CONSTRUCTIONS OF VIOLENT CONFLICT IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONTENT & DISCOURSE ANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE (WITHIN WP5, WP6, WP7, & WP8)

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(EXECUTIVE SUMMARY)

Violent conflicts are complex situations which are unobservable as a whole. To make sense of violent conflict, people rely on public discourse – notably, communications by strategic actors, mass media coverage, political debates, and social media contents. In public discourse, available information about conflicts is represented selectively, and endowed with interpretable meaning on four levels of abstraction.

On the lowest level, conceptual categories are constructed in order to identify important objects of concern, the main actors and groups, relevant acts, and evaluative considerations. In conflicts, the most important such conceptual categories include the construction of exclusive collective identities and shared ends, and the provision of normatively charged categories that enable describing “good” ingroup behavior differently from “evil” outgroup actions, even if these are otherwise similar (e.g., “pre-emptive” vs. “first strike”).

On the second level, statements about the state of the world (“evidential claims”) provide selected information about current events, recall specific pasts and project expected future developments. Research has documented a wide range of selection biases governing what kinds of information are presented in the media, including a focus on violence and escalation, and a strong orientation toward the behavior of conflict elites and decision makers. In addition, specifically in conflicts, special attention must be paid to the uncertainty of provided information, and the advancement of contradictory claims.

On the third level, interpretative frames integrate selected information into coherent accounts that render it meaningful: They suggest causal explanations and assign responsibility, project likely future developments and recommend particular courses of action, and pass evaluative judgment. Depending on how information is selected and contextualized, frames can sustain contrasting evaluative positions and agendas toward the conflict. Accordingly, the framing of conflict has been one main focus of conflict discourse research in the past. In particular, the escalatory/de-escalatory implications of frames, as well as the mobilization of historical analogies for advocating specific interpretations of a conflict, are a key concern.

On the highest level, conflict narratives link available frames into a chain of connected events, and construct finalities needed to achieve closure. Conflict narratives assign specific roles to important conflict actors (e.g., establishing who is the rogue and the hero) and imply characteristic traits and motivations driving the development of the plot. Importantly, non-closed conflict narratives justify strong agendas for action, identifying what must be done or accomplished to “solve” the problems driving the narrative.

In addition to how conflicts are presented in public discourse, it is essential to investigate how contested or widely accepted the respective constructions are: Do different societies, or groups within society, adhere to the same or different conflict interpretations? Are different views competing within the debate? Also, the representation of conflict evolves quickly following the unfolding of new events: New information becomes available, different frames and agendas are constructed; previously accepted interpretations may be challenged or confirmed, and different views may become dominant. To identify the conditions facilitating specific constructions, debate configurations and dynamics, INFOCORE assumes a theory-informed, context sensitive, comparative and diachronic approach to the analysis of conflict discourse.
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(WITHIN WPS 5, WP6, WP7, & WP8)

People understand the world through the lens of their own and others’ appropriated constructions: Their ways of hearing about, talking about, and thus participating in discourse about violent conflict constitutes much of the range of possible meanings that conflict can take on for them (Gamson, 1996). When people act, they react primarily to their semantic constructions of social reality endowing it with subjective, culturally embedded meaning (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). While private sense making is most directly responsible for such behavior, it is public, collaborative discourse that enables people to understand the world in connectable, communicable terms: Public discourse – which takes place in the media and various other arenas, e.g., public events, social/online media, political debates etc. – informs and continually updates the shared meaning available for discourse participants’ understandings.

Due to its paramount importance for shaping social behavior in general, and political action in specific, public discourse has been the focus of much research in the past. Such research generally shares three premises: First, discourse research1 is generally constructionist: It acknowledges the contingency of meaning upon social construction, and the impossibility of deriving meaning directly from the phenomena described (van Dijk, 1983; Wetherell & Potter, 1988). Second, it is strongly focused on shared constructions, emphasizing dominant interpretations that prevail in privileged arenas of public communication (notably, the mass media) and disregarding fringe or private views (van Dijk, 2002; Sibley, Liu, & Kirkwood, 2006). Third, almost all social scientific approaches assume that discourse has a triple relationship to the way people understand their social environment (van Dijk, 1985; Fairclough, 2003): Discourse reflects (with several reservations) aspects of participants schematic beliefs; it informs participants’ understandings, so it exerts a causal influence upon people’s beliefs; and, by rendering others’ beliefs and interpretations observable in public, discourse renders ideas communicable, shaping shared beliefs and social/cultural conventions (Pan & Kosicki, 1993).

At the same time, the field is organized along several important cleavages or disagreements. Epistemologically, some researchers are more confident about their ability to distil (semantic) meaning from others’ (lexical) discourse than others. A linguistic tradition, which also informs most computer science/artificial intelligence/natural language processing (NLP) applications, depends fully on patterns of lexical indicators (and a few grammatical rules); it invests its trust in statistical procedures to recognize shared ways of expressing things (e.g., Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Manning & Schütze, 1999). A sociological/cultural tradition invests heavily in the researcher’s cultural embeddedness and interpretative practice to “read” discourse and justify their interpretations (e.g., Fairclough, 2003; Wetherell & Potter

1 In this paper, I refer to discourse research as all scientific research that primarily investigates communicative texts in a wide sense, including some traditions that do not normally use the word “discourse”. This focus is different from the much narrower label “discourse analysis”, which refers to a bundle of specific analytic strategies.
A communication science tradition, finally, departs from a categorization of discourse practices according to (pre-defined or inductively created) semantic categories: It operates on the level of semantic meaning, instead of lexical discourse, and relies on both theory and researcher interpretations to map lexical indicators upon semantic meaning (e.g., Gamson, 1992; Edy, 1999; Wolfsfeld, 1997). Methodologically, consequently, the NLP tradition proceeds in a quantitative fashion, while the interpretative tradition tends to apply qualitative methodological strategies. The last tradition is more open methodologically, and is implemented in different ways across disciplines: Political science tends toward abstract categories and strong quantification (e.g., Lowe, Benoit, Mikhaylov & Laver, 2011) communication science has developed various hybrid formats for analyzing discourse in a category-based fashion: More qualitative strategies such as narrative analysis or frame analysis (e.g., Elliott, 2005; van Gorp, 2010), which derive concrete meaning inductively, coexist with quantitative content analysis, which defines categories deductively (e.g., Krippendorff, 2013). Recent automated approaches also require category definitions to be developed \textit{a priori}, but can define categories at low levels of abstraction to enable subsequent qualitative interpretation of detected patterns (e.g., Baden, 2010). “Qualitative” content analysis and related approaches populate the mid-range of the methodological continuum (e.g., Mayring, 2000). Within INFOCORE, both qualitative and quantitative strategies are used.

Further consequential distinctions concern the analytic angle taken: Linguistic analyses are chiefly interests in language use, and focus on processes of signification and categorization. Discourse processing research and psychological approaches access discourse as information to be represented mentally (e.g., van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) or computationally (in the case of artificial intelligence/NLP; van Atteveldt, 2008). Cultural and political sciences as well as social psychology tend to understand discourse as reflection of constructed social, political, and cultural reality: They focus on common beliefs (social representations, stereotypes, etc.; e.g., Moscovici, 1961) and practices reflected in, or constituted by, public discourse (e.g., exertion of power, establishment of conventions, etc.; e.g., Fairclough, 1989). Relatedly, political science often accesses discourse as a means for manipulating public perceptions and preferences (e.g., Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). In communication science, most of these approaches exist. In addition, it accesses discourse also as communicative constructions embedded within a process of deliberate construction/discourse production (e.g., by journalists, political elites, etc.), incomplete, transformative dissemination (chiefly, in the mass media), and the reconstructive, idiosyncratic comprehension by disperse audiences (Baden, 2010; van Dijk, 1985; Höijer, Norstedt, & Ottosen, 2002). This latter view dominates INFOCORE’s analyses.

Normatively, we can distinguish a teleological, a representational, and an agnostic position: At the teleological end, researchers view discourse as a means for shaping social reality, which can be used for good and for bad – seeking to establish empowering and dignifying manners of constructing social reality (e.g., Fairclough, 2003). Such studies appraise the openness, subjectivity, discursiveness, interactivity and diversity of discourse, and denounce consensus as hegemonic and backward (e.g., Herman & Chomsky, 1988). In a representational view, discourse is denounced if it “misrepresents” the world, or is systematically
biased in any way. This view may, but need not violate the constructivist epistemology: While some applications naively postulate known “facts” that should have been represented, better studies check for plausibility and correspondence to available input, identifying exclusionary patterns, biases and omissions (e.g., Benson, 2009). The agnostic view, which we follow in INFOCORE, does not primarily evaluate discourse, but attempts to understand what meaning is constructed and why (Wetherell & Potter, 1988). Its commitment is empiricist before normative, and its evaluations rest, if presented, in the (argued/demonstrated) effects of the meaning constructed.

**Research on conflict-related discourse**

Within discourse research, constructions of conflict and war have consistently played an important role. Conflict-related discourse is highly consequential for the analysis of violent conflict itself (Wolfsfeld, 1997): Given high need for information and analysis and scarce direct access to information, discourse advances to become a key informant of people’s conflict perceptions and behavior (Nohrstedt et al., 2000). Accordingly, a wide variety of actors attempt to influence conflict discourse, inciting also scholarly interest in conflict discourse (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009). In addition, conflict discourse is a prime venue for studying many key concerns of discourse research – notably, the creation and charging of categories, selective representations and interpretations of the world, processes of consensus formation and political conflict (Wolfsfeld, Frosh, & Awadby, 2008): Conflict discourse is ripe with historical analogies and metaphors, emotive language, controversial terminology, and speech acts (Kampf & Liebes, 2013).

Research in conflict discourse has addressed a variety of connections between constructed meaning and the evolution of conflict. Through the construction of social collectives (e.g., nations, ethnicities, races or classes), discourse provides audiences with a sense of shared identity and instills patriotism/group loyalty and exalts ingroups over others (e.g., Güney, 2010; Shmueli, Elliott, & Kaufman, 2006). Likewise, especially during violent conflict, enemy collectives are constructed as cohesive groups (even when this is utterly implausible, e.g. Nazi constructions of international, capitalist, Bolshevik Jewry), often presented or personalized as unified collective actor (e.g., in the war “against Milosevic”; Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012). Conflict discourse is ripe with biased accounts, contraptions and twisted representations. It assumes a strongly ingroup-specific perspective, often using emotive and incendiary language to present grievances as blatant injustice and outrage; Conflict roles are assigned, presenting women and children as victims, outgroup members as rogues or suspect at least (Fröhlich, 2010); Attacks and atrocities, victories and achievements are discursively constructed to fuel confidence in one’s own moral superiority and imminent success (Entman, 1991; Wolfsfeld et al., 2008). At the same time, current conflicts are often constructed as natural outcomes of eternal or long-standing struggles throughout history (e.g., Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012). Non-violent solutions appear as futile and war inevitable, absolving oneself from the accusation of aggression and attributing full responsibility to the enemy.² Beyond such discourse during conflict,
researchers have dedicated particular attention to justifications advanced for the commencement of hostilities (e.g., Höijer, Nohrstedt, & Ottosen, 2002; Lule 2004). Fewer scholars by far have investigated the discursive construction of the “end” of a conflict (e.g., Aday, Cluverius & Livingston, 2005). Post-conflict reconstructions of past conflict have been another important concern in research (most saliently, for World War II). The evolution of conflict interpretations over time, and their varying roles for the development of conflict, however, are still underresearched.

Key constructs in discourse research
The variety of concerns addressed in discourse research is almost as diverse as the social reality discourse is used to construct; providing a comprehensive review is doomed to fail. However, it is possible to organize several key constructs used in the analysis of public discourse, specifically in a conflict context.

Elements of the World: From social categories to semantic concepts
One first, basic but important focus of discourse research concerns which phenomena in the social world are constructed as “of one kind”, or as “of different kinds” – the construction of semantic concepts: What makes a terrorist, freedom fighter, or rebel? While conceptual definitions in discourse evolve through their use for the interpretation of real world phenomena, they are more strongly and stably conventionalized than their uses (enabling dictionaries etc.). This is best understood in the definition of social collectives and identities: Inclusionary and exclusionary practices in the assignment of labels such as “citizen”, “German”, or “immigrant” reveal the complex negotiations in discourse that define social categories. Conceptual categories are deliberately forged and redefined in discourse to serve political ends. For instance, conflict discourse contains high amounts of dichotomous categorizations, where the negation of one category membership implies membership in an opposed category (most famously, us/them, but also victims/perpetrators, attackers/defenders). Conflict discourse tends to introduce denotatively redundant categories enabling the connotation of positive or negative valence to the same phenomena, depending on who these are attributed to (e.g., first strike/pre-emptive strike). Also the use of explicitly or implicitly evaluative terminology has been extensively studied. While certain actors – notably, journalists – normally avoid openly evaluative terminology and leave evaluations to connoted concepts and framing (below), evaluative language is deeply embedded in political discourse. A final basic form of categorization, studied mostly in the context of linguistic taxonomies, is the different kinds of relations that phenomena can enter into. Most importantly, static relations of similarity/difference, inclusion/exclusion and possession can be distinguished from dynamic relations of agency, causality/influence, and transformation (and associative relations). Each of these basic categories share that they are rarely questioned in everyday discourse, and

of discourse production in conflict: e.g., ingroup-oriented communication leads to the selective affirmation of shared ideas and values, proximity and empathy with own troops and victims may bias emotional responses

3 The analysis of conceptual meaning is different from, though related to, analyzing the characterization of specific objects through the use of specific concepts: While the question whether someone is presented as a “rebel” belongs into the domain of framing (below), I am here concerned with discursive notions of what a “rebel” is.
thus suggest a natural identity, or distinction, between heterogeneous phenomena. Creating new categories can powerfully change people’s thinking (e.g., renaming social welfare contributions into non-wage labor costs, creating the category “Palestinian”). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue that most reasoning is grounded conceptually and thus responds to linguistic conventions (see also Croft & Cruse, 2004): Shared categories render the similarities of diverse phenomena salient, while distinct categories emphasize differences between the similar phenomena. Accordingly, in order to understand how discursive constructions of the world function and change, one first point of access is to look at how the denotative and connotative meaning of conceptual categories (specifically, social identity categories, interests, actions, values, etc.) are constructed.

*Descriptions of the World: From Information, evidence, and inference to Evidential Claims.*

The second main concern addresses what is being said about the social world: Discourse discriminates “noteworthy” information, which is verbalized, from “uninformative” information that is omitted, and endows verbalized claims with an epistemic truth status (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Grice, 1975). Discourse tends to emphasize facts that deviate from established expectations (Bruner, 1991), and highlight information that is believed to carry impact on further developments. What is verbalized or omitted depends on the intended meaning, the purpose and context of the debate, shared and idiosyncratic knowledge, institutionalized routines, and many other factors. Moreover, research has addressed different ways how information is legitimized in discourse: Speakers warrant claims by presenting examples or anecdotes, citing statistical or testimonial evidence; they cite authorities, argue the plausibility of their claims, or use rhetorical devices to render them seemingly obvious and undisputable (van Dijk, 2003; DeAndrea, 2014). Relatedly, discourse participants qualify their claims as certain or uncertain, controversial or widely accepted. Struckmann, Steinle, Biedermann, Koch and Baden (2012) have found that journalists tend to present information as relatively certain, even if it often is not (see also Baeriswyl, 1982; Stocking, 1992). Strategic communicators often tend to eclipse possible doubts, while experts normally highlight uncertainty (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012).

Statements about the world in discourse are often people’s only way of knowing about the world beyond their immediate experiences. Many beliefs and attitudes that people hold are based not on personal knowledge, but on discursive representations of distant realities – which are necessarily, often purposefully selective, more or less warranted and uncertain (Peter, 2003). This is particularly true in unobtrusive, confusing yet urgent situations such as violence and conflict. Accordingly, one of the key elements of researching public conflict discourse is to investigate “evidential claims” about the world: ontological claims about some aspect of the world, backed by some epistemic justification. Among all evidential claims, we are both interested in claims about specific key concerns driving the conflict, and in those claims presented

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4 This justification may not be explicated, but must imply that the claim accurately reflects the world (and not a fantasy) based on some form of knowing. It requires a proposition with the target domain of expressed meaning referring to social reality, expressing a past, present, or (expected) future state of the world claimed to be the case.
as important, novel information for understanding specific histories, situations or scenarios, thus updating people’s conflict knowledge.

Interpretations of the World: From contextualization and causal accounts to Interpretative Frames.

Information alone is insufficient to make sense of social reality, or violent conflict in particular. To become meaningful, information must be “framed”, i.e., embedded into coherent context that provides the grounds for explanation and interpretation (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987). Frames address three challenges characteristic for discourse: First, the complexity of social reality exceeds what can be verbalized, necessitating a selection of “relevant” information. Second, what is relevant rests not in phenomena themselves, but in their relation to other concerns – notably, evaluative implications, or a role in explaining aspects of the world based on some coherent “central organizing idea” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987). Only through its interpretation within selective, coherent context can information imply possible ways of acting upon it. Third, there are always multiple possible selections of aspects that suggest different coherent meanings. Frames are constructed purposefully to advocate specific understandings, evaluations, and courses of action in a competitive debate (Baden, 2010).

Frames in discourse function primarily by arranging propositions in characteristic, recurring ways (van Gorp, 2007). People perceive adjoined propositions in discourse to be related, and construct possible connections integrating the elements based on their prior knowledge (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). Frames thus are constructed against the backdrop of beliefs that people are expected to share (Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997). Frames draw upon formal/informal logic and analogical reasoning sustaining causal inference, and refer to conventional and popular wisdom (traded via socialization and/or acquired through experience⁵), recent public discourse, and collective memory (Baden, 2010; Edy, 1999; Gamson, 1996): Discourse merely contains a “frame package” (Pan & Kosicki, 1993; van Gorp, 2007) – a set of devices raising familiar categories and expressing evidential beliefs. This package then invites audiences to use further knowledge and to actively construct a macrostructure (the central organizing idea) that integrates the package into a coherent whole (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Gamson & Modigliani, 1987). While frame packages can be identified in manifest discourse, the interpretation of frames takes place between discourse and the recipient (van Gorp, 2007; Baden, 2010).

Entman (1993) has suggested that frames can be organized into four frame elements: Every frame needs to define its focal concern (problem definition, here: concern definition).⁶ This concern is embedded within a

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⁵ Frames are often interpreted against personal experience. However, frames in public communication do not normally refer to experiential knowledge, unless it is known to be shared (“popular wisdom”, Gamson, 1992). As communicative devices, frames can only refer to knowledge shared by speaker and expected audiences.

⁶ Entman’s (1993) terminology is somewhat narrow as he envisages focal concerns to always be problems that frames offer definite treatments for (see also Benford & Snow, 2000, for a similar, problem-focused conceptualization). It ignores that frames might define also unproblematic states, or offer projections of what might happen as a consequence without offering specific recommendations/endorsements. Also, evaluations can refer to other normative standards than morality, such as inspiration, popularity, conventionality, profitability, efficiency, or
causal account that provides both a suitable explanation (causal attribution)\(^7\) and projects into the future what will or should happen with regard to this concern (treatment recommendation, here: future projection). In addition, frames provide an evaluative tendency that is justified against some evaluative standard (moral evaluation, here: evaluation). Beyond this basic structure, researchers have proposed many possible frame “types”, most of which are of doubtful theoretical value.\(^8\) Some types categorize typical kinds of propositions used as problem definition within a frame,\(^9\) or specific kinds of causal accounts employed to link the problem definition to causal attribution and projection (notably, episodic and thematic news frames; Iyengar, 1991). However, all frames can be understood in terms of the coherent assembly of an ontological account (cause-concern-projection) and a normative appraisal (evaluation): They comprise a selective set of purposefully arranged evidential claims, which invoke relevant conceptual categories (Baden, 2010). These claims then constitute a logically ordered causal account, which contextualizes a focal concern through specific causes and consequences, and supports a normative standard for evaluation (Entman, 1993).

Research on frames in conflict discourse has highlighted that specific kinds of focal concerns – notably military action, casualties, victims – tend to dominate at the expense of other relevant concerns (e.g., Fröhlich, Scherer, & Scheufele, 2007; Höijer, Nohrstedt, & Ottosen, 2002; Robinson, Goddard, Parry, Murray & Taylor, 2010; Wolfsfeld, Frosh & Awadby, 2008). Causal explanations tend to personalize blame or attribute it to specific collective actors and do not further question contextual conditions, intentions, or pressures: Agency (specifically, the enemy’s) often appears as unmotivated outcome of actors’ respective natures (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012). Contextual explanations prevail mostly to account for the friendly side’s less laudable actions (Entman, 1991; Wolfsfeld et al., 2008), or if conflict is sufficiently remote for discourse to remain impartial. Evaluations are often extreme, as ambivalence and neutral appraisals retreat (de Bens, Hauttekeete, & Ghent, 2002). Conflict frames normally contain rather explicit calls for action, the outcome of which are presented as certain and uniquely valued. With regard to the semantic resources mobilized, conflict propaganda relies heavily on selective, culturally resonant constructions of the past and sustainability (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, see also Baden & Springer, 2014). Accordingly, I use a different terminology here to emphasize the more general nature of the structures identified by Entman, Benford and Snow.

\(^7\) E.g., the attribution of responsibility or a causal or naturalizing account

\(^8\) For instance, “responsibility frames” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000) merely represent an analytic perspective where the key interest is in the causal attribution dimension of the frame and the question who, if anyone, is presented as in control of causal mechanisms. Similarly, “morality frames” emphasize the evaluative dimension of the frame in analysis, and “economic consequences frames” represent an interest in specific kinds of projections that may or may not be present in a frame’s projection dimension (Valkenburg, Semetko, & de Vreese, 1999). “Valence frames” (or “Pro-frames” or “Con-frames”; Druckman, 2001; Brewer, 2001) categorize frames based on their evaluative tendency implied toward an object that is typically related to but often external to the frame (for a discussion of the relative quality of evaluations, see Schuck & de Vreese, 2012). These labels thus define not frame “types”, but analytic perspectives which appraise only specific parts of a frame, or consider whether specific elements are more or less strongly emphasized in a frame.

\(^9\) E.g., “conflict frames” (Valkenburg et al., 1999) refer to focal concerns constituted by the opposition between two positions; “horserace frames” (Scheufele, 1999) refer to focal concerns constituted by the comparison of two positions; “strategy frames” (Lawrence, 2000) are sometimes understood as frames that use strategic intent as causal explanation, and sometimes refer to strategic action as their focal concern.
make ample use of analogical inference (e.g., holocaust/Hitler comparisons; Edy, 1999; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Bennett & Manheim, 1993), while references to experiential knowledge are less common.10

Following Herman and Chomsky (1988), frames exert considerable power upon public perceptions and preferences to the degree that one or few interpretations dominate in discourse (see also de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006; Carragee & Roefs, 2004). Conversely, Druckman (2004) has shown that audiences are relatively autonomous in deciding which interpretative frames to adopt as long as competing frames remain present in the debate (see also Gamson, 1992). Consequently, the diversity of frames in conflict news is one key determinant of their tendency to open up societal debate and sense making, or to propagate specific, hegemonic views (Baden & Springer, 2014; Tenenboim-Weinblatt & Hanitzsch, 2014). Strategic actors may try to immunize their frames against empirical and normative challenging, and optimize their cultural resonance to obtain discursive hegemony (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009; Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012): They may mobilize normative absolutes and values beyond social negotiation (e.g., morals, divine justice); and they may refer to culturally strongly conventionalized historical or popular narratives to frame current situations as natural and inevitable (Edy, 1999). To the degree that such strategies succeed in crowding out alternative frames, the path forward appears to be painted clearly by the lessons of the past. By contrast, frames that present reality as man-made, context-dependent and changeable, and the path forward as open for various forms of negotiable action open up opportunities for re-evaluations of the situation. Specifically when multiple, diverse frames compete in a debate, constructing an understanding and policy choice requires choice, deliberation, and the continued search for corroborating evidence (Druckman, 2001; Baden & Springer, in press): Novel evidential claims continue to challenge existing frames, helping audiences to discriminate plausible from implausible interpretations, and requiring frames to continuously evolve as events unfold (Motta & Baden, 2013). When frames are supported by new information, they can accrue considerable followership, or even gain discursive dominance (Pennington & Hastie, 1988). The dynamics of frames evolving, gaining and losing discursive hegemony, advancing different interpretations and advocating different courses of action present another key focus of our research (Motta & Baden, 2013; Baden, Motta, & Dimitrakopoulou, 2012).

Directions for the World: From narrative to Agendas for Action

Looking at the larger interpretations raised by frames in discourse, many frames can be organized into larger semantic structures, two of which are particularly noteworthy. At the highest level of abstraction, frames that share common background assumptions about the nature of the world form common interpretative repertoires – ideationally coherent ways of describing social reality (Wetherell & Potter, 1988; see also Baden & Springer, in press; Noakes & Johnston, 2005). Repertoires are constituted by specific assumptions about what the world is made of, how things in the world are related, and what is valuable and desirable: They interpret the world as a place where a limited range of agents and objects interact with one another in a limited range of different ways (Wetherell & Potter, 1988). Repertoires do not necessarily deny that other

10 This is different in non-violent conflict, where frames are often closely grounded in everyday experiences.
things and interactions exist, but subordinating their relevance to their primary logic. For instance, they may interpret the world as a human quest for a moral and peaceful society, wherein politics and economics, animals and things are subordinated to the imperative of cooperative social relations. In discourse, repertoires serve to privilege certain kinds of frames over others, and legitimize and delegitimize specific kinds of actors (Ettema & Glasser, 2006).

Within interpretative repertoires, specific sequences of coherently framed events can form into causally connected narratives. Narratives can generally be defined as discursive representations of time-ordered sequences of events, which take place within a coherent story world (Elliott, 2005; Bussele & Bilandzic, 2008): Narratives constitute a range of assumptions about the environment wherein social life takes place, and which bears some implied relation to the real world (Bruner, 1991). This environment is then populated by sentient, willful, and relatively consistent actors as well as a limited set of objects that interact with one another. The interactions can be organized into more or less complex plotlines that causally link actions and occurrences to their story-relevant consequences within the confines of the story environment (Elliott, 2005). Importantly, narratives not only have an orderly temporal structure, but also a definite beginning and end: Unlike repertoires or frames, narratives require closure (Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2008). They commence from some stable situation, which is complicated by specified problems that require resolution. Throughout the narrative, interactions contribute to the problem and the solution, until another stable state is achieved, and the narrative ends. Accordingly, narratives can be understood as time-ordered sequences of events within one interpretative repertoire (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; see also Price & Tewksbury, 1997): As one situation leads to another, one frame’s focal concern becomes the next frame’s cause, and the next situation actualizes the prior frame’s projection.

Within the somewhat disorganized field of narrative analysis in the social sciences, conflict-related narratives have been a consistent concern of research. Most immediately, narratives extend the relevance of current (or past or future) controversies across time (Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2013). They link them to previous and subsequent situations, and endow relevant agents with relatively time-stable behavioral patterns, importing related meaning for the interpretation and evaluation of new events: Seemingly appeasing acts of known brutal or greedy actors appear as feints, while the good guys’ objectionable acts are demoted to accidents, or can be reinterpreted as tactical necessities on the path to a greater good (Entman, 1991; Wolfsfeld et al., 2008). Defeats and hardship become mere setbacks in a greater struggle. Narratives play an important role also for the formation and maintenance of collective identities in conflict (Archetti, 2012; Nossek & Berkowitz, 2006; Sheafer, Shenhar, & Goldstein, 2010): Historical narratives in

11 Within repertoires, discourse is not necessarily consensual, they can also sustain competing frames and different positions; nor is discourse always controversial across repertoires, which may admit commensurable interpretations.

12 Story worlds can deviate from rules known from the real world (e.g., in fictional narratives involving magic) but maintain some similarity, follow conventional orders, and are relevant in some way to real world concerns (e.g., by passing normative judgment, or narrating specific patterns or problems).

13 For instance, Fröhlich (2010) has found that women are normally presented as objects, not agents, in conflict coverage, and thus denied active influence on the plot; this is different for post-conflict reconstruction, where women sometimes advance to become key actors.
particular serve to conceptualize present heterogeneous society as united by a common ancestry, experience, and destiny. Narratives can construct conflicts as eternal or as temporary aberration, postulate the natural unity of difference of groups, construct common characteristics and values of a society, and cast certain groups as superior over others (see also Ettema & Glasser, 2006).

Importantly, collective narratives extend not only into the past, but also the future (Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2013): They construct and negotiate the common quests and fundamental values that a society is demanded to follow. Conflict narratives typically construct finalities that are not (yet) achieved, they remain “non-closed” (Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2008); the remaining changes needed to achieve closure present an agenda for action. Such action may focus on the need to undo the disturbance driving the narrative from its initial, stable state and causing the conflict (reverting to balance); or it may derive from the constructed ideal state of the finality, such as peace, victory, or deliverance (ascending to balance). In addition, narratives often mobilize collective memory to show how action that turned out conducive in the past legitimizes current calls for action (Edy, 1999; Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2013). Agendas – especially in conflict – are usually explicated as directives and demands, but they can also be implicated in the presentation of current, unsatisfying states and unhelpful acts. However, narratives are rarely fully explicated: To the degree that narratives are well-familiar in a culture (e.g., as myths and established actor stereotypes), highly selective references may suffice to retrieve the complex necessities that require the advocated action: Conflict narratives require the less explication the longer the conflict continues, and the more conventionally it is framed in the public debate. Because the story worlds spanned by narratives naturalize agency and causality and provide their own evaluative contexts, narratives can powerfully present advocated agendas as obvious and acceptable: Audiences transported into the narrative suspend their disbelief and critical faculties (Bussele & Bilandzic, 2008) and might thus be led to support even extreme agendas (e.g., genocide, war). Accordingly, the narrative construction of collective agendas in conflict presents one key interest in INFOCORE’s research.

Research agendas in discourse research

From this follow three main research agendas needed to understand the role of discourse in conflict.

1. Discourse & Construction

The most immediate challenge is to understand what meanings are constructed for the social world that conflict takes place in: On the level of concepts, we can ask what kinds of categories are used to adjoin/distinguish and characterize actors/actor groups. We can investigate what categories are used to present their actions, how events are categorized, and what kinds of issues, goals and values are raised. Both the inclusiveness/exclusiveness of categorizations and the evaluative (connotative or denotative) charging of categories play key roles for enabling the construction of resolvable, or essential conflict.

14 The nexus of transportation and persuasion is mostly studied in popular culture and advertising research, but is pertinent also in the context of propaganda and violence (Edy & Meirick, 2007; Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012)
On the level of **evidential claims**, we can scrutinize what events and facts are selected as information, identifying conflict-typical selection biases. We can ask who introduces these claims, and how these are qualified and warranted, assessing specifically the contentiousness or uncertainty of claims. We distinguish claims about the past, present, and future, which play key roles for naturalizing, evaluating, and directing accounts of conflict, and inform audiences’ sense of urgency, policy preferences, and manifest behavior.

On the level of **frames**, we need to analyze how social reality is interpreted in discourse: Which objects are cast as problematic, what causes are attributed, and what future developments projected? How are evaluations justified? Further concerns involve the mobilization of analogies, collective memory, and other inferential reasoning in frames, which render selective, possibly biased interpretations seemingly natural and persuasive. Beyond individual frames, we are interested in the diversity of interpretations.

On the level of **narratives**, we can investigate how cross-temporal accounts of social reality, the conflict, and the groups participating therein are forged. We can trace the construction of group and actor identities and values, and evaluate their exclusiveness and openness to conflict or reconciliation. Likewise, we can identify the interpretative repertoires constituting the story worlds wherein interpretations of conflict are set. Crucially, we need to identify the agendas for action advocated to resolve the current situation and evaluate the means and finalities thus constructed. Because most actors understand and respond to conflict based on its discursive representation (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), our analysis must depart from the description and understanding the quality of meaning presented in its various nuances.

2. **Consensus & Contention**

Building upon the descriptive analysis, the next question is how commonly acknowledged and accepted, or how contested such constructions are. We need to distinguish marginal, widely ignored/rejected claims, frames, and narratives from those generally acknowledged as relevant, and again from those accepted as accurate accounts of social reality (Sibley, Liu, & Kirkwood, 2006). At the same time, constructions may also be so well established that they do not require further mentioning, shaping the set of culturally conventionalized assumptions.

Discourses may be more or less open toward plural, competing accounts, tolerating or marginalizing constructions that do not tally with established beliefs. Evidential claims can be challenged (often also involving a challenge to used categories), frames can be criticized as misleading or irrelevant, and the desirability and priority of agendas can be contested. Moreover, new evidential claims may contradict presumptions included in a frame, and agendas may be inconsistent with the causes, projections, and evaluations in a frame. Each of these contestations may affect the sharedness and hegemony of views within discourse: Semantic contention may be resolved by competition (rejection of weaker views), by hierarchical ordering (accepting both views as non-contradictory but differently important), or the transformation and possible merger of constructions and the creation of new meaning. Where no resolution is found, confusion or internal conflict arises, possibly leading to the creation of polar views in different sub-discourses:

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15 Not necessarily in the sense of resolving conflict: Agendas may pursue other finalities than peaceful cohabitation.
Different groups within or across societies may regard different constructions as consensual, contentious or irrelevant, introducing inter-group semantic polarization and conflict. Accordingly, we need to assess specific patterns of adherence to and rejection of relevant interpretations: The force of discourse for shaping audience perceptions, informing behavior and legitimizing (possibly radical) conflict actions depends critically on the degree of consensus achieved in a group. Accordingly, the analysis of consensus and conflict over important constructions must be our second step.

3. Discourse & Dynamics

Semantic conflict is also a key driver of evolution in discursively constructed meaning (Motta & Baden, 2013). New evidential claims challenge and transform frames and agendas, conflicting views transform and gain or lose hegemony in discourse, new consensus is formed and new conflicts arise. Each of the above concerns can therefore be investigated in diachronic perspective: Categories morph and gain or lose evaluative charges. Evidential claims are revised, become validated or are called into question. Frames change shape, adjusting to accommodate new concerns and evidence, and aligning in new ways to perpetuate ongoing narratives and support changing agendas. Processes of consensus formation or erosion can be traced over time. Viewpoints polarize or de-polarize between groups, as mediating positions are formulated more or less commonly. Semantic conflicts result in time-varying constellations of hegemonic, contested, and marginal constructions, and necessitate further evolution of advanced claims, frames, and agendas. In order to comprehend the role of public discourse for the interpretation of violent conflict, we need to focus on dynamics of diachronic change in the way social reality is constructed, and analyze processes of transformation, radicalization, polarization, consensus formation and the establishment and erosion of widely accepted meaning.
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