

# When Deterrence Backfires: House Demolitions, Palestinian Radicalization, and Israeli Fatalities

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Michael Freedman<sup>1</sup>  and Esteban F. Klor<sup>2</sup>

## Abstract

Conflict points around the world involve government forces fighting terrorist groups. In this type of warfare, there is a danger that counterterrorist efforts may backfire, providing ammunition for additional cycles of violence. We study this issue focusing on selective and indiscriminate house demolitions employed by Israel during the Second Intifada. We exploit the temporal and spatial variation of this policy to assess its impact on Palestinians' political views. We find that the civilian population does not react to punitive house demolitions, a selective form of counterterrorism. On the contrary, Palestinians are more likely to adopt more radical political opinions in response to precautionary house demolitions, an indiscriminate form of counterterrorism. We also show that political radicalization induced by indiscriminate counterterrorism leads to an increase in future terror attacks. Overall, our analysis provides explicit empirical support to the mechanism behind the positive correlation between indiscriminate counterterrorism and future levels of violence.

## Keywords

counterterrorism, political radicalization, house demolitions

## Introduction

Why is counterterrorism an effective policy to reduce violence in some circumstances but backfires in others? The prevailing view in the conflict literature is that discriminate

<sup>1</sup>Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel

<sup>2</sup>Department of Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

## Corresponding Author:

Michael Freedman, Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, Haifa 3498838, Israel.

Email: [mrffreed@poli.haifa.ac.il](mailto:mrffreed@poli.haifa.ac.il)

measures of counterterrorism are more effective than indiscriminate ones. According to this view, selective measures of counterterrorism do not lead to an increase in violence whereas indiscriminate measures may backfire and lead to an increase in violence (Kalyvas 2006). The theoretical literature highlights the role of the civilian population's political preferences as one of the main mechanisms underlying these relationships: indiscriminate violence is supposed to bring about the radicalization of the population whereas selective violence should not.

The empirical literature testing this theory is divided into two different complementary approaches. The first approach builds off a larger 'winning hearts and minds' literature (Biddle 2008; Berman et al. 2011; Beath et al. 2013; DeNardo 1985; Hirose et al. 2017), and focuses exclusively on the mechanism; i.e. whether selective and/or indiscriminate counterterrorism leads to the radicalization of the population (Hatz 2019a, 2019b; Jaeger et al. 2012; Mason and Krane 1989; Shaver and Shapiro 2019). The second empirical approach adopts a "reduced form" framework, and directly tests whether or not selective and/or indiscriminate forms of counterterrorism are effective in curtailing future attacks (Benmelech et al. 2015; Condra and Shapiro 2012; Lyall 2009; Zhukov 2015). These studies deliver contradictory evidence on the reduced form effect of indiscriminate measures on retaliatory violence. While Lyall (2009) and Zhukov (2015) find that indiscriminate measures are effective in curtailing future attacks, Condra and Shapiro (2012) and Benmelech et al. (2015) find the opposite effect. Overall, this highlights the need to causally assess the relationship between counterterrorism and retaliatory violence from beginning to end, as the theory posits that the radicalization of the local population is a necessary condition for indiscriminate violence to backfire.

We evaluate the relationship between counterterrorism and retaliatory violence in the context of the Second Intifada, where there was a massive rise in violent attacks by Palestinian militants and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), together with a drop in the security coordination between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. To suppress terror, Israel chose to directly intervene in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, using a number of tactics to achieve their goals. These included targeted killings, curfews, air strikes, and house demolitions. We focus on two main types of house demolitions that Israel carried out: punitive and precautionary house demolitions. Punitive house demolitions are directly targeted against terror operatives. Following Kalyvas' (2006) definition of a given policy as selective if that policy targets opponents on an individual level, we classify punitive house demolitions as a selective policy of counterterrorism. In contrast, precautionary house demolitions target houses located in certain areas for military purposes, irrespective of their owners' behavior.<sup>1</sup> We classify precautionary house demolitions as an indiscriminate form of counterterrorism because this policy targets a group, regardless of the actions of the afflicted individuals (Kalyvas 2006, 142).

We report two main empirical findings. First, counterterrorist acts are interpreted in a discerning manner by the civilian population. The civilian population does not react to punitive house demolitions, a selective form of counterterrorism. On the contrary,

Palestinians are more likely to adopt more radical political opinions only in response to precautionary house demolitions, an indiscriminate form of counterterrorism. Second, using a 2SLS design, we find an increase in the number of future acts of terror committed in districts which exhibit political radicalization due to precautionary house demolitions. We also include a rich set of empirical tests that assess the sensitivity of our results to different specifications and identification concerns and find that our main results are robust to these choices.

Our results corroborate the findings of [Hatz \(2019b\)](#) that perceptions of selectivity matter. Even though punitive house demolitions include an element of collective punishment (e.g. family members and other individuals residing in the house are also affected), the Palestinian population does not radicalize after the implementation of this policy. Hence, Palestinians seem to interpret punitive house demolitions as a selective form of punishment, which is commensurate to terror operatives. In contrast, precautionary house demolitions are interpreted by the Palestinian population as a collective punishment. Consequently, Palestinians harden their preferences towards peace and negotiations only in the aftermath of precautionary house demolitions.

In addition, our analysis indicates that counterterrorist acts have an effect that goes beyond militant groups, and that their impact on the civilian population matters for the evolution of the conflict over time. We are not able to identify which particular channel links civilians' political preferences with increases in violence (e.g. mobilization, support to militants, or both). That said, we provide evidence that indiscriminate counterterrorist measures, which are perceived as a threat by the aggrieved population, are associated with radicalization and a subsequent increase in Israeli fatalities.

We concentrate here on a particular conflict and a particular time period, and one should be cautious when generalizing our results to other contexts. That said, we believe that the broader message of this study is relevant for conflicts elsewhere. House demolitions are one example of a type of violence suffered by civilians in the course of counterterrorism. Similar types of violence include actions such as drones, targeted assassinations, and missile strikes. The efficacy of these counterterrorism actions is the subject of current policy debates in other conflicts around the world ([Christia et al. 2021](#); [Johnston and Sarbahi 2016](#); [Shah 2018](#); [Zussman and Zussman 2006](#)).

## Violence and Counter Violence During Conflict

[Kalyvas' \(2006\)](#) seminal work sets up a theory of violence during conflict which typically involves three actors: the state, insurgents, and the civilian population. During a conflict, both the state and insurgents vie for the support of the civilian population, especially in areas where control is contested. From the perspective of the state, civilians provide valuable intelligence on the actions of the insurgents. From the perspective of the insurgents, civilians are a potential mobilizing resource and typically provide refuge to militants.

According to this setup, the state engages in selective violence in order not to alienate the civilian population. However, when it is not possible to engage in selective

violence—either due to lack of precision weapons, capacity, or accurate information—it sometimes is effective to engage in indiscriminate violence (Zhukov 2015). In this scenario, the devastation to militant capacity could be so high (such as transfer of populations) that retaliation is not possible.

Of course, the main risk in using indiscriminate violence is that it may backfire and lead to an increase in violence. Specifically, it may radicalize the civilian population, leading them to side with the militants (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Zhukov 2014). An increase in militants' popular support strengthens their capabilities by providing them with potential recruits and resources from the civilian population (Toft and Zhukov 2015). In addition, it makes it more difficult for the state to acquire valuable information.

Due to the risk of backlash, states may tolerate insurgent attacks and choose not to implement indiscriminate policies of counterterrorism to combat them (Abrahams et al. 2020; Toft and Zhukov 2012). However, this approach may embolden militants to carry out more attacks. Overall, this suggests that states need to be careful regarding how to best respond to militant violence, terrorism, or to insurgents.

## **House Demolitions Within the Israeli-Palestinian Context**

Israelis and Palestinians have gone through periods of high and low conflict intensity. Israel has employed several counterterrorism measures that differ in the degree which they discriminate between combatants and civilians. This paper focuses on house demolitions, which has a long and controversial history in Israel.<sup>2</sup> In practice, Israel carries out two main types of house demolitions, whose classification is determined jointly by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Israeli Supreme Court of Justice.<sup>3</sup> According to the law, the IDF is required to give a prior warning to house owners and a justification before its demolition. In most cases, house owners appeal the IDF's decision and the case is argued in front of the Israeli Supreme Court of Justice. Consequently, the Palestinian population knows the reasons behind house demolitions.

The first type of house demolition is punitive—its goal is to punish the perpetrators of terror, and to deter future attacks. The stated rationale of this policy is deterrence, where the assumption is that people would be less willing to resort to terror if they know that they and their families are going to become homeless after the attack. This is a discriminate form of counterterrorism as it targets specific individuals who are involved in terror. The second type of house demolitions is precautionary—it is used by the IDF typically in cases where there are security concerns related to the houses' locations. For instance, houses that oversee main roads are demolished to prevent the possibility of future sniper attacks. Similarly, houses close to the border may be demolished to allow patrols to drive by. During the second Intifada, precautionary house demolitions were primarily used in the Gaza Strip to create “no go areas” around the border, Israeli settlements, army posts, and in areas where rockets had been launched towards Israel. In this way, they are indiscriminate since even houses of individuals who are not involved in terror or who have not broken the law may be demolished—although

homeowners are sometimes given financial compensation for the destruction of their homes.

House demolitions remain a controversial counterterrorism tool in Israel. Proponents argue that they are an effective way to stop terror, as the loss of property deters future potential attackers. This is the IDF main justification in favor of using this policy in cases argued in front of the Supreme Court of Justice (see, e.g. [Cohen and Shany 2019](#)). Detractors argue that it is an ineffective tool as it radicalizes the local population, which increases popular support for future attacks. The report conducted by [Shnayderman \(2004\)](#) claims that, in addition to the material harm inflicted as a result of the loss of property, house demolitions also have severe long-term consequences and affect almost all aspects of family life.<sup>4</sup>

Empirically, recent work finds that punitive house demolitions do cause an immediate and significant decrease in suicide terror attacks, while precautionary house demolitions lead to an increase in suicide terror attacks ([Benmelech et al., 2015](#)). However, it remains unclear what is the mechanism behind these effects, and to what extent the political preferences of the overall Palestinian population matter for observed fluctuations in future levels of violence. This is the focus of the current study and its main contribution to the related literature.

## Data

To study the relationship between house demolitions and Palestinian public opinion we merge several data sets. These data sets include detailed information on Palestinian public opinion, house demolitions, and Israeli and Palestinian fatalities.

The micro-level data on the political attitudes of the Palestinian population are the same as those used in [Jaeger et al. \(2012, 2015\)](#). These data come from a set of surveys conducted by the Development Studies Program (DSP) at Bir Zeit University. The data include 25 polls from 6 November 2000 until 20 December 2006 where every poll has 1200 observations (about 30,000 respondents overall). The polls include a wide array of questions on political issues such as support for democracy, support for peace negotiations with Israel, and support for different Palestinian political factions. The surveys also include important demographic information such as gender, age, marital status, education, and type of residence. By including information on individuals' district of residence, we are able to estimate the effect of house demolitions at the district level.

We measure individuals' political radicalization by focusing on two related questions that repeat themselves in most surveys. The first question asks: "Which of the following political groups do you support?" The possible answers include Fatah, Hamas, The Palestinian Islamic Jihad, other, and support for no faction.<sup>5</sup> We follow the classification of [Jaeger et al. \(2012\)](#), who showed that Fatah's supporters are more moderate than supporters of any other faction, including individuals disaffected from Palestinian factions. The average share of individuals that support Fatah for the entire period at issue equals 29.12%. The second question asks: "Do you support or oppose

the continuation of negotiations with the Israelis?" We define support for peace negotiations as a moderate position. On average, 61.72% of individuals support negotiations.

The micro-level data on house demolitions are the same as those used in [Benmelech et al. \(2015\)](#). The data were obtained from B'Tselem, an Israeli human rights organization that monitors the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The data include all punitive house demolitions between September 2000 and December 2005 and all precautionary house demolitions for 2004 and 2005. The data also include the specific location of every house that was demolished, its size, number of residents affected, number of units, date of the demolition, and the reason for the demolition. Following the literature's standard definition of selective and discriminate violence we classify punitive house demolitions as a selective form of counter-terrorism and precautionary house demolitions as an indiscriminate form of counterterrorism (see, e.g. [Benmelech et al. 2015](#); [Kalyvas 2006](#)).

The theoretical arguments presented above revolve around concepts like (suicide) terrorism and counter-terrorism, which are commonly used by the related literature.<sup>6</sup> Our empirical analysis relies on data on curfews, Israeli and Palestinian fatalities, and Palestinian suicide attacks as proxies to those concepts. These data come from B'Tselem and the Israeli Security Agency. Finally, we include data on the economic and demographic characteristics of the Palestinian population, which we obtained from Palestinian Labor Force Surveys (see [Benmelech et al. 2010](#) for a detailed description of these variables).

[Table 1](#) presents summary statistics for the main variables of interest over time. The table shows that support for Fatah falls during the most violent years of the Second Intifada, and recovers towards the end of the Intifada as the number of Palestinian fatalities decreases. In contrast, support for negotiations remains relatively stable, with a small majority supporting peace negotiations throughout the Second Intifada. Punitive house demolitions follow the same temporal pattern, which is highly correlated with Israeli fatalities. Israel did not conduct any punitive house demolition between 1998 and October 2001. Israel renewed this policy in 23 October 2001 when it demolished the house of Sa'id al-Hutri in Qalqiliya, who committed a suicide terror attack at a discotheque in Tel Aviv in June 2001 killing 21 Israelis ([Shnayderman 2004](#)). We observe relatively low levels of house demolitions at the beginning of the second uprising, a sharp increase in 2002 and 2003 (together with a sharp increase in the number of Israeli fatalities), a moderate decrease in 2004 and a sharp decrease in their use for 2005.

Unfortunately, the data for precautionary house demolitions is only available since 2004. Most precautionary house demolitions occurred in Rafah refugee camp between March and November of 2004. During those months, the IDF demolished 619 houses in Rafah to create a 300-m buffer zone along Gaza's border with Egypt (Human Rights Watch 2004). That said, our data set includes precautionary house demolitions in other districts within the Gaza Strip (Khan Yunis, North Gaza, Gaza City) and the West Bank (Qalqilya, Nablus, Jenin, Hebron, etc.).

**Table 1.** Summary Statistics (by Year).

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Public opinion data						
Support for Fatah	0.29	0.23	0.23	0.27	0.32	0.43
Support for peace negotiations	0.61	0.51	0.64	0.63	0.59	—
Suicide terror attacks	3	33	60	28	15	13
Israeli fatalities	42	195	439	199	109	52
Palestinian fatalities	286	470	1038	589	831	193
House demolitions						
Punitive	0	9	239	224	153	2
Precautionary	—	—	—	—	914	10

Authors' calculations using house demolitions and fatality data from B'Tselem and poll data from DSP. The data set covers the period October 2000 to December 2005.

Figure 1 plots the average number of Israeli fatalities in terror attacks (the first number), punitive house demolitions (the second number), and support for negotiations (the third number) for all 16 districts under the Palestinian Authority rule (11 in the West Bank, 5 in Gaza). The figure illustrates the spatial heterogeneity of violence and radicalization. For instance, some areas have a more radical population and are associated to higher levels of Israeli fatalities and house demolitions (Hebron, Nablus, Jenin), while other areas experienced low levels of violence and more willingness to conduct negotiations (Tubas, Jericho).

Table 2 displays summary statistics of the economic and demographic variables of interest, pooled by political preferences. This table shows that there aren't any clear differences in the observable characteristics of Fatah and non-Fatah supporters, and between those who support peace negotiations and those who oppose peace negotiations. The largest observable difference is that males are more likely to support Fatah and to oppose peace negotiations.<sup>7</sup> To account for this difference and other potential confounders, our specifications include a rich set of demographic and economic controls.

Overall, Table 1 and Figure 1 show that there is a high level of spatial and temporal variation in house demolitions, fatalities, and radicalization. This is crucial for our empirical design which includes time and district fixed effects.

## Empirical Strategy

Our empirical strategy exploits the temporal and geographic variation in house demolitions to estimate their impact on Palestinian public opinion. We propose the following model:





Figure 1. Israeli fatalities, punitive house demolitions, and support for negotiations, by district.



**Table 2.** Summary Statistics on Demographic and Economic Characteristics.

	All	Fatah	Not Fatah	Support negotiations	Oppose negotiations
Share male	0.49	0.57	0.46	0.48	0.53
Age	36.58	35.53	36.63	36.87	34.04
Share married	0.78	0.76	0.78	0.79	0.71
Share refugees	0.43	0.45	0.42	0.42	0.45
Share in city	0.41	0.40	0.42	0.39	0.39
Share in refugee camp	0.18	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.19
Daily wage (NIS)	63.64	62.99	64.46	63.36	64.06
Unemployment rate	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.37	0.37
Education—Elementary	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.18	0.14
Education—Preparatory	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.26	0.28
Education—Secondary	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.28
Education—Some college	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.09
Education—College degree	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.11
Days with curfews	13.12	11.96	12.00	14.72	14.38

Authors' calculations using polling data from DSP. The data on curfews come from the UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The data set covers the period October 2000 to December 2005.

$$Att_{i,j,t} = \alpha_1 \cdot HD_{j,t-k} + \alpha_2 \cdot P_{j,t-k} + \alpha_3 \cdot I_{j,t-k} + \alpha_4 \cdot X_{j,t-k} + Z_{i,j,t} \cdot \Phi + \mu_j + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{i,j,t} \quad (1)$$


where the outcome variable  $Att_{i,j,t}$  is the political attitude of individual  $i$  in district  $j$  and poll  $t$ . The main explanatory variable  $HD_{j,t-k}$  is the number of houses demolished in district  $j$  within  $k$  weeks before the poll taken at time  $t$ . The model controls for  $P_{j,t-k}$ , the number of Palestinian fatalities (including targeted killings) in district  $j$  within  $k$  weeks before poll  $t$ , and  $I_{j,t-k}$ , the number of Israeli fatalities in district  $j$  within  $k$  weeks before poll  $t$ . Model (1) also controls for other security measures such as border closings in district  $j$  within  $k$  weeks before poll  $t$  ( $X_{j,t-k}$ ), and for a vector of individuals' demographic characteristics such as age, education, occupation, and gender ( $Z_{i,j,t}$ ). The model also includes district fixed effects and time dummies.

The goal of the proposed econometric specification is to identify  $\alpha_1$ , which represents the causal effect of house demolitions on an individual's political attitudes. By including fixed-effects for each district, we are essentially examining whether changes over time in house demolitions within a district are correlated with the change over time in political views in that district. The identifying assumption is that the occurrence of house demolitions across locations over time is not affected by deviations of the local trend in political views relative to the national trend. This seems like a reasonable assumption considering that the timing for most house demolitions is somewhat random.

To examine this issue further, we plot in [Figure 2](#) the number of days that elapsed between the actual terror attack and the subsequent punitive house demolition. According to the figure, about one fourth of punitive house demolitions happen within 30 days after an attack. At the same time, in the majority of cases, a long-time elapses between the attack and the corresponding house demolition. The actual timing of punitive house demolitions is affected by the time it takes the IDF to determine that a given suspect plays a significant role in a terrorist cell and, after that, the time it takes to obtain the authorization from the Supreme Court to demolish his or her house. The timing of precautionary house demolitions is also random as these demolitions are also approved by the Supreme Court and their actual execution is related to the Court's timeline.

There are two remaining concerns with our empirical strategy. First, it is possible that effects of house demolitions are confounded by other IDF counterterrorism actions that are used in response to terror attacks. For instance, in the aftermath of a terror attack, terrorists' districts of origin may not only experience house demolitions but other security measures as well, such as targeted killings, closures and/or curfews (see [Benmelech et al. 2010](#)). The second concern is that it is possible that some actions of Palestinian terror groups operating at the district level may have an effect on the political preferences of the district's residents. For example, a successful attack against an Israeli target may lead to the radicalization of the population in the district of origin of the perpetrator.

We address these concerns by controlling for all available security measures (e.g. Palestinian fatalities and curfews), and by the number of suicide attacks (and resulting Israeli fatalities) that happened within 30 days before the polls. This allows us to estimate the marginal effects of house demolitions above and beyond the effects of other security measures implemented in the immediate aftermath of suicide terror attacks, as well as the effects of other conflict dynamics that vary at the district level.



**Figure 2.** Time elapsed between Palestinian attacks and punitive house demolitions.

## The Effect of House Demolitions on Radicalization and Violence

Our analysis delivers three key findings. First, we show that the Palestinian civilian population distinguishes between selective and indiscriminate forms of counterterrorism (as classified by the IDF and Supreme Court), and adopts more radical political positions only in response to indiscriminate forms of counterterrorism. Second, we observe that precautionary house demolitions, an indiscriminate form of counterterrorism, have both a short-term and a long-term effect on the radicalization of individuals' political preferences. Third, using a 2SLS design, we find that political radicalization caused by indiscriminate policies of counterterrorism is likely to lead to an increase in the number of terror attacks and Israeli fatalities.

### *Selective Versus Indiscriminate Forms of Counterterrorism*

[Table 3](#) estimates the impact of punitive house demolitions, a selective form of counterterrorism, on the political opinions of the Palestinian civilian population. To capture the salience of house demolitions, we measure all house demolitions within 4 weeks of each poll.<sup>8</sup>

Column 1 shows the results of estimating the simple correlation between punitive house demolitions within 4 weeks of each survey and support for Fatah. This model does not control for any of the available individuals and districts' demographic and social characteristics. Column 2 adds these controls to the model. The results in columns 1 and 2 suggest that punitive house demolitions are associated with a decrease on support for Fatah. Note, however, that these models do not include time or district fixed effects. Therefore, these coefficients are likely spurious due to the negative correlation between house demolitions and reduced support for Fatah shown in [Table 1](#) and [Figure 1](#).

Column 3 adds to the estimated model district and time fixed effects. As already mentioned above, district fixed effects allow us to control for constant districts' omitted characteristics that may be correlated with their population's preferences and the observed level of violence. Time effects allow us to control for aggregate trends on the level of violence and preferences. Once we take this into account, the negative correlation observed in columns 1 and 2 completely disappears. The estimated coefficient even indicates that punitive house demolitions may have a slight positive effect on political moderation, although the effects are not statistically significant. Accordingly, we conclude that punitive house demolitions do not affect Palestinians' support for Fatah.

Columns 4–6 in [Table 3](#) repeat the same estimations but focusing on the effects of punitive house demolitions on Palestinians' support for negotiations with Israel. The results deliver the same pattern as the one obtained for Fatah support. A naïve estimation of the impact of punitive demolitions on support for negotiations without controlling for district or time effects would lead us to believe that punitive house

**Table 3.** The Effect of Punitive House Demolitions on Political Radicalization.

Variable	Support for Fatah			Support for negotiations		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Punitive house demolition (100s)	-0.0667 (0.196)	-0.0957 (0.198)	0.3280 (0.232)	-0.500** (0.226)	-0.528** (0.231)	0.1440 (0.249)
Palestinian fatalities (100s)	-0.0069*** (0.002)	-0.0059*** (0.002)	-0.0002 (0.002)	0.0006 (0.002)	-0.0001 (0.002)	0.0017 (0.002)
Israeli fatalities (100s)	0.0050** (0.002)	0.0041* (0.002)	0.0007 (0.003)	-0.0002 (0.002)	-0.0001 (0.002)	-0.0011 (0.003)
Suicide attacks within 30 days before polls	-0.0281*** (0.009)	-0.0381*** (0.009)	-0.0178* (0.010)	-0.0050 (0.008)	-0.0121 (0.008)	-0.0023 (0.009)
City		-0.0262*** (0.008)	-0.0207** (0.009)		-0.0142 (0.010)	-0.0173 (0.011)
Refugee camp		0.0032 (0.012)	-0.0090 (0.013)		-0.0040 (0.015)	-0.0120 (0.016)
Male		0.0947*** (0.007)	0.0951*** (0.007)		-0.0297*** (0.009)	-0.0290*** (0.009)
Age		-0.0012*** (0.000)	-0.0016*** (0.000)		0.0014*** (0.000)	0.0014*** (0.000)
Married		0.0161 (0.010)	0.0121 (0.010)		0.0640*** (0.013)	0.0627*** (0.013)
Refugee		0.0232*** (0.008)	0.0220** (0.009)		-0.0323*** (0.011)	-0.0356*** (0.011)
Elementary education		0.0193 (0.014)	0.0079 (0.013)		-0.0055 (0.017)	-0.0106 (0.017)
Middle school		-0.0152 (0.013)	-0.0297** (0.013)		-0.0542*** (0.017)	-0.0584*** (0.017)
Secondary education		0.0064 (0.014)	-0.0169 (0.013)		-0.0632*** (0.017)	-0.0689*** (0.017)
Some college		0.0103 (0.017)	-0.0070 (0.017)		-0.107*** (0.021)	-0.110*** (0.021)
College degree		-0.0053 (0.016)	-0.0271* (0.016)		-0.0744*** (0.020)	-0.0809*** (0.020)
Locality's average wage		-0.0029*** (0.000)	0.0014 (0.001)		-0.0013*** (0.000)	-0.0040*** (0.001)
Locality's unemployment rate		-0.345*** (0.041)	-0.0411 (0.080)		-0.0937* (0.052)	0.0788 (0.075)
Percent of closures last month		-0.0007** (0.000)	0.0006 (0.001)		0.0007 (0.000)	0.0013** (0.001)
Observations	17,466	16,474	16,474	12,064	11,969	11,969
R <sup>2</sup>	0.002	0.023	0.047	0.001	0.020	0.031
Control for demographic Charact.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Time effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

See [Table 1](#). The data set covers the period October 2000 to December 2005.

Note: Estimated via OLS. Dependent variable is an indicator variable for support for Fatah (columns 1–3) and supporting peace negotiations (columns 4–6). The main explanatory variable is all punitive house demolitions, up to 4 weeks before the polls. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the poll-district level, in brackets; \*indicates statistically significant at 10% level, \*\*indicates statistically significant at 5% level; \*\*\*indicates statistically significant at 1% level.

demolitions bring about the radicalization of the Palestinian population. The preferred specification in column 6 shows that this is not the case.

Table 4 examines the effect of precautionary house demolitions, an indiscriminate form of counterterrorism, on Palestinians' support for Fatah and for peace negotiations. The results establish that precautionary house demolitions lead to a decrease in support for Fatah and for negotiations with Israel. This is the case across all specifications, including those controlling for time and district fixed effects. This implies that our results are precisely estimated and are unlikely to be driven by other unobserved conflict factors associated with house demolitions (Altonji et al. 2005). Our preferred specifications in columns 3 and 6 indicate that a standard deviation increase in the number of precautionary house demolitions is associated with a 1.8% decrease in support for Fatah and a 1.6% decrease in support for peace negotiations with Israel evaluated at their means. These effects are larger in magnitude compared to other factors, such as the percent of closures in the last month or the number of Palestinian fatalities.

Overall, these analyses show that the Palestinian population adopts more radical political opinions to counterterrorism measures viewed as indiscriminate, while its political preferences are not affected by selective policies of counterterrorism.

### *The Long-Term Effects of House Demolitions*

Table 5 examines the sensitivity of our results to different lags of house demolitions prior to the public opinion surveys. This allows us to test to what extent the effects of house demolitions on individuals' preferences remain salient or fade over time.

All columns in Table 5 present models using our preferred specification, which includes demographic controls, district fixed effects, and time effects. Panel A shows the results for punitive house demolitions whereas panel B shows the results for precautionary house demolitions. Columns 1 and 4 reproduce the results of columns 3 and 6 from Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Columns 2 and 5 estimate the effects of house demolitions within 8 weeks of the surveys, and columns 3 and 6 focus on the effects of house demolitions within 12 weeks of the surveys.

The table shows that the long-term effects of house demolitions on individuals' political preferences are similar to their short-term effects. Punitive house demolitions do not have a long-term effect on public opinion, whereas precautionary house demolitions are associated with less support for Fatah and peace negotiations among the Palestinian civilian population. Interestingly, the magnitude of the effect of precautionary house demolitions does not seem to fade over time. A standard deviation increase in the number of precautionary house demolitions within 12 weeks of a survey is associated with a 2.1% decrease in support for peace negotiations with Israel.

Figure 3 summarizes all the findings above. The figure displays the effects of house demolitions within 4, 8, and 12 weeks of the surveys on the political preferences of the Palestinian population. The left panel of Figure 3 shows that support for Fatah is affected by precautionary house demolitions but not by punitive house demolitions.

Table 4. The Effect of Precautionary House Demolitions on Political Radicalization.

Variable	Support for Fatah			Support for negotiations		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Precautionary house demolition (100s)	-0.0470** (0.024)	-0.0433* (0.024)	-0.0529* (0.027)	-0.0757*** (0.029)	-0.0380 (0.029)	-0.0987*** (0.034)
Palestinian fatalities (100s)	-0.0068 (0.005)	-0.0107* (0.006)	-0.0091 (0.006)	-0.0068 (0.005)	-0.0107* (0.006)	-0.0091 (0.006)
Israeli fatalities (100s)	0.0036 (0.002)	0.0006 (0.003)	0.0032 (0.003)	-0.0004 (0.003)	-0.00491* (0.003)	-0.0007 (0.003)
Suicide attacks within 30 days before polls	-0.0321* (0.016)	-0.0523*** (0.017)	0.0143 (0.020)	-0.0317 (0.020)	-0.0472** (0.020)	0.0487** (0.023)
City		-0.0139 (0.013)	-0.0097 (0.014)		-0.0073 (0.017)	-0.0006 (0.018)
Refugee camp		0.0142 (0.019)	-0.0072 (0.020)		-0.0023 (0.024)	-0.0228 (0.025)
Male		0.103*** (0.012)	0.103*** (0.011)		0.0002 (0.015)	0.0006 (0.014)
Age		-0.0014*** (0.001)	-0.0016*** (0.001)		0.0009 (0.001)	0.0010 (0.001)
Married		-0.0042 (0.016)	-0.0099 (0.016)		0.0495** (0.021)	0.0451** (0.020)
Refugee		0.0255* (0.014)	0.0224 (0.014)		-0.0526*** (0.017)	-0.0508*** (0.017)
Elementary education		-0.0196 (0.024)	-0.0181 (0.023)		-0.0431 (0.029)	-0.0489* (0.028)
Middle school		-0.0379* (0.023)	-0.0423** (0.023)		-0.0792*** (0.028)	-0.0839*** (0.028)
Secondary education		-0.0468** (0.023)	-0.0584*** (0.023)		-0.0754*** (0.029)	-0.0903*** (0.028)
Some college		-0.0435 (0.028)	-0.0517* (0.028)		-0.119*** (0.035)	-0.125*** (0.035)
College degree		-0.0695*** (0.026)	-0.0769*** (0.026)		-0.0884*** (0.032)	-0.105*** (0.032)
Locality's average wage		-0.0035*** (0.000)	-0.0020 (0.002)		-0.0020*** (0.001)	-0.0034 (0.003)
Locality's unemployment rate		0.0389 (0.103)	0.0488 (0.212)		0.148 (0.132)	-0.565* (0.333)
Percent of closures last month		-0.0028*** (0.001)	-0.0019** (0.001)		-0.0045*** (0.001)	-0.0049*** (0.001)
Observations	7,805	7,147	7,147	4,649	4,624	4,624
R <sup>2</sup>	0.002	0.027	0.047	0.006	0.025	0.058
Control for demographic Charact.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Time effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

See Table 1. The data set covers the period March 2004 to December 2005.

Note: Estimated via OLS. Dependent variable is an indicator variable for support for Fatah (columns 1–3) and supporting peace negotiations (columns 4–6). The main explanatory variable is all precautionary house demolitions, up to 4 weeks before the polls. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the poll-district level, in brackets; \*indicates statistically significant at 10% level, \*\*indicates statistically significant at 5% level, \*\*\*indicates statistically significant at 1% level.

**Table 5. The Long Term Effect of House Demolitions.**

Variable	Support for Fatah			Support for negotiations		
	4 weeks before poll	8 weeks before poll	12 weeks before poll	4 weeks before poll	8 weeks before poll	12 weeks before poll
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<b>Panel A: Punitive house demolitions</b>						
Punitive HDs (100s)	0.245 (0.214)	0.219 (0.137)	0.0080 (0.087)	0.144 (0.249)	0.137 (0.173)	0.155 (0.116)
Palestinian fatalities (100s)	-0.0018 (0.002)	-0.0004 (0.001)	0.0210 (0.036)	0.0017 (0.002)	-0.0004 (0.001)	0.0452 (0.030)
Israeli fatalities (100s)	0.0023 (0.002)	-0.0002 (0.001)	0.0737 (0.075)	-0.0011 (0.003)	0.0010 (0.001)	-0.165** (0.076)
Suicide attacks within 30 days before polls	-0.0164* (0.010)	-0.0144 (0.009)	-0.0157 (0.010)	-0.0023 (0.009)	-0.0025 (0.009)	0.0045 (0.009)
Observations	16,474	16,474	16,474	11,969	11,969	11,969
R <sup>2</sup>	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.031	0.031	0.032
<b>Panel B: Precautionary house demolitions</b>						
Precautionary HDs (100s)	-0.0529* (0.0272)	-0.0600*** (0.0223)	-0.0589** (0.0245)	-0.0987*** (0.0336)	-0.0995*** (0.0303)	-0.129*** (0.0309)
Palestinian fatalities (100s)	-0.00909 (0.00649)	0.0175*** (0.00631)	0.124** (0.0625)	0.0156*** (0.00380)	-0.00447 (0.00645)	0.193*** (0.0478)
Israeli fatalities (100s)	0.00323 (0.00279)	-0.0613*** (0.0207)	0.0174 (0.216)	-0.000729 (0.00340)	0.00647 (0.0226)	-0.269 (0.251)
Suicide attacks within 30 days before polls	0.0143 (0.0195)	0.00482 (0.0192)	0.0123 (0.0240)	0.0487** (0.0233)	0.0571** (0.0223)	0.0667** (0.0269)
Observations	7,147	7,147	7,147	4,624	4,624	4,624
R <sup>2</sup>	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.058	0.056	0.058
Control for dem. Charact.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

See [Table 1](#). The data set covers the period October 2000 to December 2005.

Note: See [Tables 3](#) and [4](#). Panel A repeats the specification of Columns 3 and 6 from [Table 3](#) for all punitive house demolitions 8 weeks before polls and 12 weeks before polls. Panel B repeats the specification of Columns 3 and 6 from [Table 4](#) for all precautionary house demolitions, 8 weeks before polls and 12 weeks before polls; \*indicates statistically significant at 10% level, \*\*indicates statistically significant at 5% level; \*\*\*indicates statistically significant at 1% level.




The right panel shows the same pattern but focusing on support for peace negotiations. The figure clearly shows that, as stated above, the magnitude of the effect of precautionary house demolitions is steady over time.

Table 6 includes both types of house demolitions in the specification of model 1, with district and time fixed effects for both the short and long term. Note that including both types of demolitions in the same models forces us to restrict our estimation to years 2004 and 2005, which are the only ones with available data on precautionary house demolitions. The results of these estimations are robust both in terms of their signs and magnitudes. They indicate that precautionary house demolitions lead to a decrease in support for Fatah and peace negotiations over the short-term and long-term, while punitive house demolitions have no statistically significant effect on Palestinians' political preferences. This table dissipates concerns that the different effects of precautionary and punitive house demolitions on Palestinians' preferences is affected by the different years included in the regressions.

Overall, these analyses show that the Palestinian civilian population distinguishes between selective and indiscriminate forms of counterterrorism, and adopts more radical political positions only in response to indiscriminate forms of counterterrorism.

### Concerns Regarding Reverse Causality

In this subsection, we address concerns related to reverse causality. It is possible that we are not correctly identifying the direction of causality, and that Palestinian radicalization leads to more house demolitions. To test for this possibility, we regress political radicalization on house demolitions that occur within 1 month after the polls, using similar specifications to those in Tables 3 and 4. Table 7 displays the results of these estimations. The table indicates little evidence of reverse causality as we do not find any



**Figure 3.** The effect of house demolitions on Palestinians' political preferences.

**Table 6.** The Effect of Punitive and Precautionary House Demolitions on Political Radicalization.

Variable	Support for Fatah			Support for negotiations		
	4 weeks before poll		12 weeks before poll	4 weeks before poll		12 weeks before poll
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Punitive HDs (100s)	1.0090 (0.984)	0.4850 (0.473)	0.3700 (0.260)	-2.315** (1.125)	-0.5230 (0.533)	-0.1760 (0.313)
Precautionary HDs (100s)	-0.0578** (0.028)	-0.0579*** (0.022)	-0.0579** (0.025)	-0.0867** (0.034)	-0.0986*** (0.030)	-0.127*** (0.031)
Palestinian fatalities (100s)	-0.0078 (0.007)	0.0148** (0.007)	0.1020 (0.064)	0.0150*** (0.004)	-0.0029 (0.007)	0.199*** (0.049)
Israeli fatalities (100s)	0.0026 (0.003)	-0.0536** (0.022)	0.0620 (0.218)	0.0004 (0.003)	0.0027 (0.023)	-0.2650 (0.252)
Suicide attacks within 30 days before polls	0.0093 (0.020)	0.0030 (0.019)	0.0075 (0.024)	0.0609** (0.024)	0.0583*** (0.022)	0.0663*** (0.027)
Observations	7,005	7,005	7,005	4,488	4,488	4,488
R <sup>2</sup>	0.048	0.049	0.048	0.061	0.057	0.059
Control for dem. Charact.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

See [Table 1](#). The data set covers the period March 2004 to December 2005.

Note: Repeats the specification of [Table 5](#) while controlling for suicide attacks that happened within a month of the polls; \*indicates statistically significant at 10% level, \*\* indicates statistically significant at 5% level; \*\*\* indicates statistically significant at 1% level.

statistically significant relationship between support for Fatah or for peace negotiations and future house demolitions.

### *Do Changes in Public Opinion Lead to More Attacks?*

Having established that precautionary house demolitions bring about the radicalization of the Palestinian population, we now examine to what extent changes in Palestinian public opinion are associated with future terror attacks. From an identification standpoint, the endogeneity between public opinion and terror attacks challenges such an analysis, since presumably individuals living in more radical localities are more likely to commit acts of terror. To overcome this challenge, we exploit the changes in public opinion that are due to the temporal and spatial variation of precautionary house demolitions. Thus, we examine the impact of changes in public opinion on future terror attacks using a 2SLS design.

Specifically, we propose the following two-stage model. We aggregate individuals' preferences (and the rest of individuals' characteristics) to the district-poll level. In the first stage, we estimate the main specification of model 1 and calculate predicted values

**Table 7.** Testing for Reverse Causality.

Variable	Punitive house demolitions (100s) within 30 days after the surveys		Precautionary house demolitions (100s) within 30 days after the surveys	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Support for Fatah	0.0067 (0.015)		−0.1330 (0.172)	
Support for negotiations		0.0045 (0.012)		0.0915 (0.212)
Observations	221	174	96	64
R <sup>2</sup>	0.394	0.402	0.491	0.723
Control for demographic Char.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

See Table 1. The data set covers the period March 2004 to December 2005. Data is collapsed by district and polling date.

Note: Estimated via OLS. Dependent variable are the number of punitive house demolitions (columns 1 and 2) or precautionary house demolitions (columns 3 and 4) for each district before each survey. All regressions include controls for residence type, gender, age, marital status, refugee status, education dummies, local unemployment rate, the local wage rate, and the number of closure days in the 30 days preceding the poll. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the poll-district level, in brackets; \* indicates statistically significant at 10% level, \*\* indicates statistically significant at 5% level; \*\*\* indicates statistically significant at 1% level.

for the aggregated individuals' political preferences.<sup>9</sup> Subsequently, we estimate the following second-stage model:


$$\begin{aligned} (IsraeliFatalities)_{j,t,k} = & \beta_1 \cdot \widehat{Att}_{j,t} + \beta_2 \cdot P_{j,t-k} + \beta_3 \cdot X_{j,t-k} + Z_{i,j,t} \cdot \Phi \\ & + \mu_j + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{j,t} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where  $(IsraeliFatalities)_{j,t,k}$  is the number of Israeli fatalities caused on attacks from residents of district  $j$  within  $k$  days after poll  $t$ .  $\widehat{Att}_{j,t}$  is the aggregated predicted preferences of individuals in district  $j$  according to poll  $t$ . The rest of the covariates are identical to those used in the estimation of model 1, and include all available districts' social and demographic characteristics, as well as district fixed effects and time dummies.

The goal of the econometric specification proposed in model (2) is to identify  $\beta_1$ , which represents the effect of political attitudes on future terror fatalities. An important identifying assumption of the two-stage specification is that precautionary house demolitions affect future Israeli fatalities only through changes in Palestinian public opinion. This assumption would be violated, for instance, if house demolitions could affect future Israeli fatalities via their impact on terrorist group capabilities. Since we cannot rule out this possibility, our IV estimates should be interpreted in a cautious manner. That is, the estimates of equation (2) do not necessarily show the causal effect of radicalization on violence. Rather, they depict the correlates obtained by estimating the effects of indiscriminate measures of counterterrorism on civilians' radicalization, and how those changes in political preferences translate into future acts of violence.

The results of the estimations appear in [Figure 4](#). The first panel shows second stage's estimates when we focus on support for Fatah as the main dependent variable of interest. The second panel focuses on support for negotiations. The figures suggest that decreases in support for Fatah and peace negotiations at the district level (brought by an increase on precautionary house demolitions) are associated with an increase in terror fatalities originating in that district after 90 days. This effect remains positive and significant up to 180 days after the survey.

The estimated coefficients when focusing on support for Fatah suggest that a standard deviation increase on precautionary house demolitions at the average district-month cell are associated with an increase of 0.2 Israeli fatalities that originate at that district within 120 days of a survey. The expected increase in Israeli fatalities that originate at an average district-survey cell equals 0.31 when we focus on support for negotiations.<sup>10</sup> That is, a standard deviation increase in precautionary house demolitions are associated with a 6% (based on support for Fatah) to a 10% (based on support for negotiations) increase in the number of Israeli fatalities that originate on an average district within 120 days of a survey. These results are consistent with previous research which has indicated that it takes Palestinians more time and preparation to react to Israeli actions ([Haushofer et al. 2010](#)). Consequently, changes in public opinion do not



**Figure 4.** Effects of public opinion on Israeli fatalities (2SLS).

affect fluctuations on the number of immediate attacks, but make more attacks likely in the medium to long-term.


As mentioned above, one can raise a number of hypotheses that would violate the exclusion restriction assumed in model (2). Model (3) proposes an estimation that includes individuals' attitudes and house demolitions on the right-hand side.<sup>11</sup>

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\text{Israeli Fatalities})_{j,t} = & \gamma_1 \cdot HD_{j,t} + \gamma_2 \cdot Att_{j,t} + \gamma_3 \cdot P_{j,t-k} + \gamma_4 \cdot X_{j,t-k} \\
 & + Z_{i,j,t} \cdot \Phi + \mu_j + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{j,t}
 \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

This model is estimated for descriptive purposes only. A main concern is that shocks affecting Israeli fatalities may also affect actual individual attitudes (instead of predicted attitudes used in model (2)), biasing least-squares estimates of this regression. That said, this model arguably shows to what extent fluctuations in Israeli fatalities are correlated with fluctuations in individuals' attitudes as opposed to precautionary house demolitions and policies of deterrence.<sup>12</sup>

Figure 5 shows the estimated coefficients of the model together with their respective 95% confidence intervals.

The figure shows that less radicalized preferences are correlated with a significant decrease in the future number of Israeli fatalities. The estimated rate ratios for fatalities within 120 days after each survey imply that a one percentage point increase in Fatah support is associated with a decrease in the number of future fatalities by a factor of 0.07. A one percentage increase in support for negotiations is associated with a decrease in the number of future fatalities by a factor of 0.015. These effects imply that a standard deviation increase in radicalization (which is equal to 0.1141 for support for Fatah and 0.1227 for support for negotiations) correlates with an increase of 0.3343 and



**Figure 5.** Effects of public opinion and precautionary house demolitions on Israeli fatalities.

0.4257 respectively, in the number of Israeli fatalities originating from an average district-survey cell. Based on the first stage of model (2), these coefficients imply that a standard deviation increase in precautionary house demolitions are associated with a 1.5% (based on support for negotiations) to a 6.8% (based on support for Fatah) increase in the number of Israeli fatalities that originate on an average district within 120 days of a survey. Importantly, fluctuations in the number of precautionary house demolitions are not correlated with the subsequent number of Israeli fatalities for any of the specifications above.

## Conclusions

This paper focuses on house demolitions in the Palestinian Territories to jointly assess the impact of selective and indiscriminate acts of counterterrorist actions on the civilian population's political preferences. We show that the civilian population is more likely to adopt more hawkish opinions only in response to indiscriminate forms of counterterrorism, and that political radicalization is conducive to future acts of terror. This suggests that policies of counterterrorism have an impact that goes beyond militant groups, and that their impact on the civilian populations matters for the future evolution of conflict.

We would like to conclude by highlighting several limitations and directions for future work. First, while we establish a link between indiscriminate house demolitions and civilian attitudes, we are unable to determine if these changes happen due to psychological factors (such as anger and desire to obtain revenge), or whether they are more incentive-based (i.e. promoted by militants' leaders to increase the aggrieved population's support for their organization). Second, more work is needed to establish the exact mechanism that connects radicalization to terror attacks. While we show that

civilian attitudes matter for violence, it remains an open question whether this is due to increased support for militant groups, or to increased mobilization and recruitment to militant groups.

Finally, our analysis focuses on a particular conflict and time period: the Second Intifada, which was fought mostly by militant groups and the IDF during the years 2000–2006. Whether the results of this study are generalizable to other contexts remains an open question. Note, for example, that this violent conflict occurred before the emergence of social media. Thus, these results may underestimate the current role of civilian grievances for conflict where social media amplifies local grievances to the overall population. This highlights the importance of deterring violence by militant groups without alienating or hurting the local population. If this is not possible, governments should at least consider properly compensating civilians for their pain and suffering. This is not only an ethical response towards the aggrieved civilian population, but it may also be an effective tool to avoid civilians' radicalization, thus helping to lower future levels of violence (Silverman 2020).

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### **ORCID iD**

Michael Freedman  <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0634-5344>

### **Notes**

1. B'Tselem, an Israeli human rights organization that monitors the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, categorizes precautionary house demolitions as demolitions for "alleged military necessity." See <https://www.btselem.org/razing>
2. See Benmelech et al. (2015) for a detailed description of house demolitions in Israel.



3. There is also a third type of demolition, administrative in nature, where houses built without building permits are demolished (Hatz 2019a). We do not include these demolitions in our analysis because they do not relate to security concerns and are mostly concentrated in East Jerusalem.
4. A detailed description of the overall effects of house demolitions on the afflicted Palestinian families is beyond the scope of this study. See Shnayderman (2004) for direct testimonies of three different Palestinian families whose houses were demolished by the IDF in 2004.
5. Survey questions on political preferences are sometimes a sensitive matter and some individuals may refuse to answer them. Fortunately for us, this is not the case in the DSP polls. The particular question on political preferences contains several answers and almost all respondents choose one of them. According to the data, 29.12% of individuals report that they support Fatah, whereas 22.64% support Hamas and 9.53% support the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Importantly, there is a possibility to answer “other factions” and “no one” to this question, and these alternatives receive the support of 10.35% and 28.35% of the population, respectively. Given all of the above, only 49 out of 18,047 observations contain a missing value for the question on political preferences (that is, 0.27% of the observations).
6. See Richards (2019) and Pedahzur (2005) for definitions of terrorism and suicide terrorism, respectively. See also Crelinsten (2019) for a working definition of counterterrorism.
7. Women show a higher support for Hamas because Hamas provides an important number of social services, like education and health clinics, for which women tend to be the greater beneficiaries.
8. We estimate model (1) using a linear probability model (OLS) instead of a probit model to avoid complications related to the incidental parameter problem (Cruz-Gonzales et al. 2017). Using a probit model yields the same results.
9. The results of these estimations appear in Appendix Table A1.
10. These magnitudes are obtained by multiplying first stage effects by a standard deviation increase on precautionary house demolitions and second stage effects. This is equal to  $(-0.588 * 0.13 * 26.42)$  for Fatah support and  $(-0.1074 * 0.13 * 22.21)$  for support for negotiations.
11. “Horse-race” regressions in which we test which right-hand side variable has more explanatory power are widely used in the literature, even in cases when some of the variables may be endogenous. See, for example, Becker and Woessmann’s (2009) study on the effects of Protestantism and literacy on economic outcomes. We thank one of the reviewers for suggesting this analysis.
12. There is an additional important difference between the estimations of models (2) and (3). Due to the incidental parameter problem (Cruz-Gonzales et al. 2017), the inclusion of fixed effects is not valid for a Poisson estimation with instrumental variables. As a consequence, the estimations in Figure 4 rely on a linear model (the results are qualitative the same when we use a Poisson estimation). The estimation in Figure 5 relies on panel data with fixed effects but not on a two-stage estimation. Therefore, it uses a Poisson model that computes conditional fixed-effects estimators.

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Appendix  
Table A1. First Stage Model: The Effects of Precautionary House Demolitions on Political Preferences.

Controlling for palestinian fatalities	7 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	210 days	240 days
Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Support for Fatah									
Punitive HDs (100s)	-0.0396 <sup>***</sup> (0.0178)	-0.0567 <sup>***</sup> (0.0173)	-0.0561 <sup>***</sup> (0.0173)	-0.0564 <sup>***</sup> (0.0173)	-0.0589 <sup>***</sup> (0.0176)	-0.0591 <sup>***</sup> (0.0177)	-0.0577 <sup>***</sup> (0.0174)	-0.0572 <sup>***</sup> (0.0174)	-0.0569 <sup>***</sup> (0.0171)
Palestinian fatalities (100s)	0.0163 <sup>***</sup> (0.00518)	-0.000610 (0.000715)	-0.000267 (0.000497)	-0.000335 (0.000411)	-0.000561 (0.000371)	-0.000353 (0.000334)	-0.000335 (0.000327)	-0.000422 (0.000322)	-0.000394 <sup>***</sup> (0.000277)
Observations	64	64	64	64	64	64	64	64	64
R <sup>2</sup>	0.720	0.704	0.703	0.703	0.707	0.708	0.705	0.707	0.713
Panel B: Support for negotiations									
Precautionary HDs (100s)	-0.0047 <sup>***</sup> (0.0394)	-0.0107 <sup>***</sup> (0.0373)	-0.093 <sup>***</sup> (0.0346)	-0.111 <sup>***</sup> (0.0364)	-0.107 <sup>***</sup> (0.0344)	-0.108 <sup>***</sup> (0.0386)	-0.106 <sup>***</sup> (0.0281)	-0.0967 <sup>***</sup> (0.0270)	-0.0977 <sup>***</sup> (0.0271)
Palestinian fatalities (100s)	0.00273 (0.0102)	0.006977 (0.00139)	0.000845 (0.00111)	0.000741 (0.00104)	-0.00100 (0.000925)	-0.00216 <sup>***</sup> (0.000754)	-0.00222 <sup>***</sup> (0.000728)	-0.00241 <sup>***</sup> (0.000737)	-0.00239 <sup>***</sup> (0.000698)
Observations	64	64	64	64	64	64	64	64	64
R <sup>2</sup>	0.699	0.703	0.705	0.704	0.706	0.744	0.750	0.769	0.778
Control for dem. Charact.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

See Table 1. The data set covers the period October 2000 to December 2005.  
Note: Estimated via OLS. Dependent variable is the mean support for Fatah at the poll-district level (panel A) and the mean support for peace negotiations at the poll-district level (panel B). The main explanatory variable is all precautionary house demolitions. Robust standard errors appear in brackets; \*\*\*indicates statistically significant at 10% level, \*\*indicates statistically significant at 5% level, \*indicates statistically significant at 1% level.