imposed on oil and gas companies, based on recommendations made by a committee of public finance experts, headed by Eytan Sheshinski.},
	keywords = {Eytan, FISCAL policy, Israel, SHESHINSKI},
	issn = {00999660},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=bth\&AN=57827725\&site=eds-live},
	author = {CHAZAN, GUY}
}
@article {edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.201.352220110101,
	title = {Privatization and Its Benefits: Theory and Evidence.},
	year = {2011},
	abstract = {Abstract: Privatization has been a key component of structural reform programs in both developed and developing economies. The aim of such programs is to achieve higher microeconomic efficiency and foster economic growth, as well as reduce public sector borrowing requirements through the elimination of unnecessary subsidies. Microeconomic theory tells us that incentive and contracting problems create inefficiencies due to public ownership, given that managers of state-owned enterprises pursue objectives that differ from those of private firms (political view) and face less monitoring (management view). Not only are the managers {\textquoteright} objectives distorted, but the budget constraints they face are also [...]},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.201.3522\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski and Luis F., L{\'o}pez-calva}
}
@article {edsbas.ftmpra.oai.mpra.ub.uni.muenchen.de.5306220100101,
	title = {Limits on Individual Choice.},
	year = {2010},
	abstract = {Individuals behave with choice probabilities defined by a multinomial logit (MNL) probability distribution over a finite number of alternatives which includes utilities as parameters. The salient feature of the model is that probabilities depend on the choice-set, or domain. Expanding the choice-set decreases the probabilities of alternatives included in the original set, providing positive probabilities to the added alternatives. The wider probability {\textquoteright}spread{\textquoteright} causes some individuals to further deviate from their higher valued alternatives, while others find the added alternatives highly valuable. For a population with diverse preferences, there exists a subset of alternatives, called the optimum choice-set, which balances [...]},
	keywords = {H0 - General},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftmpra.oai.mpra.ub.uni.muenchen.de.53062\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.167.672220100101,
	title = {www.hicn.org Ethnic Conflict and Job Separations.},
	year = {2010},
	abstract = {Abstract: We study the effect of the second Intifada, a violent conflict between Israel and its Palestinian neighbors which erupted in September 2000, and the ensuing riots of Arab citizens of Israel, on labor market outcomes of Arabs relative to those of Jewish Israelis. The analysis relies on a large matched employer-employee dataset, focusing on firms that in the pre-Intifada period hired both Arabs and Jews. Our analysis demonstrates that until September 2000 Arab workers had a lower rate of job separation than their Jewish peers and that this differential was significantly reduced after the outbreak of the Intifada. We [...]},
	keywords = {Amos Zehavi and participants, Daniele Paserman, Eytan Sheshinski, Fran{\c c}oise Vermeylen, Marimon, Robert Sauer},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftciteseerx.oai.CiteSeerX.psu.10.1.1.167.6722\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sami H., Miaari and Asaf, Zussman and Noam, Zussman}
}
@article {edsrep.v77y2010i308p775.78420100101,
	title = {Environmental Protection and the Private Provision of International Public Goods.},
	journal = {Economica},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {775},
	abstract = {International environmental protection like the combat of global warming exhibits properties of public goods. In the international arena, no coercive authority exists that can enforce measures to overcome free-rider incentives. Therefore decentralized negotiations between individual regions serve as an approach to pursue efficient international environmental protection. We propose a scheme which is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. The negotiating entities offer side-payments to counterparts in order to influence their taxation of polluting consumption. Side-payments, in turn, are self-financed by means of externality-correcting taxes. As we show, a Pareto-efficient outcome can be attained. Copyright (c) The London School of Economics and Political Science 2009.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.v77y2010i308p775.784\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Martin, Altemeyer-Bartscher and Dirk T. G., R{\"u}bbelke and Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsrep.5306220100101,
	title = {Limits on Individual Choice.},
	journal = {MPRA Paper},
	year = {2010},
	abstract = {Individuals behave with choice probabilities defined by a multinomial logit (MNL) probability distribution over a finite number of alternatives which includes utilities as parameters. The salient feature of the model is that probabilities depend on the choice-set, or domain. Expanding the choice-set decreases the probabilities of alternatives included in the original set, providing positive probabilities to the added alternatives. The wider probability {\textquoteright}spread{\textquoteright} causes some individuals to further deviate from their higher valued alternatives, while others find the added alternatives highly valuable. For a population with diverse preferences, there exists a subset of alternatives, called the optimum choice-set, which balances these considerations to maximize social welfare. The paper analyses the dependence of the optimum choice-set on a parameter which specifies the precision of individuals{\textquoteright} choice ({\textquoteright}degree of rationality{\textquoteright}). It is proved that for high values of this parameter the optim},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.53062\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep.v12y2010i1p7.2120100101,
	title = {Refundable Annuities (Annuity Options).},
	journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {7},
	abstract = {Individuals can insure themselves perfectly against uncertainty about the length of life by purchasing deferred annuities early in life. In the absence of other uninsurable uncertainties (e.g., income), there will be no residual purchases or sales of annuities later in life, thereby avoiding any adverse-selection. In contrast, the presence of such uncertainties creates an active residual annuity market based on the arrival of new information. We characterize the equilibrium in the residual annuity market and propose a new financial instrument, refundable annuities with a guaranteed refund price, which enables individuals who hold a portfolio of such annuities to better adjust their optimum consumption plan to different realizations. Refundable annuities are shown to be equivalent to annuity options, that is, options that, if exercised, enable the purchase of annuities later in life at a predetermined price. Holding a variety of refundable annuities is (ex ante) welfare enhancing. Copy},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.v12y2010i1p7.21\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsrep.v77y2010i308p775.78420100101,
	title = {Environmental Protection and the Private Provision of International Public Goods.},
	journal = {Economica},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {775},
	abstract = {International environmental protection like the combat of global warming exhibits properties of public goods. In the international arena, no coercive authority exists that can enforce measures to overcome free-rider incentives. Therefore decentralized negotiations between individual regions serve as an approach to pursue efficient international environmental protection. We propose a scheme which is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. The negotiating entities offer side-payments to counterparts in order to influence their taxation of polluting consumption. Side-payments, in turn, are self-financed by means of externality-correcting taxes. As we show, a Pareto-efficient outcome can be attained. Copyright (c) The London School of Economics and Political Science 2009.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.v77y2010i308p775.784\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Martin, Altemeyer-Bartscher and Dirk T. G., R?bbelke and Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsgcl.21700161120100101,
	title = {Refundable Annuities (Annuity Options).},
	journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {7},
	abstract = {Abstract},
	keywords = {Annuities, Investment analysis},
	issn = {1097-3923},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsgao\&AN=edsgcl.217001611\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep.dp55420100101,
	title = {Limits on Individual Choice.},
	journal = {Discussion Paper Series},
	year = {2010},
	abstract = {Individuals behave with choice probabilities defined by a multinomial logit (MNL) probability distribution over a finite number of alternatives which includes utilities as parameters. The salient feature of the model is that probabilities depend on the choice-set, or domain. Expanding the choice-set decreases the probabilities of alternatives included in the original set, providing positive probabilities to the added alternatives. The wider probability {\textquoteright}spread{\textquoteright} causes some individuals to fur- ther deviate from their higher valued alternatives, while others find the added alternatives highly valuable. For a population with diverse preferences, there ex- ists a subset of alternatives, called the optimum choice-set, which balances these considerations to maximize social welfare. The paper analyses the dependence of the optimum choice-set on a parameter which specifies the precision of individuals{\textquoteright} choice ({\textquoteright}degree of rationality{\textquoteright}). It is proved that for high values of this parame- ter the},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.dp554\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsrep.v9y2010i01p150.151_9920100101,
	title = {The Economic Theory of Annuities. Eytan Sheshinski. Princeton University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-691-13305-8, 184 pages.},
	journal = {Journal of Pension Economics and Finance},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {150},
	abstract = {No abstract is available for this item.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.v9y2010i01p150.151_99\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Kotlikoff, Laurence J.}
}
@article {edsgcl.23780879020100101,
	title = {Environmental Protection and the Private Provision of International Public Goods.},
	journal = {Economica},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {775},
	abstract = {International environmental protection like the combat of global warming exhibits properties of public goods. In the international arena, no coercive authority exists that can enforce measures to overcome free-rider incentives. Therefore decentralized negotiations between individual regions serve as an approach to pursue efficient international environmental protection. We propose a scheme which is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. The negotiating entities offer side-payments to counterparts in order to influence their taxation of polluting consumption. Side-payments, in turn, are self-financed by means of externality-correcting taxes. As we show, a Pareto-efficient outcome can be attained.},
	keywords = {Environmental issue, Environmental protection, Global warming},
	issn = {0013-0427},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsgao\&AN=edsgcl.237808790\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin and Rubbelke, Dirk T.G. and Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep._278420090101,
	title = {Uncertain Longevity and Investment in Education.},
	journal = {CESifo Working Paper Series},
	year = {2009},
	abstract = {It has been argued that increased life expectancy raises the rate of return on education, causing a rise in the investment in education followed by an increase in lifetime labor supply. Empirical evidence of these relations is rather weak. Building on a lifecycle model with uncertain longevity, this paper shows that increased life expectancy does not suffice to warrant the above hypotheses. We provide assumptions about the change in survival probabilities, specifically about the age dependence of hazard rates, which determine individuals{\textquoteright} behavioral response w.r.t. education, work and age of retirement. Comparison is made between the case when individuals have access to a competitive annuity market and the case of no insurance.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep._2784\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsrep.5314420090101,
	title = {Uncertain Longevity and Investment in Education.},
	journal = {MPRA Paper},
	year = {2009},
	abstract = {It has been argued that increased life expectancy raises the rate of return on education, causing a rise in the investment in education followed by an increase in lifetime labor supply. Empirical evidence of these relations is rather weak. Building on a lifecycle model with uncertain longevity, this paper shows that increased life expectancy does not suffice to warrant the above hypotheses. We provide assumptions about the change in survival probabilities, specifically about the age dependence of hazard rates, which determine individuals{\textquoteright} behavioral response w.r.t. education, work and age of retirement. Comparison is made between the case when individuals have access to a competitive annuity market and the case of no insurance.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.53144\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsbas.ftmpra.oai.mpra.ub.uni.muenchen.de.5314420090101,
	title = {Uncertain Longevity and Investment in Education.},
	year = {2009},
	abstract = {It has been argued that increased life expectancy raises the rate of return on education, causing a rise in the investment in education followed by an increase in lifetime labor supply. Empirical evidence of these relations is rather weak. Building on a lifecycle model with uncertain longevity, this paper shows that increased life expectancy does not suffice to warrant the above hypotheses. We provide assumptions about the change in survival probabilities, specifically about the age dependence of hazard rates, which determine individuals{\textquoteright} behavioral response w.r.t. education, work and age of retirement. Comparison is made between the case when individuals have [...]},
	keywords = {J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftmpra.oai.mpra.ub.uni.muenchen.de.53144\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep.dp51920090101,
	title = {Longevity and Aggregate Savings.},
	journal = {Discussion Paper Series},
	year = {2009},
	abstract = {Two salient features of modern economic growth are the rise in aggregate savings rates and the steady increase in life expectancy. This paper links these processes, showing that under certain conditions economic theory supports the hypothesis that increased longevity leads to higher aggregate savings in steady state. The analysis is based on a lifecycle model with uncertain longevity in which individuals choose an optimum consumption path and a retirement age. Conditions on the age-specific pattern of improvements in survival probabilities are shown to ensure that individual savings rise with longevity and that aggregation preserves this result. Population theory (Coale (1972)) is used to link the steady-state age density function and the population{\textquoteright}s growth rate to individuals{\textquoteright} survival probabilities. The importance of a competitive annuity market in avoiding unintended bequests is underscored.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.dp519\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsrep.dp52020090101,
	title = {Uncertain Longevity and Investment in Education.},
	journal = {Discussion Paper Series},
	year = {2009},
	abstract = {It has been argued that increased life expectancy raises the rate of return on education, causing a rise in the investment in education followed by an increase in lifetime labor supply. Empirical evidence of these relations is rather weak. Building on a lifecycle model with uncertain longevity, this paper shows that increased life expectancy does not suffice to warrant the above hypotheses. We provide assumptions about the change in survival probabilities, specifically about the age dependence of hazard rates, which determine individuals{\textquoteright} behavioral response w.r.t. education, work and age of retirement. Comparison is made between the case when individuals have access to a competitive annuity market and the case of no insurance.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.dp520\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@book {ups.9780262062725.003.000220080101,
	title = {Optimum Delayed Retirement Credit.},
	year = {2008},
	publisher = {The MIT Press},
	organization = {The MIT Press},
	abstract = {This chapter discusses how benefits vary with the age of retirement beyond the earliest eligibility age, including how retiring ahead of the normal retirement age reduces benefits by a certain percentage annually, particularly in the United States. It cites the need for a good and flexible retirement system to accommodate diversity in terms of life expectancy, income levels, and the degree of difficulty in continuing labor. It describes a pattern in the United States called delayed retirement credit (DRC), and actuarial reduction factor (ARF). It also argues that the system should be neutral in its approach to individual retirement decisions, assuming that the system would preserve optimal individual decisions on retirement.},
	isbn = {9780262062725},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsups\&AN=ups.9780262062725.003.0002\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsbas.ftzbwkiel.oai.econstor.eu.10419.2610320070101,
	title = {Policies to internalize reciprocal international spillovers.},
	year = {2007},
	abstract = {An effective policy scheme to overcome the suboptimal low provision levels of global public goods is developed in this paper. By suggesting a decentralized approach to raise environmental public good provision levels we take account of the lack of a coercive global authority that is able to enforce efficient international environmental regulations. In our model individual regions voluntarily commence international negotiations on public good provision, which are accompanied by side-payments. These side-payments are financed by means of regional externality-correcting taxes. Side-payments and national tax rates are designed in a mutually dependent way. The decentralized scheme we recommend for approaching Pareto [...]},
	keywords = {Coase-Theorem, ddc:330, F35, H23, Internalisierung externer Effekte, international, Internationale Umweltpolitik, {\"O}ffentliches Gut, Theorie, Umweltschutz, Verhandlungen},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftzbwkiel.oai.econstor.eu.10419.26103\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin and R{\"u}bbelke, Dirk T. G. and Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {S001429210600124320070101,
	title = {Quasi-hyperbolic discounting and social security systems.},
	journal = {European Economic Review},
	volume = {51},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {1247 - 1262},
	abstract = {Hyperbolic discounting has become a common assumption for modeling bounded rationality with respect to individual savings decisions. We examine the effects of hyperbolic discounting on the comparison of alternative social security systems. We show that this form of bounded rationality breaks the equivalence between funded and pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems established in Sheshinski and Weiss [Sheshinski, E., Weiss, Y., 1981. Uncertainty and optimal social security. Quarterly Journal of Economics 95, 189{\textendash}206]. Intergenerational transfers within a PAYG economy are usually secured by the social security system and independent of longevity, whereas this is not the case for the funded economy. The savings level under hyperbolic discounting is lower than under exponential discounting [Laibson et al., 1998], but the ratio between the savings level under hyperbolic discounting within a funded economy and a PAYG economy depends on the effectiveness of the commitment devices. It is shown that if},
	issn = {0014-2921},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edselp\&AN=S0014292106001243\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Schwarz, Mordechai E. and Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsbas.ftmpra.oai.mpra.ub.uni.muenchen.de.5471920070101,
	title = {Differentiated Annuities in a Pooling Equilibrium.},
	year = {2007},
	abstract = {Regular annuities provide payment for the duration of an owner{\textquoteright}s life-time. Period-Certain annuities provide additional payment after death to adesignated beneficiary provided the insured dies within a certain period after annuitization. It has been argued that the bequest option offered by the latter is dominated by life insurance which provides non-random bequests. This is correct if competitive annuity suppliers have full information about individual longevities and price annuities accordingly. In contrast, this paper shows that when individual longevities are private information, a competitive pooling equi-librium which offers annuities at common prices to all individuals may have positive amounts of both [...]},
	keywords = {H0 - General},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftmpra.oai.mpra.ub.uni.muenchen.de.54719\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsjsr.412191620070101,
	title = {Optimum and Risk-Class Pricing of Annuities.},
	journal = {The Economic Journal},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {240},
	abstract = {When information on longevity (survival functions) is unknown early in life, individuals have an interest in insuring themselves against moving into different {\textquoteright}risk-classes{\textquoteright} as their life expectancy is revealed. The First-Best allocation involves transfers across states of nature. With symmetric information, competitive equilibrium separates different risk classes and cannot provide such transfers because insurance firms are unable to precommit. When utility is invariant to risk-class realisation, the optimum entails uniform consumption and optimum retirement age independent of risk-class and an optimum social security scheme is superior to competitive equilibrium. When preferences depend on risk-class, welfare ranking of systems becomes indeterminate.},
	issn = {00130133},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsjsr\&AN=edsjsr.4121916\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep.v117y2007i516p240.25120070101,
	title = {Optimum and Risk-Class Pricing of Annuities.},
	journal = {Economic Journal},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {240},
	abstract = {When information on longevity (survival functions) is unknown early in life, individuals have an interest in insuring themselves against moving into different {\textquoteright}risk-classes{\textquoteright} as their life expectancy is revealed. The "First-Best" allocation involves transfers across states of nature. With symmetric information, competitive equilibrium separates different risk classes and cannot provide such transfers because insurance firms are unable to "precommit". When utility is invariant to risk-class realisation, the optimum entails uniform consumption and optimum retirement age independent of risk-class and an optimum social security scheme is superior to competitive equilibrium. When preferences depend on risk-class, welfare ranking of systems becomes indeterminate. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.v117y2007i516p240.251\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {S004727270700052720070101,
	title = {Optimum commodity taxation in pooling equilibria.},
	journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
	volume = {91},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {1565 - 1573},
	abstract = {This paper extends the standard model of optimum commodity taxation (Ramsey, F., 1927. A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation. Economic Journal 37, 47{\textendash}61; Diamond, P., Mirrlees, J., 1971. Optimal Taxation and Public Production, II: "Tax Rules". American Economic Review 61, 261{\textendash}278) to a competitive economy in which markets are inefficient due to asymmetric information. Insurance markets are prime examples: consumers impose varying costs on suppliers but firms cannot associate costs with individual customers and consequently all are charged equal prices. In such a competitive pooling equilibrium, the price of each good is equal to the average of individual marginal costs weighted by equilibrium quantities. We derive modified Ramsey{\textendash}Boiteux Conditions for optimum taxes in such an economy and show that, in addition to the standard formula, they include first-order effects which reflect the deviations of prices from marginal costs and the response of equilibrium quantities to the taxes},
	issn = {0047-2727},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edselp\&AN=S0047272707000527\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep._205820070101,
	title = {Policies to Internalize Reciprocal International Spillovers.},
	journal = {CESifo Working Paper Series},
	year = {2007},
	abstract = {An effective policy scheme to overcome the suboptimal low provision levels of global public goods is developed in this paper. By suggesting a decentralized approach to raise environmental public good provision levels we take account of the lack of a coercive global authority that is able to enforce efficient international environmental regulations. In our model individual regions voluntarily commence international negotiations on public good provision, which are accompanied by side-payments. These side-payments are financed by means of regional externality-correcting taxes. Side-payments and national tax rates are designed in a mutually dependent way. The decentralized scheme we recommend for approaching Pareto efficient Nash equilibria is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. As it is implementable for a wide class of Nash solutions, it is applicable to various international externality problems.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep._2058\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Martin, Altemeyer-Bartscher and Dirk T. G., R{\"u}bbelke and Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsbas.ftmpra.oai.mpra.ub.uni.muenchen.de.5329020070101,
	title = {Refundable Annuities (Annuity Options).},
	year = {2007},
	abstract = {Individuals can insure themselves perfectly against uncertainty about the length of life by purchasing deferred annuities early in life. In the absence of other uninsurable uncertainties (e.g. income), there will be no residual purchases or sales of annuities later in life, thereby avoiding any adverse-selection. In contrast, the presence of such uncertainties creates an active residual annuity market based on the arrival of new information. We characterize the equilibrium in the residual annuity market and propose a new financial instrument, refundable annuities with a guaranteed refund price, which enables individuals who hold a portfolio of such annuities to better adjust [...]},
	keywords = {H0 - General},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftmpra.oai.mpra.ub.uni.muenchen.de.53290\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep.8439.120070101,
	title = {Introduction to Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and the Growth Mechanism of the Free-Enterprise Economies[Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and the Growth Mechanism of the Free-Enterprise Economies].},
	journal = {Introductory Chapters},
	year = {2007},
	abstract = {How much credit can be given to entrepreneurship for the unprecedented innovation and growth of free-enterprise economies? In this book, some of the world{\textquoteright}s leading economists tackle this difficult and understudied question, and their responses shed new light on how free-market economies work{\textendash}and what policies most encourage their growth. The contributors take as their starting point William J. Baumol{\textquoteright}s 2002 book The Free-Market Innovation Machine (Princeton), which argued that independent entrepreneurs are far more important to growth than economists have traditionally thought, and that an implicit partnership between such entrepreneurs and large corporations is critical to the success of market economies. The contributors include the editors and Robert M. Solow, Kenneth J. Arrow, Michael M. Weinstein, Douglass C. North, Barry R. Weingast, Ying Lowrey, Nathan Rosenberg, Melissa A. Schilling, Corey Phelps, Sylvia Nasar, Boyan Jovanovic, Peter L. Rousseau, Edward N. Wolff, Deepak Soma},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.8439.1\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski and Robert J., Strom}
}
@article {edsrep.8536.120070101,
	title = {Introduction to The Economic Theory of Annuities[The Economic Theory of Annuities].},
	journal = {Introductory Chapters},
	year = {2007},
	abstract = {Annuities are financial products that guarantee the holder a fixed return so long as the holder remains alive, thereby providing insurance against lifetime uncertainty. The terms of these contracts depend on the information available to insurance firms. Unlike age and gender, information about individual survival probabilities cannot be readily ascertained. This asymmetric information causes market inefficiencies, such as adverse selection. Groundbreaking in its scope, The Economic Theory of Annuities offers readers a theoretical analysis of the functioning of private annuity markets. Starting with a general analysis of survival functions, stochastic dominance, and characterization of changes in longevity, Eytan Sheshinski derives the demand for annuities using a model of individuals who jointly choose their lifetime consumption and retirement age. The relation between life insurance and annuities that have a bequest option is examined and "annuity options" are proposed as a response},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.8536.1\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsrep.v108y2006i2p353.35620060101,
	title = {Note on Longevity and Aggregate Savings.},
	journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics},
	year = {2006},
	pages = {353},
	abstract = {In a recent paper in this journal, Bloom, Canning and Graham (2003) model the effect of changes in longevity on individual savings. They proceed to present empirical findings about the relation between longevity and "aggregate savings." There is a missing link between their empirics and theory: the changes in the populations age density distribution due to increased longevity. This note provides such an aggregation analysis within a simple model with uncertain survival, endogenous life-cycle consumption and retirement age. It is shown that, with continuous annuitization, an increase in expected longevity raises aggregate steady-state savings. The magnitude of this effect depends on the economy{\textquoteright}s age-specific distribution and on the elasticity of optimum retirement to changes in longevity. Copyright The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics" 2006 .},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.v108y2006i2p353.356\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsbas.ftmpra.oai.mpra.ub.uni.muenchen.de.5471720060101,
	title = {Optimum Commodity Taxation in Pooling Equilibria.},
	year = {2006},
	abstract = {This paper extends the standard model of optimum commodity taxation (Ramsey (1927)and Diamond-Mirrlees (1971)) to a competitive economy in which markets are inefficient due to asymmetric information. Insurance markets are prime examples: consumers impose varying costs on suppliers but firms cannot associate costs with individual customers and consequently all are charged equal prices. In such a competitive pooling equilibrium, the price of each good is equal to the average of individual marginal costs weighted by equilibrium quantities. We derive modified Ramsey Boiteux Conditions for optimum taxes in such an economy and show that, in addition to the standard formula, they [...]},
	keywords = {H0 - General},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftmpra.oai.mpra.ub.uni.muenchen.de.54717\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep.v5y2006i01p1.25_0020060101,
	title = {Planning for the optimal mix of paygo tax and funded savings.},
	journal = {Journal of Pension Economics and Finance},
	year = {2006},
	pages = {1},
	abstract = {The paper uses an overlapping generations model to analyse the problem of a benevolent planner determining the pay-as-you-go tax rate and the level of funded savings, in an economy where both are policy variables. We characterize the conditions under which it is desirable to have both a positive tax rate and a positive level of savings. The optimal size of the tax rate and of savings depend both on the stochastic characteristics of earnings growth and the return to savings, and on the shape of the utility function of the representative agent. Among the comparative statics results presented, the central one is that increasing the variability of earnings raises the desirability of a pay-as-you-go system, under general conditions. This is consistent with earlier analyses of pay-as-you-go as a provider of intergenerational insurance. A numerical example using the CARA utility and normal distributions illustrates the calculation of optimal tax and savings levels, using annual data for post},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.v5y2006i01p1.25_00\&site=eds-live},
	author = {De Menil, Georges and Murtin, Fabrice and Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {S004727270500123420060101,
	title = {Private information, Coasian bargaining, and the second welfare theorem.},
	journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
	volume = {90},
	year = {2006},
	pages = {871 - 895},
	abstract = {Most of the debate about Coasian bargaining in the presence of externalities relates to the First Welfare Theorem: is the outcome under bargaining efficient? This debate has involved the definition and importance of transaction costs, the significance of private information, and the effect of entry. There has been little analysis of how Coasian bargaining relates to the Second Welfare Theorem: even if the bargaining outcome is efficient, does the process limit the set of Pareto optimal allocations which can be achieved? We consider a model in which individuals utilize a common resource and may affect each other{\textquoteright}s output. The individuals differ in their productivities or tastes and this information is private to each of them. The government can manage the common resource and use nonlinear taxes to correct for the externality or it can turn the common resource over to a private owner who can charge individuals to utilize it with a nonlinear fee schedule. The government and the owner hav},
	issn = {0047-2727},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edselp\&AN=S0047272705001234\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Brito, Dagobert L. and Hamilton, Jonathan H. and Intriligator, Michael D. and Sheshinski, Eytan and Slutsky, Steven M.}
}
@article {edsrep.32130700000000037020060101,
	title = {Optimum Commodity Taxation in Pooling Equilibri.},
	journal = {Levine{\textquoteright}s Bibliography},
	year = {2006},
	abstract = {This paper extends the standard model of optimum commodity taxation (Ramsey (1927) and Diamond-Mirrlees (1971)) to a competitive economy in which some markets are inefficient due to asymmetric information. As in most insurance markets, consumers impose varying costs on suppliers but {\textellipsis}firms cannot associate costs to customers and consequently all are charged equal prices. In a competitive pooling equilibrium, the price of each good is equal to average marginal costs weighted by equilibrium quantities. We derive modi{\textellipsis}ed Ramsey-Boiteux Conditions for optimum taxes in such an economy and show that they include general-equilibrium effects which re{\textdaggerdbl}flect the initial deviations of producer prices from marginal costs, and the response of equilibrium prices to the taxes levied. It is shown that condition on the monotonicity of demand elasticities enables to sign the deviations from the standard formula. The general analysis is applied to the optimum taxation of annuities and life insurance.(Th},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.321307000000000370\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsbas.ftzbwkiel.oai.econstor.eu.10419.2588920060101,
	title = {Differentiated annuities in a pooling equilibrium.},
	year = {2006},
	abstract = {Regular annuities provide payment for the duration of an owner{\textquoteright}s lifetime. Period-Certain annuities provide additional payment after death to a beneficiary provided the insured dies within a certain period after annuitization. It has been argued that the bequest option offered by the latter is dominated by life insurance which provides non-random bequests. This is correct if competitive annuity and life insurance markets have full information about individual longevities. In contrast, this paper shows that when individual longevities are private information, a competitive pooling equilibrium which offers annuities at common prices to all individuals may have positive amounts of both types [...]},
	keywords = {D11, D82, ddc:330},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftzbwkiel.oai.econstor.eu.10419.25889\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep._184420060101,
	title = {Differentiated Annuities in a Pooling Equilibrium.},
	journal = {CESifo Working Paper Series},
	year = {2006},
	abstract = {Regular annuities provide payment for the duration of an owner{\textquoteright}s lifetime. Period-Certain annuities provide additional payment after death to a beneficiary provided the insured dies within a certain period after annuitization. It has been argued that the bequest option offered by the latter is dominated by life insurance which provides non-random bequests. This is correct if competitive annuity and life insurance markets have full information about individual longevities. In contrast, this paper shows that when individual longevities are private information, a competitive pooling equilibrium which offers annuities at common prices to all individuals may have positive amounts of both types of annuities in addition to life insurance. In this equilibrium, individuals self-select the types of annuities that they purchase according to their longevity prospects. The break-even price of each type of annuity reflects the average longevity of its buyers. The broad conclusion that emerges from},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep._1844\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsrep._182820060101,
	title = {Longevity and Aggregate Savings.},
	journal = {CESifo Working Paper Series},
	year = {2006},
	abstract = {For the last fifty years, countries in Asia and elsewhere have witnessed a surge in aggregate savings per capita. Some empirical studies attribute this trend to the increases in life longevity of the populations of these countries. It has been argued that the rise in savings is short-run, eventually to be dissipated by the dissaving of the elderly, whose proportion in the population rises along with longevity. This paper examines whether these conclusions are supported by economic theory. A model of life-cycle decisions with uncertain survival is used to derive individuals{\textquoteright} consumption and chosen retirement age response to changes in longevity from which changes in individual savings are derived. Conditions on the age-profile of improvements in survival probabilities are shown to be necessary in order to predict the direction of this response. Population theory (e.g. Coale, 1952) is used to derive the steady-state population age density function, enabling the aggregation of individual},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep._1828\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsbas.ftzbwkiel.oai.econstor.eu.10419.2587320060101,
	title = {Longevity and aggregate savings.},
	year = {2006},
	abstract = {For the last fifty years, countries in Asia and elsewhere witnessed a surge in aggregate savings per capita. Many empirical studies attribute this trend to the highly significant increases in life longevity of the populations of these countries. Some argue that the rise in savings is shortrun, to be eventually dissipated by the dissaving of the elderly, whose proportion in the population rises along with longevity. This paper examines whether these conclusions are supported by economic theory. A model of life cycle decisions with uncertain survival is used to derive individuals{\textquoteright} consumption and chosen retirement age response to changes in [...]},
	keywords = {D1, D6, ddc:330, E2, H0},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftzbwkiel.oai.econstor.eu.10419.25873\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep._181520060101,
	title = {Optimum Commodity Taxation in Pooling Equilibria.},
	journal = {CESifo Working Paper Series},
	year = {2006},
	abstract = {This paper extends the standard model of optimum commodity taxation (Ramsey (1927) and Diamond-Mirrlees (1971)) to a competitive economy in which some markets are inefficient due to asymmetric information. As in most insurance markets, consumers impose varying costs on suppliers but firms cannot associate costs to customers and consequently all are charged equal prices. In a competitive pooling equilibrium, the price of each good is equal to average marginal costs weighted by equilibrium quantities. We derive modified Ramsey-Boiteux Conditions for optimum taxes in such an economy and show that they include general-equilibrium effects which reflect the initial deviations of producer prices from marginal costs, and the response of equilibrium prices to the taxes levied. It is shown that condition on the monotonicity of demand elasticities enables to sign the deviations from the standard formula. The general analysis is applied to the optimum taxation of annuities and life insurance.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep._1815\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsbas.ftzbwkiel.oai.econstor.eu.10419.2586020060101,
	title = {Optimum commodity taxation in pooling equilibria.},
	year = {2006},
	abstract = {This paper extends the standard model of optimum commodity taxation (Ramsey (1927) and Diamond-Mirrlees (1971)) to a competitive economy in which some markets are inefficient due to asymmetric information. As in most insurance markets, consumers impose varying costs on suppliers but firms cannot associate costs to customers and consequently all are charged equal prices. In a competitive pooling equilibrium, the price of each good is equal to average marginal costs weighted by equilibrium quantities. We derive modified Ramsey- Boiteux Conditions for optimum taxes in such an economy and show that they include general-equilibrium effects which reflect the initial deviations of [...]},
	keywords = {Abzinsung, Asymmetrische Information, D43, ddc:330, H21, Optimale Besteuerung, Theorie, Verbrauchsteuer},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftzbwkiel.oai.econstor.eu.10419.25860\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep.halshs.0075416820060101,
	title = {Planning for the optimal mix of paygo tax and funded savings.},
	journal = {Post-Print},
	year = {2006},
	abstract = {We analyze the optimal balance between social security taxation and private saving in the provision of retirement income in dynamically efficient economies, a question at the center of policy debates in Europe and the United States. We consider the relative importance for this question of the return to capital, the internal return of the pay-as-you-go system, and the variabilities and correlation (or independence) of labor earnings and the capital return. We analyse these influences theoretically in the context of a two-period, overlapping generations model with uncertainty. We use a new method to calibrate the model using annual data on GDP per worker and the total real return on equities, from 1950 to 2002, from which we infer the stochastic characteristics of lifetime labor income and the return to lifetime savings in the US, UK, France and Japan. We obtain a range of optimal, steady-state values of the social security tax and the rate of lifetime savings. When the relative rate of},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.halshs.00754168\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Georges De, Menil and Fabrice, Murtin and Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsjsr.387703620060101,
	title = {Note on Longevity and Aggregate Savings.},
	journal = {The Scandinavian Journal of Economics},
	year = {2006},
	pages = {353},
	abstract = {In a recent paper in this journal, Bloom, Canning and Graham (2003) model the effect of changes in longevity on individual savings. They proceed to present empirical findings about the relation between longevity and aggregate savings. There is a missing link between their empirics and theory: the changes in the populations age density distribution due to increased longevity. This note provides such an aggregation analysis within a simple model with uncertain survival, endogenous life-cycle consumption and retirement age. It is shown that, with continuous annuitization, an increase in expected longevity raises aggregate steady-state savings. The magnitude of this effect depends on the economy{\textquoteright}s age-specific distribution and on the elasticity of optimum retirement to changes in longevity.},
	keywords = {D1, D6, E2, H0, Longevity, Retirement, Savings},
	issn = {03470520},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsjsr\&AN=edsjsr.3877036\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep.32130700000000047420060101,
	title = {Differentiated Annuities in a Pooling Equilibrium.},
	journal = {Levine{\textquoteright}s Bibliography},
	year = {2006},
	abstract = {Regular annuities provide payment for the duration of an owner{\textquoteright}s lifetime. Period-Certain annuities provide additional payment after death to a beneficiary provided the insured dies within a certain period after annuitization. It has been argued that the bequest option offered by the latter is dominated by life insurance which provides non-random bequests. This is correct if competitive annuity and life insurance markets have full information about individual longevities. In contrast, this paper shows that when individual longevities are private information, a competitive pooling equilibrium which offers annuities at common prices to all individuals may have positive amounts of both types of annuities in addition to life insurance. In this equilibrium, individuals self-select the types of annuities that they purchase according to their longevity prospects. The break-even price of each type of annuity reflects the average longevity of its buyers. The broad conclusion that emerges from},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.321307000000000474\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsrep.32130700000000037020060101,
	title = {Optimum Commodity Taxation in Pooling Equilibri.},
	journal = {Levine{\textquoteright}s Bibliography},
	year = {2006},
	abstract = {This paper extends the standard model of optimum commodity taxation (Ramsey (1927) and Diamond-Mirrlees (1971)) to a competitive economy in which some markets are inefficient due to asymmetric information. As in most insurance markets, consumers impose varying costs on suppliers but firms cannot associate costs to customers and consequently all are charged equal prices. In a competitive pooling equilibrium, the price of each good is equal to average marginal costs weighted by equilibrium quantities. We derive modified Ramsey-Boiteux Conditions for optimum taxes in such an economy and show that they include general-equilibrium effects which reflect the initial deviations of producer prices from marginal costs, and the response of equilibrium prices to the taxes levied. It is shown that condition on the monotonicity of demand elasticities enables to sign the deviations from the standard formula. The general analysis is applied to the optimum taxation of annuities and life insurance.(Thi},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.321307000000000370\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsrep.v225y2005i6p699.71020050101,
	title = {Transfers as a Means to Combat European Spillovers.},
	journal = {Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik)},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {699},
	abstract = {In 2004, there was a further enlargement of the European Union. Among the new member countries are eight Central and Eastern European countries. Especially the accession countries located directly at the border to the EU generate significant environmental spillovers harming the Union. These spillovers are mitigated but not deleted by the enlargement regulations. In this paper we will therefore analyze an instrument which many further diminish the spillover problems: transfers, which are conditional on a tightening of environmental policy in the accession countries. The environmental policy considered is the policy of environmental taxation.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.v225y2005i6p699.710\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Dirk T.G., Ruebbelke and Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsjsr.2381269620050101,
	title = {Transfers as a Means to Combat European Spillovers.},
	journal = {Jahrb{\"u}cher f{\"u}r National{\"o}konomie und Statistik / Journal of Economics and Statistics},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {699},
	abstract = {In 2004, there was a further enlargement of the European Union. Among the new member countries are eight Central and Eastern European countries. Especially the accession countries located directly at the border to the EU generate significant environmental spillovers harming the Union. These spillovers are mitigated but not deleted by the enlargement regulations. In this paper we will therefore analyze an instrument which may further diminish the spillover problems: transfers, which are conditional on a tightening of environmental policy in the accession countries. The environmental policy considered is the policy of environmental taxation.},
	issn = {00214027},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsjsr\&AN=edsjsr.23812696\&site=eds-live},
	author = {R{\"u}bbelke, Dirk T. G. and Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {S004727270200224420040101,
	title = {On atmosphere externality and corrective taxes.},
	journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
	volume = {88},
	year = {2004},
	pages = {727 - 734},
	abstract = {It has been argued that in the presence of an {\textquoteleft}Atmosphere Externality{\textquoteright} and competitive behavior by households, a uniform commodity tax on the externality-generating good attains the first best. It is demonstrated, however, that if income redistribution is desirable then personalized taxes are required for a second-best optimum. Each of these taxes is the sum of a uniform (across households) tax and a component, positive or negative, which depends on the household{\textquoteright}s income and demand elasticities. Second-best optimal indirect taxes and rules for investment in externality-reducing measures are also considered.},
	issn = {0047-2727},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edselp\&AN=S0047272702002244\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsgcl.11964000920040101,
	title = {On the atmosphere externality and corrective taxes.},
	journal = {The Journal of Public Economics},
	year = {2004},
	pages = {727},
	abstract = {In the presence of an {\textquoteright}Atmosphere Externality{\textquoteright} and competitive behavior by households, a uniform commodity tax on the externality-generating good, attains the first best. If income redistribution is desirable, then personalized taxes are required for the second best optimum.},
	keywords = {Commodity markets {\textendash} Taxation, Taxation {\textendash} Analysis, United States},
	issn = {0047-2727},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsgao\&AN=edsgcl.119640009\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsbas.ftmpra.oai.mpra.ub.uni.muenchen.de.5516320030101,
	title = {Optimal Policy to Influence Individual Choice Probabilities.},
	year = {2003},
	abstract = {This paper presents a model in which government may affect outcomes by manipulating individual choice probabilities through the design of the domain of choice or the use of fiscal instruments. Such manipulations are ineffective when individuals are perfectly rational, provided all alternatives are permitted. However, even a small deviation from perfect rationality is shown to call for policy that substantially manipulates choice probabilities. This policy aims to lend weight to alternatives preferred by individuals who are prone, more than others, to make mistakes. At very low levels of rationality, when choices are largely random, it is always socially optimal to [...]},
	keywords = {H00 - General},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftmpra.oai.mpra.ub.uni.muenchen.de.55163\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep.v49y2003i3p429.459.20030101,
	title = {Privatization and Its Benefits: Theory and Evidence.},
	journal = {CESifo Economic Studies},
	year = {2003},
	pages = {429},
	abstract = {Privatization has been a key component of structural reform programs in both developed and developing economies. The aim of such programs is to achieve higher microeconomic efficiency and foster economic growth, as well as reduce public sector borrowing requirements through the elimination of unnecessary subsidies. Microeconomic theory tells us that incentive and contracting problems create inefficiencies due to public ownership, given that managers of state-owned enterprises pursue objectives that differ from those of private firms (political view) and face less monitoring (management view). Not only are the managers{\textquoteright} objectives distorted, but the budget constraints they face are also softened. The soft-budget constraint emerges from the fact that bankruptcy is not a credible threat to public managers, for it is in the central government{\textquoteright}s own interest to bail them out in case of financial distress. Empirical evidence shows a robust corroboration of theoretical implications: privatiz},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.v49y2003i3p429.459.\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski and Luis F., L{\'o}pez-calva}
}
@article {edsjsr.354904720030101,
	journal = {Economica},
	year = {2003},
	pages = {574},
	issn = {00130427},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsjsr\&AN=edsjsr.3549047\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep._86820030101,
	title = {Bounded Rationality and Socially Optimal Limits on Choice in a Self-Selection Model.},
	journal = {CESifo Working Paper Series},
	year = {2003},
	abstract = {When individuals choose from whatever alternatives available to them the one that maximizes their utility then it is always desirable that the government provide them with as many alternatives as possible. Individuals, however, do not always choose what is best for them and their mistakes may be exacerbated by the availability of options. We analyze self-selection models, when individuals know more about themselves than it is possible for governments to know, and show that it may be socially optimal to limit and sometimes to eliminate individual choice. As an example, we apply Luce{\textquoteright}s (1959) model of random choice to a work-retirement decision model and show that the optimal provision of choice is positively related to the degree of heterogeneity in the population and that even with very small degrees of non-rationality it may be optimal not to provide individuals any choice.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep._868\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsrep._88020030101,
	title = {Note on Income Taxation and Occupational Choice.},
	journal = {CESifo Working Paper Series},
	year = {2003},
	abstract = {With varying aptitudes in different occupations, individuals typically maximize income by specializing in one occupation which promises the highest income. Due to numerous labor market imperfections and uncertainties, the choice of best occupation is accomplished with only partial success. We demonstrate that an income tax that reduces after-tax income differentials across occupations tends to exacerbate the errors of choice made by individuals. Following a model proposed by Tinbergen (1951) and developed by Houthakker (1974), we use Luce{\textquoteright}s (1959) multinominal logit approach to evaluate the magnitude of the distortions due to errors in occupational choice caused by income taxation. In an example, we show that the deadweight loss can be as high as a third of total income.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep._880\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsrep._88420030101,
	title = {Note on the Optimum Pricing of Annuities.},
	journal = {CESifo Working Paper Series},
	year = {2003},
	abstract = {In a perfectly competitive market for annuities with full information, the price of annuities is equal to individuals{\textquoteright} (discounted) survival probabilities. That is, prices are actuarially fair. In contrast, the pricing implicit in social security systems invariably allows for cross subsidization between different risk groups (males/females). We examine the utilitarian approach to the optimum pricing of annuities and show how the solution depends on the joint distribution of survival probailities and incomes in the population.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep._884\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsrep.5516320030101,
	title = {Optimal Policy to Influence Individual Choice Probabilities.},
	journal = {MPRA Paper},
	year = {2003},
	abstract = {This paper presents a model in which government may affect outcomes by manipulating individual choice probabilities through the design of the domain of choice or the use of fiscal instruments. Such manipulations are ineffective when individuals are perfectly rational, provided all alternatives are permitted. However, even a small deviation from perfect rationality is shown to call for policy that substantially manipulates choice probabilities. This policy aims to lend weight to alternatives preferred by individuals who are prone, more than others, to make mistakes. At very low levels of rationality, when choices are largely random, it is always socially optimal to entirely eliminate individual choice in order to prevent the errors generated by such choice. It is better to impose one alternative that is not the preferred one for some individuals instead of inducing a completely random draw by everybody.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.55163\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep._87320030101,
	title = {Optimum and Risk-Class Pricing of Annuities.},
	journal = {CESifo Working Paper Series},
	year = {2003},
	abstract = {When information on longevity (survival functions) is unknown early in life, individuals have an interest to insure themselves against future {\textquoteright}risk-class{\textquoteright} classification. Accordingly, the First-Best typically involves transfers across states of nature. Competitive equilibrium cannot provide such transfers if insurance firms are unable to precommit their customers. On the other hand, public insurance plans that do not distinguish between {\textquoteright}risk-class{\textquoteright} realizations are also inefficient. It is impossible, a-priori, to rank these alternatives from a welfare point of view.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep._873\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsrep._88920030101,
	title = {Optimum Delayed Retirement Credit.},
	journal = {CESifo Working Paper Series},
	year = {2003},
	abstract = {A central question for pension design is how benefits should vary with the age of retirement beyond early eligibility age. It is often argued that in order to be neutral with respect to individual retirement decisions benefits should be actuarially fair, that is, the present value of additional contributions and benefits ({\textquoteright}Delayed Retirement Credit{\textquoteright} - DRC) due to postponed retirement should be equal. We show that in a self-selection, asymmetric information model, because individual decisions are suboptimal, the socially optimal benefit structure should be less than actuarially fair.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep._889\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsbas.ftzbwkiel.oai.econstor.eu.10419.7637420030101,
	title = {Bounded Rationality and Socially Optimal Limits on Choice in a Self-Selection Model.},
	year = {2003},
	abstract = {When individuals choose from whatever alternatives available to them the one that maximizes their utility then it is always desirable that the government provide them with as many alternatives as possible. Individuals, however, do not always choose what is best for them and their mistakes may be exacerbated by the availability of options. We analyze self-selection models, when individuals know more about themselves than it is possible for governments to know, and show that it may be socially optimal to limit and sometimes to eliminate individual choice. As an example, we apply Luce{\textquoteright}s (1959) model of random choice to a [...]},
	keywords = {ddc:330, logit, moral-hazard, Retirement, self-selection},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftzbwkiel.oai.econstor.eu.10419.76374\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsbas.ftzbwkiel.oai.econstor.eu.10419.7636620030101,
	title = {Note on Income Taxation and Occupational Choice.},
	year = {2003},
	abstract = {With varying aptitudes in different occupations, individuals typically maximize income by specializing in one occupation which promises the highest income. Due to numerous labor market imperfections and uncertainties, the choice of best occupation is accomplished with only partial success. We demonstrate that an income tax that reduces after-tax income differentials across occupations tends to exacerbate the errors of choice made by individuals. Following a model proposed by Tinbergen (1951) and developed by Houthakker (1974), we use Luce{\textquoteright}s (1959) multinominal logit approach to evaluate the magnitude of the distortions due to errors in occupational choice caused by income taxation. In an [...]},
	keywords = {ddc:330, distribution of aptitudes, logit model, size distribution of income},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftzbwkiel.oai.econstor.eu.10419.76366\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsbas.ftzbwkiel.oai.econstor.eu.10419.7637120030101,
	title = {Note on the Optimum Pricing of Annuities.},
	year = {2003},
	abstract = {In a perfectly competitive market for annuities with full information, the price of annuities is equal to individuals{\textquoteright} (discounted) survival probabilities. That is, prices are actuarially fair. In contrast, the pricing implicit in social security systems invariably allows for cross subsidization between different risk groups (males/females). We examine the utilitarian approach to the optimum pricing of annuities and show how the solution depends on the joint distribution of survival probailities and incomes in the population. [...]},
	keywords = {ddc:330},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftzbwkiel.oai.econstor.eu.10419.76371\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsbas.ftzbwkiel.oai.econstor.eu.10419.7633020030101,
	title = {Optimum and Risk-Class Pricing of Annuities.},
	year = {2003},
	abstract = {When information on longevity (survival functions) is unknown early in life, individuals have an interest to insure themselves against future {\textquoteright}risk-class{\textquoteright} classification. Accordingly, the First-Best typically involves transfers across states of nature. Competitive equilibrium cannot provide such transfers if insurance firms are unable to precommit their customers. On the other hand, public insurance plans that do not distinguish between {\textquoteright}risk-class{\textquoteright} realizations are also inefficient. It is impossible, a-priori, to rank these alternatives from a welfare point of view. [...]},
	keywords = {ddc:330},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftzbwkiel.oai.econstor.eu.10419.76330\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsbas.ftzbwkiel.oai.econstor.eu.10419.7630720030101,
	title = {Optimum Delayed Retirement Credit.},
	year = {2003},
	abstract = {A central question for pension design is how benefits should vary with the age of retirement beyond early eligibility age. It is often argued that in order to be neutral with respect to individual retirement decisions benefits should be actuarially fair, that is, the present value of additional contributions and benefits ({\textquoteright}Delayed Retirement Credit{\textquoteright} - DRC) due to postponed retirement should be equal. We show that in a self-selection, asymmetric information model, because individual decisions are suboptimal, the socially optimal benefit structure should be less than actuarially fair. [...]},
	keywords = {ddc:330, delayed retirement credit, moral hazard, self-selection},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftzbwkiel.oai.econstor.eu.10419.76307\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.cesifo.49.3.42920030101,
	title = {Privatization and Its Benefits: Theory and Evidence.},
	year = {2003},
	abstract = {Privatization has been a key component of structural reform programs in both developed and developing economies. The aim of such programs is to achieve higher microeconomic efficiency and foster economic growth, as well as reduce public sector borrowing requirements through the elimination of unnecessary subsidies. Microeconomic theory tells us that incentive and contracting problems create inefficiencies due to public ownership, given that managers of state-owned enterprises pursue objectives that differ from those of private firms (political view) and face less monitoring (management view). Not only are the managers{\textquoteright} objectives distorted, but the budget constraints they face are also softened. The [...]},
	keywords = {research-article},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.cesifo.49.3.429\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan and L{\'o}pez-Calva, Luis F.}
}
@article {edsrep.1068020020101,
	title = {Romania{\textquoteright}s Pension System: From Crisis to Reform.},
	journal = {NBER Chapters},
	year = {2002},
	pages = {401},
	abstract = {No abstract is available for this item.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.10680\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Georges De, Menil and Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsbas.ftmpra.oai.mpra.ub.uni.muenchen.de.5614120000101,
	title = {Bounded Rationality and Socially Optimal Limits on Choice in A Self-Selection Model.},
	year = {2000},
	abstract = {When individuals choose from whatever alternatives available to them the one that maximizes their utility then it is always desirable that the government provide them with as many alternatives as possible. Individuals, however, do not always choose what is best for them and their mistakes may be exacerbated by the availability of options. We analyze self-selection models, when individuals know more about themselves than it is possible for governments to know, and show that it may be socially optimal to limit and sometimes to eliminate individual choice. As an example, we apply Luce{\textquoteright}s (1959) model of random choice to a [...]},
	keywords = {H0 - General},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftmpra.oai.mpra.ub.uni.muenchen.de.56141\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep.5614120000101,
	title = {Bounded Rationality and Socially Optimal Limits on Choice in A Self-Selection Model.},
	journal = {MPRA Paper},
	year = {2000},
	abstract = {When individuals choose from whatever alternatives available to them the one that maximizes their utility then it is always desirable that the government provide them with as many alternatives as possible. Individuals, however, do not always choose what is best for them and their mistakes may be exacerbated by the availability of options. We analyze self-selection models, when individuals know more about themselves than it is possible for governments to know, and show that it may be socially optimal to limit and sometimes to eliminate individual choice. As an example, we apply Luce{\textquoteright}s (1959) model of random choice to a work-retirement decision model and show that the optimal provision of choice is positively related to the degree of heterogeneity in the population and that even with very small degrees of non-rationality it may be optimal not to provide individuals any choice.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.56141\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep.5549020000101,
	title = {Optimal Policy to Influence Individual Choice Probabilities.},
	journal = {MPRA Paper},
	year = {2000},
	abstract = {With varying aptitudes in different occupations,individuals typically maximize income by specializing in one occupation which promises the highest income. Due to numerous labor market imperfections anduncertainties, the choice of best occupation is accomplished with only partial success. We demonstrate that an income tax that reduces after-tax income differentials across occupations tends to exacerbate the errors of choice made by individuals. Following a model proposed by Tinbergen (1951) and developed by Houthakker (1974), we use Luce{\textquoteright}s (1959) multinomial logit approach to evaluate the magnitude of the distortions due to errors in occupational choice caused by income taxation. In an example, we show that the deadweight loss can be as high as a third of total income.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.55490\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep.1998v19.02.a0919980101,
	title = {Alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz.},
	journal = {The Energy Journal},
	year = {1998},
	pages = {135},
	abstract = {In this paper we study the cost of adding additional capacity to transport oil from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to the Red Sea. If this capacity is obtained by adding power to the existing pipelines, the cost would increase by approximately 14 cents per barrel, but would require large capital expenditures. If this capacity is obtained by using Drag Reduction Agents, the cost would increase by 25 to 65 cents per barrel with minor capital expenditures. Since Arabian oil is inframarginal, these increased costs should have no impact on the supply of oil.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.1998v19.02.a09\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Dagobert L., Brito and Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsrep.v64y1997i2p181.20519970101,
	title = {Privatization and the distribution of income in the commons.},
	journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
	year = {1997},
	pages = {181},
	abstract = {No abstract is available for this item.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.v64y1997i2p181.205\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Brito, Dagobert L. and Intriligator, Michael D. and Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep.v27y1994i4p903.1719940101,
	title = {Quantity Competition in a Spatial Model.},
	journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics},
	year = {1994},
	pages = {903},
	abstract = {The authors analyze a duopoly model where firms first choose locations on a line segment and then choose quantities in the second stage. Pure strategy quantity equilibria fail to exist for locations close together. For low transport costs, near agglomeration occurs and the firms choose locations where pure strategy quantity equilibria exist. As transport costs rise, firms become less direct competitors as they move away from the center of the market. Coauthors are James F. Klein, Eytan Sheshinski, and Steven M. Slutsky. We analyse a duopoly model where firms first choose locations on a line segment and then choose quantities in the second stage. Pure strategy quantity equilibria fail to exist for locations close together. For low transport costs, near agglomeration occurs and the firms choose locations where pure strategy quantity equilibria exist. As transport costs rise, firms become less direct competitors as they move away from the centre of the market. Coauthors are James F. Klei},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.v27y1994i4p903.17\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Jonathan H, Hamilton and James F., Klein and Eytan, Sheshinski and Steven M., Slutsky}
}
@article {950104147919941201,
	title = {Optimal pricing, inflation, and the cost of price adjustment.},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
	volume = {32},
	year = {1994},
	pages = {1877 - 1878},
	abstract = {The article reviews the book "Optimal Pricing, Inflation, and the Cost of Price Adjustment," edited by Eytan Sheshinski and Yoram Weiss.},
	keywords = {Eytan, Inflation \& the Cost of Price Adjustment (Book), NONFICTION, OPTIMAL Pricing, PRICING, SHESHINSKI, WEISS, Yoram},
	issn = {00220515},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=bth\&AN=9501041479\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Carlson, John A.}
}
@article {edsjsr.10.2307.13619019940101,
	title = {Quantity Competition in a Spatial Model.},
	journal = {The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d{\textquoteright}Economique},
	year = {1994},
	pages = {903},
	abstract = {We analyse a duopoly model where firms first choose locations on a line seqment and then choose quantities in the second stage. Pure strategy quantity equilibria fail to exist for locations close together. For low transport costs, near agglomeration occurs and the firms choose locations where pure strategy quantity equilibria exist. As transport costs rise, firms become less direct competitors as they move away from the centre of the market. /// La concurrence par les quantit{\'e}s dans un mod{\`e}le spatial. Les auteurs analysent un mod{\`e}le de duopole o{\`u} les firmes choisissent d{\textquoteright}abord leur localisation le long d{\textquoteright}un segment lin{\'e}aire et puis, dans un second temps, les quantit{\'e}s qu{\textquoteright}elles d{\'e}sirent produire. On montre qu{\textquoteright}il n{\textquoteright}est pas possible d{\textquoteright}{\'e}tablir l{\textquoteright}existence d{\textquoteright}{\'e}quilibres pour de pures strat{\'e}gies de quantit{\'e}s quand il s{\textquoteright}agit de localisations trop rapproch{\'e}es. Quand les co{\^u}ts de transport sont faibles, il y a presqu{\textquoteright} agglom{\'e}ration et les firmes choisissent des localisations telles que des {\'e}qui},
	issn = {00084085},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsjsr\&AN=edsjsr.10.2307.136190\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Hamilton, Jonathan H. and Klein, James F. and Sheshinski, Eytan and Slutsky, Steven M.}
}
@article {edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.restud.59.2.33119920101,
	title = {Staggered and Synchronized Price Policies Under Inflation: The Multiproduct Monopoly Case.},
	year = {1992},
	abstract = {This paper analyses the optimum pricing policies of a multiproduct monopoly in the presence of inflation and fixed costs of nominal price changes. We examine the conditions which lead to [...]},
	keywords = {Articles},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.restud.59.2.331\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan and Weiss, Yoram}
}
@article {edsjsr.229795719920101,
	title = {Staggered and Synchronized Price Policies Under Inflation: The Multiproduct Monopoly Case.},
	journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
	year = {1992},
	pages = {331},
	abstract = {This paper analyses the optimum pricing policies of a multiproduct monopoly in the presence of inflation and fixed costs of nominal price changes. We examine the conditions which lead to staggered or synchronized pricing policies when the timing of price changes is endogenous. Two aspects of the decision problem are emphasized: the interactions in the joint profit function between the prices of the various goods and the interactions in the costs of price adjustment. We show that with positive interactions in the profit function and costs of price adjustments that are independent across products, staggering is unlikely. Depending on initial conditions, a firm may follow a staggered steady state or a synchronized steady state path. But the former is locally unstable while the latter is attained from a broad set of initial conditions. For a small rate of interest the staggered policy is optimal iff the interaction in profits is negative.},
	issn = {00346527},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsjsr\&AN=edsjsr.2297957\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan and Weiss, Yoram}
}
@article {edsrep.1157119900101,
	title = {Treatment of Capital Income in Recent Tax Reforms and the Cost of Capital in Industrialized Countries.},
	journal = {NBER Chapters},
	year = {1990},
	pages = {25},
	abstract = {No abstract is available for this item.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.11571\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@inbook {CAT8991887719890101,
	title = {An explanation of the behavior of personal savings in the United states in recent years / Eytan Sheshinski, Vito Tanzi.},
	booktitle = {NBER working paper series ; no. 3040},
	year = {1989},
	publisher = {Cambridge (1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138) : National Bureau of Economic Research, [1989]},
	organization = {Cambridge (1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138) : National Bureau of Economic Research, [1989]},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=agr\&AN=CAT89918877\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan. and Tanzi, Vito.}
}
@article {edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.restud.50.3.51319830101,
	title = {Optimum Pricing Policy under Stochastic Inflation.},
	year = {1983},
	abstract = {We describe aggregate inflation as a stochastic process in which the rate of change of the price level can be positive or zero, where the times spent in each state are of random duration. This class of processes includes Two-State Markov Chains and Renewal Processes as special cases. It is shown that the optimal pricing policy of a monopolistic firm with non-convex costs of price adjustment is ( S, s ) in its real-price, i.e. its nominal price relative to the price level. A basic certainty-equivalence result is proved: i.e. the firm behaves as if it faces a certain and [...]},
	keywords = {Articles},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.restud.50.3.513\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan and Weiss, Yoram}
}
@article {edsrep.1132919830101,
	title = {Inflation and Taxes in a Growing Economy with Debt and Equity Finance.},
	journal = {NBER Chapters},
	year = {1983},
	pages = {44},
	abstract = {Our tax system was designed for an economy with little or no inflation. The current paper shows that inflation causes capricious changes in the effective rate of tax on capital income and therefore in the real net rate of return that savers receive. This is not only a temporary disequilibrium effect but one which persists in steady-state equilibrium. Unlike earlier papers by Feldstein and by Green and Sheshinski, the current study recognizes that firms finance investment by both debt and equity in a ratio that depends on the tax rates and on the rate of inflation.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.11329\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Martin, Feldstein and Jerry, Green and Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.qje.96.2.18919810101,
	title = {Uncertainty and Optimal Social Security Systems.},
	year = {1981},
	abstract = {This paper examines the annuity aspect of social security within the framework of an overlapping-generations model. The duration of life is assumed to be uncertain. Under a fully funded system, demand for social security is determined by each generation so as to maximize expected lifetime utility, taking into account the welfare of future generations. Under a pay-as-you-go system with intergenerational transfers, demand for retirement benefits by the working population takes into account taxes paid by descendants. It is shown that the two modes of finance are equivalent in terms of all real aggregates. Effects of changes in expected lifetime and [...]},
	keywords = {Articles},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.qje.96.2.189\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan and Weiss, Yoram}
}
@article {edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.qje.93.3.41119790101,
	title = {Corporate Financial Policy and Taxation in a Growing Economy.},
	year = {1979},
	abstract = {I. A model of financial equilibrium, 412.{\textemdash}IL Effects of changes in the profit tax rate, 418.{\textemdash}III. Effects of changes in the taxation of retained earnings, 423.{\textemdash}IV. The nonneutrality of the corporate income tax, 427.{\textemdash}V. Conclusion, 430. [...]},
	keywords = {Articles},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.qje.93.3.411\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Feldstein, Martin and Green, Jerry and Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.restud.46.1.3119790101,
	title = {Demand for Fixed Factors, Inflation and Adjustment Costs.},
	year = {1979},
	keywords = {Articles},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.restud.46.1.31\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan and Weiss, Yoram}
}
@article {edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.qje.92.4.58919780101,
	title = {Optimal Redistributive Taxation When Individual Welfare Depends upon Relative Income.},
	year = {1978},
	abstract = {I. Introduction, 589. {\textemdash} II. An optimal negative income tax model, 591. {\textemdash} III. The maximin criterion, 594. {\textemdash} IV. A utilitarian social objective, 597. {\textemdash} V. Conclusion, 598.  Our theory {\textellipsis} depends upon the validity of a single hypothesis, viz.: that the utility index is a function of relative rather than absolute consumption expenditure. {\textemdash} J. Duesenberry [...]},
	keywords = {Articles},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.qje.92.4.589\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Boskin, Michael J. and Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsrep.320364519780101,
	title = {Inflation and Taxes in a Growing Economy with Debt and Equity Finance.},
	journal = {Scholarly Articles},
	year = {1978},
	abstract = {Our tax system was designed for an economy with little or no inflation. The current paper shows that inflation causes capricious changes in the effective rate of tax on capital income and therefore in the real net rate of return that savers receive. This is not only a temporary disequilibrium effect but one which persists in steady-state equilibrium. Unlike earlier papers by Feldstein and by Green and Sheshinski, the current study recognizes that firms finance investment by both debt and equity in a ratio that depends on the tax rates and on the rate of inflation.},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.3203645\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan and Feldstein, Martin and Green, Jerry and Auerbach, Alan}
}
@article {edsrep.1230819780101,
	title = {Inflation and Taxes in a Growing Economy with Debt and Equity Finance.},
	journal = {NBER Chapters},
	year = {1978},
	pages = {53},
	abstract = {Our tax system was designed for an economy with little or no inflation. The current paper shows that inflation causes capricious changes in the effective rate of tax on capital income and therefore in the real net rate of return that savers receive. This is not only a temporary disequilibrium effect but one which persists in steady-state equilibrium. Unlike earlier papers by Feldstein and by Green and Sheshinski, the current study recognizes that firms finance investment by both debt and equity in a ratio that depends on the tax rates and on the rate of inflation.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsrep\&AN=edsrep.12308\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Martin, Feldstei and Jerry, Green and Eytan, Sheshinski}
}
@article {edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.restud.44.2.28719770101,
	title = {Inflation and Costs of Price Adjustment.},
	year = {1977},
	keywords = {Articles},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.restud.44.2.287\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan and Weiss, Yoram}
}
@article {edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.restud.39.3.29719720101,
	title = {The Optimal Linear Income-tax.},
	year = {1972},
	keywords = {Articles},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.restud.39.3.297\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.restud.39.3.24119720101,
	title = {A Production Function for the Repairman Problem.},
	year = {1972},
	keywords = {Articles},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.fthighwire.oai.open.archive.highwire.org.restud.39.3.241\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Arrow, Kenneth J. and Levhari, David and Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {466026319700501,
	title = {DISCUSSION.},
	journal = {Journal of Finance},
	volume = {25},
	year = {1970},
	pages = {446 - 449},
	abstract = {Since the cost of supplying money to the economy is practically zero (ignoring the cost of printing money) optimality requires that the economy should be satiated with money. In other words, money is a free good from the point of view of society as a whole; hence its quantity should be expanded to the point where it cannot increase utility (or output) in the economy, i.e., to the point where the alternative cost of holding it is zero. In a competitive economy this means that the money rate of interest should be driven down to zero. One way of doing this would be to pay interest on money equal to the real rate of return on real capital. An alternative possibility is a rate of price deflation equal again to the rate of return on real assets. Professor Johnson provides a convincing argument in favor of the first policy and against deflationary measures. We believe, however, that the "optimum" which both policies are designed to achieve is not, in general, an appropriate target of monetar},
	keywords = {DEMAND (Economic theory), DEMAND for money, ECONOMIC forecasting, ECONOMIC policy, INTEREST rates, LIQUIDITY (Economics), MARGINAL utility, MONETARY policy, MONETARY theory, MONEY supply, QUANTITY theory of money, SUPPLY \& demand},
	issn = {00221082},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=bth\&AN=4660263\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
@article {edsbas.ftrepec.oai.RePEc.cup.jpenef.v.9.y.2010.i.01.p.150.151.99n.d.,
	title = {The Economic Theory of Annuities. Eytan Sheshinski. Princeton University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-691-13305-8, 184 pages.},
	year = {1966},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsbas\&AN=edsbas.ftrepec.oai.RePEc.cup.jpenef.v.9.y.2010.i.01.p.150.151.99\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Kotlikoff, Laurence J.}
}
@article {edsndl.oai.union.ndltd.org.MIT.oai.dspace.mit.edu.1721.1.10006919660101,
	title = {Essays on the theory of production and technical progress.},
	year = {1966},
	abstract = {Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics. Thesis. 1966. Ph.D. / Vita. / Includes bibliographies.},
	keywords = {ECONOMICS},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=edsndl\&AN=edsndl.oai.union.ndltd.org.MIT.oai.dspace.mit.edu.1721.1.100069\&site=eds-live},
	author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}
}
