United We Stand? Divided Voices in European Identity

Thesis submitted for the degree of "Doctor of Philosophy"

By Odelia Oshri

Submitted to the Senate of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, November 2016

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Acknowledgments

Some years ago, I found myself troubled by my difficulty to find satisfactory answers to the questions: 'what shapes the individual's behavior in a collective setting?' 'How can individuals construct and enact collective actions, driven by shared principles and rules of conduct, despite their natural and inevitable differences? The harder I searched for an answer, the more puzzling the enigma grew. One after another, what on the surface appeared as satisfactory answers—interests, power, trade-offs, interactions, etc.—became exposed as the tautologies, which they were. I searched in the political, but found the social as compellingly important; I analyzed the social and found the cultural inseparable; I examined the cultural, but found it void without the other two. Admittedly, it was this intellectual confusion, which gave birth to the present dissertation. In my search for the dynamics which constitute communities and collectiveness I found identity interactions to be a compelling answer.

As I was drafting this very particular page of acknowledgments, I realized that this very dissertation, in itself, is a product of the interactions among the multiple identities that were both in the shadow and the fore of my research. No research is an island. During the time I spent conducting and writing my research, my path crossed the life of countless people, who, even if unaware of it, shaped its course. There are too many to name individually, but few were true saviors.

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[אמא יקרה, כפי שבעבר הרחוק החזקת עבורי את הבדידים כדי שאיטיב לשרטט מסביב, כך גם היום, ואולי ביתר שאת, את מיטיבה להאיר לי את הדרך. זה קצת קלישאתי, אבל כל מילה נכונה. מעברך לירושלים מצפון הארץ, ערב הולדת התאומים ובעיצומה של כתיבת הדוקטורט, הפכו סיטואציה בלתי אפשרית לחוויה מעצימה – כנראה שנשים יכולות להשיג הכל, בעזרת אמהות כמוך! עבודת הדוקטורט מוקדשת לך.]

ABSTRACT

The European Union (henceforth, EU) is a fascinating laboratory for the study of political identities. On the one hand, it embraces twenty-eight member states that share not just an internal market, but also cooperate in other fields such as justice and home affairs. On the other hand, and despite what seemingly appears to be an increasing convergence among its member states on cardinal collective issues, a strikingly opposite tendency takes shape, as we increasingly witness calls to restrict the process of deepening and broadening the cooperation among the members of the EU. This puzzling development is essentially evident in the surveys conducted among European citizens, in difficulties to ratifying EU treaties among some member states, as well as in the gradual rise of populist right and Euroskeptic parties across Europe. My research hones in this complicated political landscape wherein not just variegated identities operate but are also being molded and reconstructed due to accelerating interactions. It tests questions such as: *What is the causal mechanism of socialization and how institutions can influence individuals through it? How such institutional influences mold individuals' identities and interests? Why socialization processes do not yield the same results on different member states?* And finally, *how are institutional identities being conveyed to European citizens by the institutions themselves*?

This dissertation consists of three main chapters [one of which is already published as an article in a referee journal and the second is under revision], which address three research objectives through a wide array of methodological tools, chiefly among them are multilevel, cross-sectional and longitudinal regression models and automatic content analysis. The three chapters focus on processes of socialization and identity-building in the EU, often dubbed in the literature as *Europeanization*. Owing to the author's postulation that identity is multifaceted, dynamic, context and interaction-dependent, the examination of European identification is done at three different, albeit related, analytical levels: the EU itself, the European parliament (EP) and the citizens of the Union.

The first chapter, **"A Community of Values: Democratic Identity Formation in the European Union"** (Oshri, Sheafer & Shenhav, 2016, *European Union Politics*), focuses on the analytical level of the individual-i.e. citizens of the EU-and focuses upon the micro-foundations of norms acceptance through the lens of Social Identity Theory (SIT). According to SIT, groups usually form a core of values shared by their members. To gain positive self-esteem, individuals develop stereotypes based on group affiliations, and these stereotypes can, in turn, lead to the acceptance of group norms. Drawing on public opinion surveys and multilevel models, this research's main finding is that membership duration in the EU is closely associated with citizens' adherence to liberal democratic values. Since they have been more profoundly socialized into EU democratic norms, residents of older member states are likely to express greater support for democratic values than those of newer or non-EU members. As such, the longer a country has been a member of the EU, the stronger its citizens' support of the EU's values.

The second chapter, **"The EU's Mechanism of Differentiated Value-Integration"** (Oshri & Shenhav, under revision for *European Journal of Political Research*) focuses on the analytical level

of the EU as a political actor and supranational organization. It focuses on another key issue of the European Union, but one that is relevant to the evolution of every institution or political organization (e.g., political party, ideological movement, NGO, etc.) who expands the fields of its action. Through the use of computerized content analysis of the fundamental EU treaties from the 1950s until the Lisbon Treaty, the study points to a sophisticated mechanism of integrating new values into the EU discourse. According to this discursive mechanism, the EU diversifies its value-based identity by integrating new values into its discourse, yet putting them in the discursive periphery of the texts while preserving a core center of fundamental values. The chapter's main argument is that this mechanism of a discursive institutional change, is sophisticated since it allows some changes and evolutions without affecting the heart of EU's identity, based on the old values. In other words, this mechanism allows institutional change, yet has the power to preventing resistance to change. Employing and utilizing a mechanism of *differentiated value-integration* provides the EU with a vital tool by which it can permit change to take place in its discursive realm, while maintaining a coherent value-identity

The third chapter in my doctoral thesis **"A matter of identity: Agenda setting powers in a fragmented parliament"** (Oshri & Fogel-Dror) focuses on the European Parliament (EP) with the main objective of identifying the prime groups that shape and dominate the agenda in the EP by unpacking legislators' discursive interactions. This research analyzes European legislators' speeches (~57,000), delivered at the EPs' sixth session (2005–2009). As European legislators belong to transnational party groups but are also members of national parties, and are originating from different countries, this paper strives to scrutinize the linkages between their different group-belongings, attributes and affiliation and the prevailing discourse in the parliament. On the face of it, it is expected that discourse in the EP is align by European political groups since the parliament is organized along transnational party lines and not according to nationalities or other group affiliations. Yet, contrary to expectations we found that countries exert greater influence on the discourse than national or transnational parties in topics of high politics – such as security and foreign affairs. Investigating further into these puzzled findings we discovered even more striking results - weak and small states are those who dominate the discourse on issues of high politics. This comes as a surprise since common wisdom predicts that pivot and powerful states will shape the agenda on high politics issues. In sum, we show that the EP, though organized along transnational lines, enables different groups from different levels to speak their voice. In so doing, it encapsulates transnational, but also national voices in it. Whose voice is the loudest? We show that it depends on the issue at hand.

Aggregating the objectives and findings of these three chapters, this dissertation project delineates and emphasizes the crystallization of different aspects of supranational identity and provides an important purview to the various elements and processes that ultimately comprise the 'European voice'. Along with the specific conclusions of each chapter, this PhD dissertation has an overall argument as for the importance of integration processes in the EU to political identities. This dissertation shows that in addition to the EU's influential power in the economy, trade, justice, etc., it also exerts its power on processes of identity change at the individual (first chapter), the organizational (second chapter) and the political groups (third chapter) levels. These processes of identity change are highly effective, as they accompanied by strong political resistance.

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INTRODUCTION

How does the European Union (EU) talk, construct and reconstruct its identity? Who are the prime groups that shape and predict the core themes discussed in the European parliament (EP)? Was a community of Europeans, who share similar values, ultimately created after more than sixty years of integration processes? These three questions stand at the core of my dissertation and serve the broader means of elucidating patterns of change and persistence in the values and identity frontiers of the EU as a political community. While these questions seem to diverge in their analytical scrutiny and contemplation, they are interconnected in at least three dimensions. First, and most intuitively, is their shared focus on the EU as the object of study. Second is their shared premise of political values as constituting the bedrock of communal identity at the supranational level. Continuing this line of logic, these three questions also share a scientific focus on the importance of values to the construction and sustainability of a supranational political community. By identifying and tracing the voice(s) of the different entities and agents–be they citizens, parliament or the EU itself–which constitute and drive the evolution of the EU as a political community, answering these questions grants us with the added–value of discerning the holistic and multilayered nature of European identity and assessing its role and place in the continuation of the European project.

The scholarly need to answer these three questions lies in the fundamental acknowledgment that the European project is still unfolding and the particular evolution of the EU as a political community is still in process. Hence, one cannot fully comprehend and assess the political evolution of the EU without exploring how it manages to balance continuity and change in its values and identity frontiers. In this context, two main theoretical premises frame the analytical endeavors of this dissertation. First, that the identity of the EU is essentially a social phenomenon that is constructed and reconstructed by collective agents and in light of common values and second, that the EU's identity is the patterned result of its members' interactions and deliberations on the main values that constitute it as a political actor. The combination of these two premises reinforces the foundation upon which this dissertation is built, according to which, the EU's identity is continually subject to dynamic shifts and alterations as its discursive trajectories reflect the complex dualism of diversity and unity in the core values and identities of its members. In this respect, throughout the dissertation I advance the notion that identity in general, and organizational identity in particular,

should always be explored and analyzed in relation to an "other" and over the course of time, rather than as a stable 'entity' that is out there, imposed on the 'self' and waiting to be discovered.

The main objective of this chapter is to introduce and discuss three theoretical pillars that lie at the heart of the dissertation's three research studies: socialization, identity and values and to provide a summary of these studies and their main findings.

i.   Key theoretical pillars of the dissertation

Processes of Socialization in Europe

The EU traces its origins to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC), formed by six countries in the 1950s. Since then, the EU has profoundly broadened and deepened its mandate by enhancing the cooperation among its members in an unprecedented way. Compared to the partial economic cooperation rendered by and embodied in the ECSC, today, the EU embraces twenty-eight member states (including Britain), which have developed a single market, through a standardized system of rules and laws, applied to all member states. Such development ensures the free movement of people, goods, services and capital, with nineteenth member states adopting a common currency, the Euro, thus, constituting the Euro-zone. Moreover, the EU has been enacting substantial legislation as it shifts its boundaries beyond the economic realm and into justice and home affairs, including the abolition of passport controls in accordance with the Schengen Agreement (Fabbrini 2013). Interestingly, despite what seemingly appears to be an increasing convergence among its member states on such cardinal collective issues, a strikingly opposite tendency takes shape, as we increasingly witness 'voices' calling to restrict the process of deepening and broadening the cooperation among the members of the EU (Abromeit 1998; Eriksen and Fossum 2004; Føllesdal 2009; Nentwich and Weale 1998; Scharpf 1999; Schmitter 2000). This puzzling development is essentially evident in the surveys conducted among European citizens (see Figure A in the appendix), in the process of ratifying EU treaties among its member states, as well as in the gradual rise of populist right and radical left parties across Europe. While these 'voices' have been evident during the ratification of the Maastricht treaty, which entered into force in 1993, and during the financial crisis of 2009, recently, they have been translated into action by voting 'leave' in the Brexit referendum.

In this context, it is relatively surprising that theories on European integration have been paying scant attention, if at all, to notions of identities or feelings as entailing the 'power' to either hinder or further the European integration. Overall, these theories, which differ with regard to the main drivers or actors of integration in Europe, conceive of institutions, states or national leaders as merely vehicles of integration, thus, peoples' feelings or identities are essentially irrelevant. For example, *the Neo-functionalist* theories plead that integration in one sector will spillover into others via the *institution* that coordinate and lead, in turn, to additional cooperation (Haas 1958; Pierson 1996; Schmitter 1969); *Intergovernmentalism*, on the other hand, conceives of *national governments* as a decisive factor in the particular trajectory of the integration. According to this approach, integration-related decisions are made in inter-governmental negotiations and deliberations, in which national governments bargain in order to further their national interests. In this context, states are perceived as reluctant to transfer competences to regional organizations and institutions-especially in sensitive policies relating to issues of sovereignty or power (Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1998); finally, *Multi-level Governance* theories conceive of *different* institutions at *different* political levels as agents that elevate the integration (Hooghe and Marks 2003; Stephenson 2013). What all these theories and approaches have in common is their emphasis on macro-level factors (institutions, national governments and elites) as the exclusive determinants of the crystallization of European integration. It is only natural, then, that they give no reference to the masses, or the European citizens, as well as to the potential contribution of these actors' own perceptions of, and reactions to, the nature and trajectory of the integration process in Europe. Such a theoretical lacuna is of cardinal importance to the development of research on European integration, mainly because the latter has enjoyed a *permissive consensus* until the Maastricht treaty (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). In this context, the gradual, yet intense, growth of a *Eurosceptic* approach to the study of European integration aims at overcoming such lacuna by granting Europe's rank-and-file citizens with considerable attention and importance with regard to the nature and continuation of European integration.

Reinforcing such a scholarly shift, a proliferating number of studies within the literature on European integration have shifted their analytical boundaries and increasingly focus on the socializing role of European institutions as highly conductive to the integration process in Europe (e.g., Alderson 2001; Checkel 2005; Dixon 2008; Egeberg 2004; Etzioni 2007;

Fernández, Eigmüller and Börner 2016; Hooghe 2001; Katzenstein 1997; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999). These studies are often guided by questions such as *what is the role of European institutions in the socialization processes in Europe?; What is the causal mechanism of socialization and how institutions can influence individuals through it? How such institutional influences mold individuals' identities and interests?* And finally, *why socialization processes do not yield the same results on different member states?* While decision-makers and scholars alike have asked these questions repeatedly for the last decade or so, the recent developments in Europe have granted them with a new political clout.

These questions are grounded in theories of socialization, according to which participation in political institutions can lead to the socialization of elites, individuals and states on both conceptual and practical terms. Kelley's study (2004), "Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives", for example, identifies and scrutinizes the socializing patterns of EU institutions in the Baltic States. Her findings show that these states changed their domestic laws in order to enhance their *compatibility* with the demands raised by the EU. Such formal and official change of laws, Kelly shows, had led to a deeper socialization process and to a change in the behavioral patterns of individuals, both within and among these states. An additional illustration to the strengthening of this line of analysis is Rohrschneider's study (1999), in which he employs an institutional learning model in order to illustrate how a particular institutional framework *shapes* individuals' values. Moreover, and to a relatively surprising extent, Rohrschneider's findings show different value-patterns between East and West Germany, as Eastern Germans' values continue to reflect the ideological premises of the political and economic institutions to which they were previously exposed, rather than the ones promoted by the EU and its institutions. In short, these, in addition to similar studies, depict a growing scholarly interest in understanding how institutions influence individuals, elites and states through the analytical prism of the socialization processes they are undergoing, through and by existing institutions.

European Identity

Since the past decade, the European integration project has been facing great challenges. Chiefly among them are the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty, the three enlargements to the East, the French and Dutch popular opposition to the EU's Constitutional Treaty, the global economic crisis and its projections onto the weaker economies of the EU-notably Greece, Italy and

Portugal, in addition to the mass influx and refugees and other migrants surging its borders. Accompanying such challenges, a more recent and dramatic one has emerged and put the very idea of the Union in question-Britain's vote to leave the EU. Common to all of these challenges are, presumably, the seemingly remoteness of the European *people* from decision-making processes in the EU arena. Such remoteness is exemplified, inter alia, in the preambles of all the Union's treaties. Usually, the preamble of national constitutions starts with clearly stating, and even emphasizing, the self-determination of the nation-most frequently with the lead of "we the people". However, in each and every treaty of the EU the preamble starts with a reference to national political elites, rather than the people. Invoking another illustration, in the Lisbon Treaty the heads of twenty–six member states chose to turn to their *national parliament* for ratification instead of asking their *people*, via national referenda, as was previously expected and conducted.[1] Additionally, while it is far-fetched that the recent British rejection of the EU will spillover and ignite a "People's spring" in Europe as some foresee, it is still quite difficult to ignore the fact that more and more *people* within Europe are increasingly dissatisfied with the pace, scope and nature of the European integration.

Hence, the aforesaid constitutes a sound contradiction to the two pivotal objectives of the EU: (1) bringing European citizens as close as possible to the decision-making process and (2) creating de-facto solidarity among European citizens. These objectives are cardinal to the continuation of the European project from at least two perspectives. First, the EU has evolved into a political actor on its own right through a process in which more and more competences and responsibilities were delegated to it by its member nation-states and as such, trust, sacrifice and solidarity among its members has been traditionally conceived of as essential for its continuous evolution into a political *community*. It is, therefore, the vertical (institutions-people) as well as the horizontal (among people from different member states) sense of community that is perceived to be considerably essential for the continuation and enhancement of the EU's institutional functioning. In this sense, the EU is more than merely a forum for the coordination of economic cooperation in tune with its members' perceived amelioration of their positions and interests. The need for a *mutual* sense of community [which is conceptualized in chapter 1 as the affinity of values that are perceived as matter] has gradually grown to be conceived of as imperative for the traditional, as well as to the newly evolving, challenges with which the EU has

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[1] Ireland was the only member state to make a referendum, which resulted with a clear-cut no-vote.

to cope if it is to stand, genuinely, as a political community. Moreover, as Risse (2010) lucidly depicts in his book, *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*, communities need to become 'real' in people's minds so that the latter can identify with them. Hence, for realizing the objective of constructing and enforcing a *collective* social identity, people need to develop the "psychological existence" of their community. Whereas this demand is difficult to realize at the EU level-and not simply due to its physical magnitude of encompassing twenty–eight member states and more than five–hundred million people-the expectation, or demand, for value proximity gains a renewed pertinence, be it as a substitute for homogenous culture, or mutual European identity (chapter 1 of this dissertation elaborates on this point).

In time, recognizing the importance embedded in notions of shared values and identities for the construction of a political community, a vast body of research has turned to examine the determinants of European identity(ies) (for an extensive review of such research see Risse 2010). One prevailing strand in this line of research focuses on the question of whether national and European identities and identification "go together"- or in simpler words: are they completing or competing with each other? (Hooge and Marks 2004, 2005; Castano 2004; Fuches, Guinaudeu, and Schubert 2009). Another strand of studies focuses on the levels of trust among Europeans as proxies for what has grown to be named as "horizontal" European identity (Delhey 2007), thereby contemplating upon distinguished political and cultural components of European identity in order to assess which type of *people's* identification is greater (Bruter 2005). Lastly, other studies provide ample evidence that transnational activities, such as travelling abroad, or even domestic transnational activities, such as watching foreign language sitcoms, foster pro-European sentiments (e.g., Fernández, Eigmüller and Börner 2016; Fligstein 2008; Gerhards and Hans 2014; Kuhn 2011, 2012; Sigalas 2010).

Yet, these studies' main 'problem' is that their identification of the determinants of European identity is highly mixed. Still, such diversity is nothing but logical, due to the plurality of scholarly definitions to European identity found in the social sciences' literature, wherein there are literally hundreds of definitions to the concept of "identity", with very few as parsimonious. Overall, the concept of identity has continuously retained its ambiguity and vagueness in different disciplines and research fields within social sciences. Such ambiguity, in turn, has kept the analytical distinction between identity, culture, institutions and social structure considerably blurred. Furthermore, as the notion of European identity is defined, too often, as

tantamount to national identity, it has continuously obstructed the analytical distinction that is imperative to identifying its determinants, or dynamics. I, personally, believe that, first, national and European identifications are completely two *different* political attachments and while the former relies mainly on feelings, the latter is composed from values; and second, that European identity is continually subject to change, resulted from rule-governed patterns of interactions (Adler and Barnett 1998; Wendt 1999) and thus, is not given prior to and independent from interactions (Lebow 2012). Hence, in this dissertation, identities in general and the European identity in particular are perceived as continuously and discursively contested, constructed and manifested over the course of time in tune with different interactions among its various elements and members.

Values

In line with the above discussion, this dissertation vigorously advocates *values* as adequate proxies for better understanding and analyzing the complex phenomenon of European identity. Such advocacy is grounded in four main empirical premises:

1. On the one hand, the EU repeatedly states that it does not seek to promote a unique European identity, but rather the opposite. Evidently, the EU's motto is "united in diversity", meaning that the EU perceives the variegated cultures, traditions and languages of its member–states as a valuable asset for the continent it aspires to preserve.[2] Hence, nurturing a pluralistic landscape of cultures in the EU seems to be of considerable importance to the evolution of the EU into a political *community*, defined by its diversity.

2. On the other hand, the omnipresence of specific liberal democratic values is clearly manifested in how the EU promotes the adoption and adherence to liberal democratic values both internally, among its member states, and externally, in its relations and interactions with third countries. To this end it emphasizes an adherence to these values as a pre–condition for the accession of countries into its community (the Copenhagen criteria), as well as etching them in its constitutional treaties, which stand as its primary legislative instrument.

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[2] http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/motto/index_en.htm

3. As values operate at the level of individuals, institutions and societies (Hofstede 2001; Hitlin 2003), they are rendered appropriate prisms through which the examination of the mutual influence, or dual constitution, of social structures and individuals can take shape. This resonates with one of the most addressed tensions in International Relations theory, the agent/structure framework, as values operate at the micro (the individual) and macro (institutions/social constructs/communities). This dissertation aims at overcoming, or at least managing, such tension in the analytical scrutiny of values by employing different units-of-analysis (national alongside organizational levels) in order to both identify their evolution and integration, as well as deciphering the mechanisms, or processes, through which they are conveyed, identified with or contested in the EU.

4. Values are a core element in one's identity. They are mental structures that serve as keynotes in the lives of individuals and communities alike by instructing behavior, choices or appraisals of events and pertain to desirable end-states (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004). Doing so, they also entail the potential of transcending specific situations, which in turn, departs them from *attitudes*, and, therefore, position them as a viable proxy for identity.

Note that the focus in this dissertation is on cultural/political values at the societal/communal level and not on individual values (although I use individual-level data in the first chapter). By political, or cultural values I refer not only to values that individual members of a society *share*, but also to the system of basic societal norms to which individuals are exposed (Swartz 2011). This dual conceptualization of values rests upon a primary postulation, according to which, different entities are 'carriers' of cultural values. Hence, studying values from *different* angles by examining *different* entities and using *different* data and methodology seems to embody a considerable added-value, as it enables learning of the values that underpin and undergird the particular political community of the EU and its, presumably, holistic identity.

The chapters of this dissertation both embody and manifest such theoretical endeavor. In the first chapter, cultural values are studied using individual-level data. These values are then aggregated to the country level in order to examine whether a community of values is, indeed, in the process of becoming such. Specifically, in order to assess the effects of EU–membership on political values, I compare levels of support for these values among more than ninety countries, members

and non-members of the EU alike, over the course of time. The second chapter turns to study the values of the EU itself through analyzing its fundamental treaties from 1950 to the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. These two chapters can, therefore, be framed in line with the demand and supply logics: the first chapter studies the "demand side" of European identity, while the second chapter studies its "supply side" by the organization itself. The third chapter takes somewhat a different path and studies European topics and political themes that were deliberated and delivered at the sixth session of the European Parliament (2004-2009). The rationale undergirding the need in studying the discourse at this distinct level is that the unique characteristics of the EP enable us with discerning, assessing and accounting for variations in different groups' discourse on themes discussed in the EP. It is not only about how different groups operate and interact in the EP, but also about deciphering the linkage between the individual parliamentarian's group belongings and identities and the discourse he, or she, promotes and conveys in the EP. In this context, the third chapter brings the recursive interactions between different groups (countries, political parties, etc.) and their identities, along with the data they provide through their speeches and parliamentary discussions and deliberations, to the forefront of the analysis.

The acknowledgment that individuals and groups adapt their values and value-priorities in order to be compatible with opportunities, or constrains, with which they are confronted is a fundamental feature in social psychology theories (e.g., Schwartz 2011). Hence, I embark upon such acknowledgment, in addition to the core elements of Social Identity Theory, in order to establish my hypotheses for the first chapter of this dissertation. In gist, the logic underpinning these hypotheses is that the time of membership can stand as a viable predictor for the overall adherence to the EU's values. In this context, I postulate that European citizens are socialized to support liberal-political values through different mechanisms. Socialization, in turn, can take shape directly-for example, as a result of citizens' first-hand interactions with the EU institutions and policy instruments, which aim at influencing their preferences– or indirectly-namely, mediated by state channels. Alternatively, socialization can stem from the costs of norm violation (e.g. Copenhagen criteria) or from benefits contingent upon norm adherence. EU institutions, for their part, can socialize citizens through mechanisms anchored in the *logic of appropriateness* or of calculation (Checkel 2005; Schmidt 2008). Nevertheless, this process can also be explained based on a psychological logic appealing to the human innate desire of being part of a group (Kennedy 2013). This chapter draws to conclusion by arguing that regardless of the specific mechanism of socialization at work, the longer a country is a

member in the EU, the greater the probability that its citizens will support the values promoted by the EU and its institutions.

The second chapter of the dissertation studies the values that underpin the EU institutions. Specifically, through analyzing the EU fundamental treaties from 1950 to 2009, this chapter deciphers the ways by which the institutional discourse on values has changed throughout the sixty years of integration. EU institutions are commonly perceived as peculiar in the sense that they are able to bridge across different types of social divides-they link state interactions to the macro level of the organization, they connect the symbolic with the material and the *agentic*-namely, the organization as an agent-with the structural (the EU as the arena where states' delegation and operations take shape). As such, these institutions' discourse is expected to reflect the variegated 'voices' echoed in the EU as a multi-level entity.

The theoretical premise guiding this chapter is that the EU is a value-based entity. A glance into the discursive realm of the EU reveals that throughout the European integration process, two values dominated the Union's treaty texts-'democracy' and 'market economy'. However, since the 1990s, new values have penetrated into the organizational discourse, chiefly among them are 'social justice', 'peace', 'human rights' and 'European identity', constituting what was termed in the literature as the 'normative power of Europe'. In this context, the second chapter of the dissertation strives to identify and scrutinize the mechanisms through which the EU balances continuity and change in its values as a means of safeguarding its identity. The analysis shows that the *new* values that penetrated into the Union's treaty text were discursively marginalized (placed in restricted linguistic areas), while the Union's *old* values remained solidly present and emphasized. This discursive strategy is assumed to serve two functions: first, since these *new* values were contested back in the 1990s, marginalizing them in the discourse is conceived of as a tool through which the legitimacy of the EU can be further sustained. Second, marginalizing *new* values within the broader discourse of the EU holds the potential of reading and interpreting the treaty text as demonstrating consistency and continuation of a stable identity throughout the entire integration process, and thus, contributes to the stability and legitimacy of the EU as a responsive actor to changes in its internal and external environments.

II.   Chapters' Summary

A) A Community of Values: Democratic Identity Formation in the European Union

What effect does EU membership have on its citizens' values? In this chapter, we aim at answering this question by identifying, tracing and assessing the extent to which the EU has been successful in instilling its democratic values among the citizens. The findings of this research indicate a strong connection between a state's duration of membership in the EU and the degree to which its citizens adhere to liberal democratic values. This, in turn, suggests that while multiple national identities coexist within the EU, it successfully manages to unite its citizens under the umbrella of democratic ideology.

Embarking upon previous research's attempts to detect the rise of specific 'European' values and identification, my co-authors and I chose to study and evaluate the popular adherence to the EU's liberal democratic values. We found that membership duration in the EU is closely associated with citizens' adherence to the EU's core liberal democratic values. As such, our findings show that the longer a country has been a member of the EU, the stronger is its citizens' support of these values. Recalling the legitimacy and community deficits from which the EU continuously suffers–i.e. the calls to restrict further integration, accompanied by the proliferation of Eurosceptic sentiments– these findings pose an intriguing puzzle. Nevertheless, theories on socialization-and the Social Identity Theory in particular-persistently predict the socialization effect of the EU on its rank-and-file citizens. The rationale behind such persistence is that since they have been more profoundly socialized into EU democratic norms, citizens of the older member–states of the EU are more likely to express their support of democratic values than those citizens of relatively newer member–states, or even non-member states, of the EU.

Indeed, according to Social Identity Theory, groups tend to form and socialize a core set of shared values among their members. Seeking to attain a positive self-esteem, individuals develop stereotypes based on group–affiliation, which, in turn, increases their acceptance of new norms. Guided by this theoretical premise, in this research, we hypothesized, first, that citizens of older member–states will support democratic values to a greater extent than citizens of newer, or non– member ones. Second, we expected an *increase* in such support as a country accumulates more years of membership in the EU. These theory-laden assumptions were corroborated by the explicit efforts undertaken by the EU to foster democratic values, evident in its continuous and enhanced democratic policies, their promotion vis-à-vis accession countries and in the EU's increased enactment of human rights laws.

Methodologically, drawing on public opinion surveys and the application of factor analysis and multilevel models, we isolated four distinct democratic values: specific, or general, support for democracy, minorities' right and anti-authoritarian attitudes. The models presented in this article demonstrate ample evidence in favor of the socialization hypothesis, according to which, citizens of the EU's member–states express considerable adherence to the democratic values fostered by the latter. The analyses, then, succeeded in unraveling the question of the EU's success in socializing its members into adhering to its democratic values, as the findings revealed a significant effect of a country's membership duration in the EU on ultimate support of the latter's citizens of democratic values. Moreover, this effect was endured pervasively even when other factors, such as a country's GDP per capita and democratic institutions, as well as the respondents' level of education or income, were taken into account. The same results were revealed when a cross–national comparison–that is, between old members and new, or non–members of the EU–as well as longitudinal analyses (within countries over time) were drawn. In more specific terms, it was found that on the aggregated and individual levels, old member–states of the EU identify more with 'democracy' than new member–states, or non-members of the EU. Substantially, We found that mean support for 'democracy' in a country with fifty–seven years of membership in the EU is expected to be 12 percent points higher than a country with only four years of membership and 14 percent higher than a non-member country.

One of the most intractable hurdles in this study was addressing the cause-and-effect tension, according to which only countries that meet basic liberal democratic criteria are allowed to join the EU in the first place. In this respect, citizens of EU member–states might, quite naturally, support 'democracy' to a greater extent than non-EU citizens, regardless of the duration of their membership in the EU. In order to address this issue of *endogeneity*, we employed three strategies. First, we compared the average change, over time, in the support for democratic values among the group of EU-members and different groups of non-members of the EU, including a group of wealthy developed European democracies (especially Switzerland, Norway and Iceland). Second, the analyses scrutinized a linear time-effect to preclude the possibility of identifying a longitudinal correlation derived from common trending alone; such possibility can be realized in case that, for instance, globalization per se and not membership in the EU is the cause for the growing support for 'democracy'. Finally, we assumed that controlling the country's level of democracy would

eliminate the hypothesis according to which support for democracy is at its highest rates both within and among consolidated democracies.

We decided to use democratic values as a proxy for European identity mainly because in contrast to the seemingly prevailing assumption, the EU has not declared, on any occasion, that it seeks to promote a *unique* European identity. Instead, it has declared quite the opposite. The EU's motto is *united in diversity*, namely that the many different cultures, traditions and languages in Europe are considered to constitute a vital, or valuable, asset that the EU strives to preserve. On the other hand, the EU has soundly and repeatedly declared its core objective of fostering and promoting democratic values. We can, therefore, assume that the EU employs a highly sophisticated strategy, which attempts to set democratic norms as integral and cardinal elements in the process of building and enhancing its supranational, multilayered, institutions. Rather than nurturing a battlefield, rife with struggles among incompatible-and even conflicting-identities, resulting from the attempt to unite its members under a particular collective identity, the EU actually seeks to *unite* its citizens under the normative umbrella of democratic ideology. This strategy allows for Europeans to retain their distinct identities while embracing and adopting the EU's normative rules, which enable the former to harmoniously coexist in the framework of the EU. In this respect, promoting legalistic values, such as anti-authoritarianism, weakens conflicting particularistic identities on the one hand, while strengthening citizens' willingness to accept the institutions of the EU and their concomitant promoted values, on the other. The findings of this research project clearly show that such a value-based identity is in the making within the broader evolution of the EU as a political community.

B) The EU's Mechanism of Differentiated Value Integration

This research utilizes methods of automatic content analysis on all of the EU's fundamental treaties (in the time frame of 1950-2009) in order to identify, trace and map the ways through which the EU (re-)constructs its normative values. Drawing on the literature of institutional change, we develop several hypotheses regarding the possible ways through which the institutions of the EU assimilate new norms and values into their fundamental discourse. Our findings show that different values are incorporated into the organizational discourse via different trajectories. Specifically, new values, which found their way into the Union's constitutional discourse from the 1990s onwards, are positioned at a "safe" distance from the EU entity in the text of its treaties. This sophisticated discursive structure, so we claim, can be construed as indicating an acceptance and integration of new values, yet keeping them at bay so as not to compromise the EU's core values.

As the deepening competences and the widening membership of the EU have considerably grown in the past decades, the European integration, as a whole, has become less uniform in its nature (Winzen and Schimmelfennig, *forthcoming*). Throughout the continuous evolution and development of the integration processes in Europe, some countries seem to have opted out from specific policy areas, such as the Schengen area or the monetary union. [3] Notions such as 'multi-speed Europe', 'core Europe', 'variable geometry' and 'Europe a la carte' have long shaped scholarly and political discourses and are regularly used in the literature as describing the phenomenon of policy differentiation, or more specifically, of *opting out*.[4] While earlier studies, aiming at deciphering the sources and implications of such phenomenon, had placed their analytical focus on *policy* differentiation, rare is the research engaging with *value* differentiation. The scholarly relative silence over this phenomenon is strikingly puzzling as already three decades ago, in the mid-1980s, the European community declared its intention to integrate new norms and values, such of 'normative power' nature. These values were 'social justice', 'peace', 'human rights' and 'European identity'. Yet, introducing and implementing change to the organizational core values allegedly entailed the potential of undermining the EU's traditional objective of 'speaking with one voice' and consequently, of destabilizing the organization. In line with the recent developments and shifts in the EU's discourse, this organizational dilemma gains new pertinence and begs the scrutiny of whether the EU has eventually integrated these *new* values into its treaty texts and if so, how? What has changed in terms of the EU's organizational adaptive capacity, if at all?

These questions guide the second chapter of this dissertation and bring the theoretical literature on institutional change to the forefront of our analysis of the EU as an evolving political community. This literature identifies three different behavioral proclivities among institutions that confront internal or external stimuli for change. The first is the long–known tendency of institutions, especially global and inter–governmental ones, to resist change and maintain a *path–dependent* trajectory despite the changing nature of and predicaments in their environment (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Chwieroth 2010; Park 2010; Vetterlein 2008; Waever 2008). A second institutional behavioral proclivity, in the context of change, is conforming to environmental pressures and expectations. This proclivity is premised on the theoretical conceptualization of change as part and parcel of institutional life, as institutions' adaptive capacity in light of and in

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[3] And the EU usually excludes new member states from immediate participation in these two policy areas.

[4] I use the term 'differentiation' in this chapter to represent a similar (in structural terms) mechanism of the EU in integrating new norms and values into its discourse.

response to change is conceived of as cardinal to their survival (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Olsen 2009). The third institutional behavioral proclivity in the context of change is a middle–of–the–road tendency, according to which institutions maneuver the opposing tendencies of change and persistence by creating and advocating a dynamic equilibrium between the two (Chreim 2005; Haas 1990). Based on these different institutional proclivities, we propose three different *strategies* that the EU enacts in its attempt to overcome the tension between its role of promoting stability and its capacity, or willingness, to change and innovate in tune with the expectations and pressures rising from its changing environment.

First, the EU can choose to not integrate new values into its constitutional discourse, or at least not to call any significant attention to them. This scenario resonates with the scholarly emphasis on institutional stability in contemporary institutional analyses. This scenario is termed *the deception strategy*, since it rests upon a strong element of *deception,* as the EU's declared policy is being discursively ignored. In an alternative strategy, one of *full integration*, the EU refers and discusses the *new* values the same way it discusses and refers to its core, *old*, values of 'democracy' and 'market economy'.

Second, the EU can demonstrate a different adaptive proclivity, which mediates between all (*full integration*) and nothing (*no integration*), wherein *new* values are incorporated into the Union's discourse, but differ from the EU's *old* values in the way they are referred and addressed to in the text. In this strategy the *old* values of 'democracy' and 'market economy' are proximate to the EU, but the *new* values of 'social justice', 'peace', 'human rights' and 'European identity', while integrated into the treaty text, are attached to other entities than the EU. In other words, instead of being flagged by *new* values as well as *old* ones, as manifesting the organizational adaptive response to and management of change, the EU is still being flagged primarily by its *old* values. We name this strategy in our study as differentiated *value integration* for two reasons. First, through such strategy the EU is able to differentiate the *new* values from the *old* ones; and second, from the reader, or members' perspective, such strategy produces a modular text in which it is quite easy to dissociate *old* values from *new* ones, as they are flagged differently–i.e. the former being associated with the EU while the latter being associated with other entities.

Methodologically, in order to scrutinize and trace these three discursive strategies, we chose to focus our analysis on the EU's fundamental treaties. These treaties are commonly conceived of as

the bedrock of European integration, from its Coal and Steel Community phase through the establishment of the European Economic Community, the internal market and the monetary and political union. The logic guiding such methodological selection is quite straightforward. On the one hand, these treaties stand as the primary legislation tools in the hands of the EU, providing the conceptual and practical framework for all its legislation processes and mechanisms. On the other hand, these treaties are abstract and general in nature and structure in comparison to other legislation; a feature that enables the analysis of values. We turned to building dictionaries, as a bag of words, for each of the values and entities identified in the EU discourse. Two measures were employed to examine our conjectures: tone and proximity. Tone was measured as the relative frequency of values in the text. Voluminous tone of a subject–matter indicated that such particular subject has been put forward and deliberated by the EU. The proximity measure, on the other hand, examined the distance or proximity between values *and* entities. As our findings illustrate, the greater the proximity between the two, the greater the indication we had that values related to and projected onto the proximate entities of the EU.

Findings show that new values have penetrated into the EU's treaty discourse during integration processes and, thereby, refute the *deception strategy*. Evidently, starting close to zero, in the Lisbon Treaty, the organizational 'talk' of new values sums up to 30 percent of the total 'talk' on values. Specifically, among the discourse on new values, the 'talk' on 'peace' and 'human rights' has augmented over the years of integration. Aiming at answering the question of *how new values penetrated into the EU's discourse*, we turned to examine the relationship among entities and values in the text. To do that, we calculated the proximities between values and entities in the selected Union's treaty texts with the premise that values that tend to appear 'together' with entities relate to and project on them. Results indicate that the mechanism of *differentiated value integration* prevails and dominates the EU's behavioral proclivities in the context of change. Results show that while 'democracy' and market economy' are proximate to the EU entity in the text, new values are proximate to other entities; while 'peace' tends to appear discursively closer to the member–states of the EU, it also tends to appear closely to entities beyond the EU and the EU itself. Similarly, while the values of 'human rights' and 'European identity' appear discursively closer to citizens, the value of 'social justice' is located as discursively closer to European regions.

Hence, the findings support the hypothesis of the mechanism of *differentiated value integration* strategy, wherein the different values integrated into the EU's treaty text are attached to *different*

entities. Still, it is important to note that the analysis was executed on a pooled data (all treaties were analyzed together). To further delve into the ways through which new values penetrated into the EU's constitutional text, we examined the proximities among entities and values in each treaty *separately* and found that the EU has established new categories of actors (entities) concomitantly with its integration of new values into its discourse. For example, in the Single European Act (1986), new values, such as 'social justice' and 'human rights' penetrated into the treaty's text together with the establishment of the *regions* and *citizens* categorical entities. Noteworthy in this context is the fact that in these texts, new values are discursively remote from the long–established ones, as well as from the EU itself. In the last treaty in our data, the Lisbon treaty, some of the new values, especially of 'human rights' and 'peace' have shifted their discursive boundaries and are now attached to the EU entity. In actuality, we recognize not so much of a static picture of differentiated trajectories of integrating new values, but rather that new values first penetrate and incorporated into the treaty text–yet in a marginalized fashion. Moreover, we recognize that in the course of time, these values evolve in their proximity, as they gradually appear discursively closer to the EU entity as well as in their tone, as they are discussed more frequently in the texts. Interestingly, though, other *new* values retain their marginalized position in the Union treaty texts.

In conclusion, honing in the EU entity in the text, one would be tempted to deduce that the EU's identity is stable as throughout the Union's treaty texts it is constantly associated with 'democracy' and 'market economy'. However, zooming out from the EU entity, one can identify and trace the textual change in which *new* norms and values indeed penetrated into Europe's normative identity. The analyses undertaken in this chapter focused on examining the EU's construction of a self–image within its constitutive text throughout the integration phases and in light of the changing landscape of expectations and pressures shaping their trajectories. In this respect, the Union seems to constantly (re–)constructs its character via a set of norms and values that posit and mark it as en emerging political entity with *new*, updated and reframed values. Yet, at the same time, it is important to note that the EU maintains its home–based values of 'market economy' and 'democracy' in spite of, or perhaps in congruence with change. Hence, to use Epstein's terminology (2013), in the process of ethos construction, the Union, as a 'speaking subject' shapes, constructs and reconstructs its image as a prudent *reformator* of values and identity frontiers.

This chapter, then, shows that, overall, the European integration process is tightly linked to a process of community–building. As indicated in our findings, a value–change came about only in the

end of the 1980s as until then, the integration process was, by large, limited to cooperation on economic issues (the internal market and custom union). Such state of affairs, along the lines of relative stagnation in the integration process, left no room for ideational change. As the past decades have clearly demonstrated, though, the EU's perception of its organizational security and legitimation have grown to constitute key factors in igniting, driving and accounting for its ideational change, as when the organization enjoys high levels of the two, it perceives the implementation of change to be much easier.

C) A matter of identity: Measuring agenda setting power in a fragmented parliament

This research focuses on the European Parliament (EP) with the main objective of identifying the prime groups that shape and dominate the discourse in the EP by unpacking legislators' discursive interactions. This research analyzes European legislators' speeches (~35,000), delivered at the EPs' sixth session (2004–2009). First, it gauges the broad dimensions that are discussed in the EP and probes the attention given to different dimensions. Secondly, it estimates a discourse-regression-model, in which the net effect on the discourse of different groups is estimated, showing how the political-discourse-space in the parliament is divided by groups. Findings show a fragmented parliament in which different EP parties control different agendas. These findings are mirrored, so we claim, by the fact that legislators hold different group-identities–they belong to transnational party groups but are also members of national parties, and originate in different countries. All in all we reveal that the European parliament, although organized along transnational lines, enables groups with different political affiliations to have their - transnational as well as national – voices heard.

Who shapes and dictates the discourse in the European Parliament? This chapter put for scrutinization two cardinal questions. The first is how and by which group-identity the discourse in the EP is aligned. On the face of it, one would expect that speeches in the EP are dictated by EP parties and not by other group identities (nationality or national parties). Not only do studies on voting patterns in the EP suggest this to be the case, but the EP is organized along transnational party lines and not according to nationality or other group affiliation. Contrary to expectation, however, we found that in debates on topics of high politics – such as security and foreign affairs, *countries* in fact exert a greater influence on the discourse than *national* or *transnational parties*. Further investigation revealed the surprising fact that rather than powerful states dominating the discourse, weak and small states in fact are the dominant players who shape the agenda on these issues.

Next we examined which EP party controls the agenda. Drawing insights from agenda setting and issue ownership literatures, we set forth two hypotheses regarding niche and large parties. Specifically we hypothesized that niche parties control peripheral issues while large ones control core issues discussed in the EP. In line with our expectations, using estimates of legislators' attention to topics, we found that the two largest political groups in the EP control the agenda on core issues such as the economy, trade and customs union. Nonetheless, it was found that the Eurosceptic EP parties set the agenda on more peripheral issues such as European identity.

Interestingly, The findings that large parties push core EP issues, i.e., issues that deal with further European integration, into the agenda, while Euroskeptic parties dominate discourse on European identity – a contested issue that is far from promoting further integration, echoes the situation of a fragmented parliament in which different group-identities are operating in it. Though they are supposed to represent their EP party, legislators hold multiple group affiliations and identities which come into play in different settings and when deliberating on different issue-dimensions. These divided identities are translated, so we show, to the *party contestation* in the European parliament.

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APPENDIX

Figure A. Percentage of people who think the European integration is a good thing

1. 1973 accession

2. Founding members

3. 1995 accession

4. 1981 accession

Figure A1-4. Percentage of people who think the European integration is a good thing. Panels are classified according to accession waves into the EU. Source: Eurobarometer trend file 1970-2002.

CHAPTER 1

A Community of Values: Democratic Identity Formation in the European Union

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A community of values: Democratic identity formation in the European Union

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Abstract
Has the European Union (EU) succeeded in socializing citizens to support the democratic values it claims to promote? On the face of it, the prevailing skepticism precludes any expectation of a successful socialization of EU citizens to the EU values. Yet, according to the socialization hypothesis, citizens' support for these values is expected to increase as countries accumulate more years of the EU membership. Using survey data to isolate distinct dimensions of democratic values, we examine differences among countries in this regard, as well as changes within countries over time. Results confirm the socialization hypothesis, showing that support for democratic values is generally higher in countries with more years of the EU membership, and that this support trends upwards over time.

Keywords
Comparative politics, European integration, European identity, democratization, norms and ideas, public opinion

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Introduction

Since its formation, the European Union (EU) has not only grown from six to 28 member states but has also broadened and deepened their mutual cooperation. At the same time, calls have been voiced to restrict this interconnection, and the governments of some member states have faced difficulties in ratifying EU treaties. This suggests that, during the years of integration, a legitimacy deficit may have evolved, symptomatic of a mismatch between the growing integration and insufficient community building (De Vries and Van Kersbergen, 2007; Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007; Etzioni, 2007; Føllesdal, 2006; Harpaz, 2011).

This study investigates whether, during the years of integration, the European community has been able to form a core of shared values among EU citizens.[1] Specifically, it probes whether and to what extent the duration of EU membership influences individuals' support for democratic values. According to the *socialization hypothesis* developed by scholars of EU studies (see, for example, Dixon, 2008), the longer a country's membership in the EU, the more its citizens are expected to manifest EU values. In reality, however, considering its current legitimacy and community deficits, it seems unlikely that the EU has been able to socialize its reluctant citizens. The analysis in this article will examine the socialization hypothesis in the context of the legitimacy deficit. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that explicitly addresses the question of whether the EU has succeeded in socializing its *citizens* to support the values it promotes.

Democratic values were defined by the EU as an important facet of the European identity (European Commission, 2001). They play a crucial role in the organization of social life, and are a pivotal component of individuals' personalities, guiding both their attitudes and their behavior (Meuleman et al., 2013). Most importantly, these values are explicitly promoted by EU institutions (Kennedy, 2013; McCormick, 2010). For the purposes of this analysis, values were identified and measured utilizing four waves of the European Value Survey (EVS) and the World Value Study (WVS).

Based on the above cross-national surveys, we fitted multilevel models and subsequent robustness tests to examine the effect of EU membership on people's adherence to general democratic values. Even when controlling for competing macro-level explanations and individual characteristics that might correlate with values, results confirm that membership in the EU fosters adherence to democratic values among citizens of EU member states. These results hold when comparison is drawn cross-nationally, between old members and new or non-members, as well as longitudinally, within countries over time.

Promoting a European identity

Collective identity has been commonly conceptualized in the literature as a cohesive element that holds a political system together and serves as a precondition for its endurance for the long term (Almond and Verba, 1963; Easton, 1965). Accordingly, in the last three decades, the European Commission has focused on promoting

European identity within the EU (for example, European Commission, 2001)—triggering, in turn, theoretical, empirical and review work on this subject. These studies, however, have produced contradictory results regarding the existence of European identity. Some researchers contend that there is no European *demos* sharing collective identity, in default of a community engaged in ongoing communication or having collective experiences and common memories—a conclusion that has received some empirical support (Duchesne and Frognier, 1995; Meinhof, 2004). Others object to this claim, appealing to empirical studies that have produced evidence for the emergence of a European collective identity (Bruter, 2003, 2005; Citrin and Sides, 2004; Deutsch, 1954; Niedermayer, 1995; Risse, 2010; Schild, 2001).

These conflicting findings can be attributed to divergent understandings of the concept of identity—both in general and specifically at European level—and to different methods used to measure identity (e.g. survey data, content analysis or experiments). Some studies have focused on the question of whether national and European identities are compatible or mutually exclusive (Hooghe and Marks, 2007; McCormick, 2010). Hooghe and Marks (2007), for example, found that people who strongly identify with their nation-state are more likely to identify with Europe as a whole. Other studies suggested that mutual trust among Europeans can be regarded as a proxy for a unified European identity (Delhey, 2007). Bruter's experimental studies distinguished between the political and the cultural component of European identity and found that people tend to identify more with the latter than with the former (Bruter, 2003, 2005).

Common to the studies cited above is their thick, and hence exclusive, perception of what is conceived of or envisioned as European identity. These studies borrow elements of national identities to define and subsequently measure identity at the European level. Yet, the EU is a distinct political entity *sui generis*, whose members do not necessarily share the same culture, tradition, religion or national history (Bellucci et al., 2012). Therefore, the concept of identity at the European level requires adaptations and adjustments.

As already noted, in view of the EU declarations regarding a pan-European supranational identity, its core element is democratic values. Thus, according to the *Declaration of European Identity,* the EU is 'determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law . . . and of respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of European Identity'.

Democratic values as a proxy for European identity

In this study, the European identity is operationalized as democratic values. The rationale for this stipulation is threefold. First, promoting these values is a declared policy of the EU (European Commission, 2001). Accordingly, democratic values are actively endorsed by different EU institutions by both word (e.g. declarations, white papers, treaties) and deed (e.g. policies, sanctions, benefits). These values are upheld within the EU as well as vis-a-vis third countries (Kotzian et al., 2011). The European Commission oversees the fulfillment of the EU law and the

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implementation of democratic and human rights policies (Youngs, 2004). The European Council sets up democratic agendas. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) holds governments and firms accountable when citizens' human rights are violated (Moravcsik, 2000; Schimmelfennig, 2010). According to Dixon (2008), Engert and Knobel (2003), and Schimmelfennig (2007) the EU promotes democratic policies vis-a-vis accession countries as well. The latter must meet political criteria as a condition for their accession into the EU. These are known as the Copenhagen Criteria and are set out in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on EU. They require 'that a candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities' (European Council, 1993: 7.A.iii).

These values also pervade the European Treaties, the primary legislative instrument of the EU (TEU, Article 49). According to these Treaties, EU membership is open to 'any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them' (TEU, Article 49). The values in question are 'respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities'. The preamble to the Lisbon Treaty opens with the assertion that human rights, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law are all part of Europe's cultural, religious and humanist inheritance (EU, 2007).

The second reason that democratic values are taken here to stand for the European identity is that the EU has not declared on any occasion that it seeks to promote a unique European identity; in fact, quite the opposite. The EU's motto is *united in diversity*, meaning that the many different cultures, traditions and languages in Europe are considered to be an asset that the EU intends to preserve.

The EU socialization hypothesis

EU can socialize residents of its member states to adopt its democratic values by underscoring their importance in various forums (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2010) and by enhancing democratic policies. It can also require the EU members to pass certain laws—which, with time, the citizenry comes to accept as normative (Checkel, 2003; Hooghe and Marks, 2007; Orbell et al., 1990; Rohrschneider, 1999). In this approach, residents of older member states, to the extent that they have been more profoundly socialized into EU norms and values, are likely to express more support for democratic values than those of newer member states or non-EU members. In other words, it is hypothesized that the longer a country has been a member in the EU, the more its citizens will support democratic values. In line with this view, differences among countries in the prevalence of democratic values are a function of differences in EU socialization at the country level. Thus, this paper sets forth the following hypotheses:

> *H1*: Citizens of old member states will support democratic values promoted by the EU to a greater extent than citizens of new member states or non-EU members.

H2: Support for democratic values in a country grows as it accumulates more years of membership in the EU.

These assumptions are corroborated by the explicit efforts on the part of the EU to foster democratic values. They are also aligned with the premises of social identity theory, according to which groups usually form a core of values shared by their members (Della Sala, 2010; Etzioni, 2007; Føllesdal, 2006; Parsons, 2002; Tajfel, 1981). To gain positive self-esteem (Tajfel, 1981) or alternatively to satisfy the need for optimal distinctiveness (Brewer, 1991), individuals develop stereotypes based on group affiliations, and these perceptions of group membership can, in turn, lead to the acceptance of group norms (Hogg, 2006).

While using membership duration as a proxy for socialization, we do not presume to offer a comprehensive theory of socialization or to endorse one particular mechanism as superior to others suggested in the literature. Explanations of change in attitudes as a consequence of institutional arrangements have been attempted in the framework of a number of different New Institutionalist theories. Moreover, our review of the literature on the EU suggests that a variety of mechanisms socializing individuals to its values may be work (Checkel, 2005). Socialization can occur directly—for example, as a result of citizens' first-hand interactions with EU institutions and policy instruments, which influence their preferences; or indirectly—mediated by the state channel. Alternatively, socialization can stem from the costs of norm violations (e.g. Copenhagen criteria) or from benefits contingent on norm adherence. EU institutions can socialize citizens through mechanisms anchored in the logic of appropriateness or of calculation (Schmidt, 2008). This process can also be explained based on a psychological logic appealing to a human desire to be part of a group (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; Kennedy, 2013). An examination of the relative benefits of all these theories is clearly beyond the scope of this article. However, using time as a proxy for socialization seems to be a practical approach irrespective of the mechanism that may account for this process.

To the best of our knowledge, the socialization hypothesis had never been tested before despite its obvious significance. Two related hypotheses had been raised and examined in the literature. One posits a socializing effect of the EU on national elites and democratic institutions (for example, Bearce and Bondanella, 2007; Checkel, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2007), but not on citizens. The other, explored by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), probes the effect of socio-economic conditions on individuals' priorities with regard to values. According to this latter hypothesis, post-materialist values are more likely to emerge among individuals in affluent societies. None of these studies, however, addresses the question regarding the effect of the EU on democratic values embraced by its citizens.

The present study examines differences among countries with respect to the above-described individual values, comparing these values cross-nationally (*H1*) and over time (*H2*).

Data and methods

The analyses rely on data from the third and fourth European Values Surveys (EVS) and the second and fourth World Values Survey (WVS),[2] which together cover the period from 1994 to 2010. Earlier waves were not used in the study as they did not include questions relating to democratic values. The EVS/WVS is a series of surveys that, together, constitute a large-scale, cross-national, longitudinal research program. All European countries, including those in Central and Eastern Europe, EU members and non-members alike, are involved in one or more waves of this study. This renders the study appropriate for investigating differences and similarities across European countries in terms of democratic values. The study also includes countries outside Europe which constitute a control group in the statistical models. Data were obtained via a questionnaire containing items gauging attitudes, opinions and values regarding a wide variety of life domains, including those targeted here: democracy, anti-authoritarian attitudes and immigrants' rights.

In the four waves used in the present research, data were collected on 295,484 people living in 99 countries, though not every question was asked in every country during each wave: some of the questions were omitted on different occasions. To investigate various latent factors associated with the prevalence of democratic values, we conducted Exploratory Factor Analysis on respondents' answers to 11 questions tapping democratic values (see Table 1). All 11 items were included in each of the four waves, but some were not addressed by individual respondents. Accordingly, the factor analysis incorporates the replies of 96,587 respondents who provided valid responses to all 11 questions.

Dependent variables: Measuring democratic values: The WVS/EVS contain various items that capture different aspects of democratic attitudes as well as questions targeting different characteristics of democracy. Some scholars utilized these items without constructing a scale or gauging their factorial structure (i.e. Inglehart, 2003), while others have suggested a scale to measure democratic attitudes. Three sets of such scales have been implemented: the 'democracy-autocracy preference' (DAP) scale (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), the 'democratic performance evolution' (DPE) scale (Ariely and Davidov, 2011), and the 'democracy as an ideal form of government' scale (Klingemann, 1999). As is shown below, our factor analyses revealed similar paths for these three scales. Four factors were retained, based on the following extraction criteria: an eigenvalue greater than one, a scree test (Floyd and Widaman, 1995), and a corresponding parallel factor analysis (see online Appendix). The factors were rotated using a promax oblique rotation to allow correlation. Questions E120–122 load on the first factor (all > 0.6), which is labeled *Demo-Specific* since it includes specific evaluations of the functioning of the economy in democracy, democracy's ability to maintain order, and decision-making processes in democracy (loadings on factors are shown in bold in Table 1). The *Anti-Authoritarian* factor includes questions gauging preferences as to who should run the country: strong leaders, experts, or the army.[3] The third factor, *Demo-General Principles*, includes people's evaluations of

Table 1. A list of question-wording for European values.

	Questions	EFA factor loadings			
		Demo-specific	Anti-author	Demo-general Principles	Minorities' rights
E121	Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling	**0.7332**	−0.0482	−0.0540	−0.0157
E120	In democracy, the economic system runs badly	**0.6660**	0.0395	0.0334	0.0012
E122	Democracies aren't good at maintaining order	**0.6431**	0.0420	0.0635	0.0157
E114	Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections	0.0303	**0.5687**	0.0518	0.0006
E115	Having the army rule the country	0.0119	**0.4852**	0.0765	0.0324
E116	Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country	0.0253	**0.4693**	−0.0918	−0.0300
E117	Having a democratic political system	0.0537	0.0105	**0.5916**	0.0053
E123	Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government	0.0088	0.0326	**0.5909**	−0.0160
A124_02	Would not like to have as neighbors—immigrants/foreign	−0.0043	−0.0076	−0.0007	**0.6759**
A124_05	Would not like to have as neighbors—people of a different race	−0.0112	0.0298	−0.0007	**0.6344**
A124_06	Would not like to have as neighbors—Muslims	0.0188	−0.0167	−0.0006	**0.6064**

Note: Exploratory Factor Analysis, using the principal factor method and the oblique promax rotation. Countries were given the same weight. The four factors explain 69% of variance.

democracy as a political ideology, with questions E117 and E123 loading heavily on that factor (all > 0.6). All three A124 questions load on the fourth factor (>0.5), labeled *Minorities' Rights*, which encapsulates peoples' willingness to have individuals of a different race, immigrants or Muslims as their neighbors.

Since, as noted earlier, some of the values were missing at the individual level, the factor scores were not used; instead, average indices were built for each of the

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four factors.[4] To this end, we multiplied every scale to give it a top code of 100 and thereby render all the scales mutually comparable. Higher scores denote greater support for democratic values. For the *Demo-Specific*, *Anti-Authoritarian*, *Demo-General Principles, Minorities' Rights*, Cronbach's α are 0.78, 0.54, 0.60, 0.71, respectively.[5]

Control variables: Individual-level and macro-level correlates of democratic values: Contextual variables and individual-level controls are presented in the regression analysis. Perhaps the most prevalent alternative hypothesis is that modernization, which brings about economic prosperity, prompts people to support democratic values. Inglehart and Norris (2003) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005) found that modernization affects peoples' values such as rationality, democracy and secularism. Their modernization theory was tested on extensive data (from more than 40 countries around the world) and has proven highly robust. According to it, economic wellbeing at early stages of political maturation has a strong influence on post-materialist attitudes later in life. Moreover, in his recent book, Welzel (2013) contends that a decrease in existential pressures nurtures a belief in tolerance and democracy and opens people's minds, making them prioritize freedom, democracy and human rights over security. Though relying on Inglehart's modernization theory, we control for a country's wellbeing at the time of the surveys rather than of respondents' adolescence. That choice is consequent to critique based on empirical findings that respondents' attitudes are not affected by economic conditions earlier in life (i.e. Duch and Taylor, 1993). The indicator most often used for a nation's wellbeing is economic development or average national income *per capita* (henceforth, GDP/capita). For the analysis we used GDP/capita (divided by 1000), at purchasing power parity, in international dollars (from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database: GDP/capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $)).

This statistic is not available for five countries at certain time points (Andorra, 2005; Puerto Rico, 1995, 2001; Zimbabwe, 2001; Kosovo, 2008); hence, these countries were excluded from the analysis. In addition, East and West Germany are treated as a single country unit in terms of their GDP/capita. GDP/capita ranges from $ 636.0687 (Ethiopia 2005) to $ 73,349.64 (Luxembourg, 2008).

A domestic contextual variable that may affect democratic values is the level of democracy in a country (Rohrschneider, 1999; Sheafer and Shenhav, 2013). The democracy index favored by scholars is the Freedom House index of Political Rights and Civil Liberties. According to the index, countries are coded on an integer scale from 1 to 7, corresponding to full democracy and autocracy, respectively. Data are reversed to a scale from 0 (no democracy) to 6 (full democracy) to facilitate interpretation. Higher scores are assigned to countries that display the most fully a set of characteristics associated with a functioning democracy.

At the individual level, we control for characteristics that have been found to influence support for democratic values, i.e. education, age, gender, and social class

(for details, see the online Appendix). Many studies show a curvilinear relationship between age and support for democratic values (see, for example, Andersen and Fetner, 2008; Neundorf, 2010). To capture the non-linear nature of this relationship, age as measured in years enters the statistical models as an orthogonal quadratic polynomial.

Due to space restrictions, we present here only the analyses of the *Anti-Authoritarian* index. Robustness analyses for the other three factors are displayed in the Online Appendix. Valid observations on the *Anti-Authoritarian* index were received from 286,799 respondents nested in 99 countries, over 219 country-years (data obtained from a single country at different times)—with 14 countries observed in four waves, 22 in three waves, 34 in two waves, and 29 in one wave.

Multilevel modeling

Previous studies that examined differences in values among countries have tended to rely on individual-level survey data (for example, Dixon, 2008; Rohrschneider, 2002) or on their country-level aggregations (for example, Schwartz, 1999). Examining data at both the national and individual levels bypasses the controversy as to which level is the most appropriate for the purpose (Kedar and Shively, 2005). Moreover, it enables the examination of contextual/macro variables, such as EUAge, GDP, etc. alongside micro-level data, such as education and income, which may influence support for certain values.

Such a multilevel design is particularly appropriate for gauging individual differences stemming from the political context, and for testing hypotheses about the consequences of macro-level political conditions (in this case EUAge) for individuals' values, attitudes and behavior (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992; Fairbrother, 2014). In this case we found that the model that fits the data best comprises three-levels:[6] individuals are first nested within countries at a certain time point (i.e. country-years, e.g. France, 1999), and then that cluster is nested in a country (France). The model is formalized as follows:

$$y_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1ijk} + \beta_2 x_{2jk} + \beta_3 x_{3k} + \beta_4 time_{jk} + v_k + u_{jk} + e_{ijk}$$

where: $v_k \sim N(0, \sigma_v^2)$ $U_{Jk} N(0, \sigma_u^2)$ $e_{ijk} N(0, \sigma_e^2)$

Respondent *ijk* is nested in country-year *jk* and country *k*. Country-years and countries each have a random intercept (u_{jk} and v_k respectively), and these random intercepts, like the individual-level error term e_{ijk}, are distributed normally, with mean 0, and are uncorrelated. Covariates x can be at the individual-level (i.e. income, level of education, age and gender, indexed *ijk*), country-year level (i.e. GDP/capita, Freedom House score and De-Meaned EUAge, indexed *jk*), or country level (EUAge Average, indexed *k*). The model includes a linear time effect to rule out the possibility of a longitudinal correlation that is due merely to common trending (e.g. the effects of globalization processes on support for certain values).

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
Figure 1. A Lowess smoothing graphic representation of the relationship between years of membership in the EU and countries' mean support for the *Anti-Authoritarian* Index.

Results: Comparing EU with non-EU countries

Figure 1 contains a graphic representation of the relationships between support for *Anti-Authoritarian* and a country's years of membership in the EU (EUAge). It displays the mean level of the *Anti-Authoritarian* index for each of the 27 EU members at different times of EU membership. For example, Italy was surveyed at three different time points (1999, 2005, and 2008), and the duration of its EU membership was calculated at each separately. Italy is one of the oldest EU members: it joined the European community in 1951. Thus, its membership duration at the second wave (1999) is specified as 48; and at the third and fourth waves (2005 and 2008) as 54 and 57, respectively (for the specifications for all the countries tested the reader is referred to the online Appendix).

An instructive picture emerges in Figure 1 with regard to the change in values over time for each country as well as to the location of each country on the *Anti-Authoritarian* scale (for a list of the *Anti-Authoritarian* scores by country-years see the Online Appendix). The graph shows that the relationship between EUAge and *Anti-Authoritarian* is positive, though non-linear and inverted-U shaped. Returning to the example of Italy (labeled IT in Figure 1), a cross-sectional examination shows that it is located high on the *Anti-Authoritarian* scale relative to other EU members (*H1*), and a longitudinal examination shows an upward trend-ing in its citizens' support for *Anti-Authoritarian* over time (*H2*).

Though Figure 1 reveals an overall upward trending, it is important to isolate the cross-national and the longitudinal component in the relationship between EUAge and support for *Anti-Authoritarian*. Since the EUAge changes both across countries and within countries over time, we cannot tell from the graph whether just one dimension is driving any covariation with *Anti-Authoritarian*, or even whether these two dimensions have different signs. The statistical models presented in the next section help to resolve this uncertainty.

Figure 2 displays the differences in mean support for *Anti-Authoritarian* for the group of EU members and for different groups of countries that are not EU mem-bers. The left-hand panel shows the differences between members and non-members (EU members versus European and non-European countries). It reveals that EU members demonstrate higher support for *Anti-Authoritarian* than non-members and that the change over time for members trends slightly upwards, whereas for non-members—downwards. Nevertheless, since this descriptive ana-lysis involves a large number of countries ($N = 99$), and since variance among countries is high, we also examined differences in mean support for *Anti-Authoritarian* between EU-members and European countries that are not EU members.[7]

These differences are displayed in the right-hand panel of Figure 2. The European countries that are not EU members exhibit an even sharper downward trending on support for *Anti-Authoritarian* than the non-member countries in the left-hand panel. It is important to note, however, that the upward trending mani-fested by EU member countries also reflects a changing number of EU members from one wave to the next.[8] Romania and Bulgaria, for example, joined the EU only in 2007, and are thus included only in the last, 2008 wave, by which time they had accumulated one year of membership each. Although these two countries are low on the *Anti-Authoritarian* scale (see Figure 1, where they are labeled RO and BG), an upward trending of the EU member group is still in place. It seems that the upward trending for the group of EU-members is generated by older member states. The Mann–Kendall test for trend analysis shows that the positive and nega-tive trends of the two groups, EU-members and non-EU European countries, are significant at 95% confidence level.

In the following section we examine the causal relationships between the dur-ation of EU membership and support for *Anti-Authoritarian*—crucially, taking into account the control measures that may influence support for *Anti-Authoritarian*.

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
Figure 2. Changes in mean support for *Anti-Authoritarian* for countries grouped into EU members (solid line) and non-EU members (dotted line). *Note:* The left-hand panel (*N* = 219) compares the trend in support for *Anti-Authoritarian* attitudes between European members and non--member countries while the right-hand panel (*N* = 130) displays trend in *Anti-Authoritarian* attitudes for EU members vis-à-vis European non-EU members. The two panels show a slightly upward tendency for EU members, whereas non-EU countries show a downwards tendency of supporting the *Anti-Authoritarian*.

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Results: Longitudinal and cross-sectional multilevel models

Table 2 reports the results for *Anti-Authoritarian* yielded by all five models. The null model (Model 1) enables an analysis of variance by identifying the ratio of each variance component to the total variance in the support for *Anti-Authoritarian* (see Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992), which is equal to $(\omega_{0o} + \tau_{0o} + \sigma_{0o})$. The ratios of ω_{0o} (country level) and τ_{0o} (country-year level) over the total variance are 17% and 3.5%, respectively. These shares (also called intra-class correlation) suggest that there are substantial differences among countries in *Anti-Authoritarian*, and that these attitudes also vary to some extent within countries over time. The null model demonstrates that, on support for *Anti-Authoritarian*, the estimated random-intercept standard deviation at the country level is considerable—7.4 points, but is less so at the country-year level—3.3 points. The estimates are shown under Model 1 in Table 2.[9]

In Model 2 we break down EUAge (our independent variable) into two component parts: cross-sectional and longitudinal. That is, to distinguish between longitudinal and cross-national effects, EUAge is entered in the models in two ways. First, it is averaged for each country across all years available (1994–2010), generating a country-level variable (EUAge Average). Estimating the average of each country's years of membership targets the fundamental differences in the membership duration across countries, with no reference to changes in EUAge over the course of time. Second, each country's average membership duration (EUAge Average) is subtracted from that country's EUAge in a given year. This yields a country-year-level variable (De-Meaned EUAge) that is orthogonal to the country's mean membership and represents the change over time within a given country. We used this technique in order to preclude inferences regarding social change based solely on the results of cross-national research. This issue has been raised by scholars who pointed out that it would be misleading to treat cross-sectional and longitudinal relationships as one and the same (Bell and Jones, 2015; Fairbrother, 2014).

Model 3 includes the competing contextual variables, i.e. GDP/capita and the Freedom House Index (for a detailed description of these variables see the online Appendix). Theoretically, these two macro-level variables are expected to have a positive effect on *Anti-Authoritarian*. Model 4 includes all the contextual factors used in our analysis (GDP/capita, EUAge variables, and the Freedom House Index), together with the micro-level predictors of *Anti-Authoritarian* (education, income, age and gender). Model 5 is similar to Model 4, but it excludes from the analysis all those countries where democratization had not yet consolidated (0–4 on democracy values) so as to further examine whether EUAge has a significant effect only among full democracies.

The total residual variance of the null model is estimated as 322 (see Table 2 at the bottom, $\omega_{0o} + \tau_{0o} + \sigma_{0o}$). For Model 2, the total residual variance is estimated as 306. It follows that the EUAge covariates in Model 2 account for 9.5% of the total variance (306/322). Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) suggest considering the proportional reduction in each of the variance components separately.

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Table 2. Longitudinal and cross-sectional multilevel models for *Anti-Authoritarian*.

Model/Measure	Null model 1	The effect of EUAge variables 2	Macro-level controls 3	Individual-level controls 4	Democracies only 5
Fixed-effects					
EUAge variables					
De-Meaned EUAge		0.331*** (0.093)	0.281*** (0.096)	0.262** (0.095)	0.266*** (0.070)
EUAge average		0.440*** (0.082)	0.237** (0.076)	0.245*** (0.076)	0.219** (0.067)
Time (1994 = 0)		−0.623** (0.230)	−1.301*** (0.259)	−1.352*** (0.260)	−1.603*** (0.262)
GDP/Capita			0.307*** (0.055)	0.289*** (0.055)	0.281*** (0.058)
Democratic institutions Freedom House Index (Combined Index)			0.105 (0.360)	0.108 (0.360)	1.298 (0.994)
Individual level controls					
Middle education (lower = 0)				2.042*** (0.078)	2.123*** (0.099)
Upper education (lower = 0)				4.825*** (0.091)	5.315*** (0.114)
Gender (female = 1)				−0.217*** (0.061)	−0.190* (0.077)
Working class				−0.334*** (0.101)	−0.069 (0.147)

(continued)

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Table 2. Continued

Model/Measure	Null model 1	The effect of EUAge variables 2	Macro-level controls 3	Individual-level controls 4	Democracies only 5
Age				0.129*** (0.010)	0.152*** (0.012)
Age*Age				−0.001*** (0.000)	−0.001*** (0.000)
Random-effects					
Country level variance (ω_{0o})	55.57	41.53	26.35	26.73	21.15
Country-year level variance (τ_{0o})	11.18	9.90	10.35	10.15	5.21
Individual level variance (σ_{0o})	255.12	255.12	255.74	252.54	241.85
Intercept	70.87*** (0.791)	70.28*** (0.813)	66.85*** (1.406)	62.37*** (1.428)	55.89*** (4.975)
Log likelihood	−1,202,186	−1,202,165	−1,175,210	−1,151,804	−679,833
N	286,799	286,799	280,291	275,121	163,233
Countries	99	99	94	94	57
Country-years	219	219	213	211	132

Note: Entries are maximum likelihood estimates of coefficients. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
*$p < 0.05$,
**$p < 0.01$,
***$p < 0.001$.

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Thus, the proportion of level 2 variance attributable to the covariates is 25%, and the proportion of level 3 variance thus explained is 11%. The results show a sizeable reduction in the variance both between and within countries, though it seems that most of this variance is attributable to the cross-sectional part of the covariate EUAge, while only a small proportion is accounted for by the longitudinal part of that variable.

The above-presented results on the effect of the EUAge covariates—which, as noted, incorporate both cross-sectional and longitudinal differences in EU membership—also hold when controlling for competing macro-level factors and individual-level covariates. In all models (2–5) the EUAge variables have a positive and significant effect on *Anti-Authoritarian*. This strongly suggests that EU membership of long standing is associated with greater support for democratic values. When level-2 and micro-level covariates are added (models 3 and 4), this effect lessens, but still remains significant. Even when macro- and micro-level factors are controlled for (model 4), mean support for *Anti-Authoritarian* in a country with 57 years of EU membership is expected to be 12 points higher than for a country with only four years of membership, and 14 points higher than for a non-member country. Models 2–5 (Table 2) include a linear effect for time (Time (1994 = 0)) wherein the first wave is set as the lowest category (1994 = 0). As noted, time was included in the models to rule out the possibility of a longitudinal correlation that is due merely to common trending. We include time as a linear measure rather than as periods: period bins would add a substantial degree of error to the time trend, since each bin would contain varying sets of countries (see Online Appendix). The results for these models suggest that, across all countries, support for *Anti-Authoritarian* is trending downwards over time, in light of the negative and significant time effect. The downward trending was also shown in Figure 2, which plotted *Anti-Authoritarian* for EU members and non-members and where the former group of countries exhibited a slight upward trending over time while the latter—a slight downward trending.

Model 3 adds to the analysis macro-level covariates which the literature describes as having a positive effect on support for democratic values. It includes terms for GDP/capita at the country-year level and countries' scores on the Freedom House's Index. As expected, the GDP/capita variable has a positive effect on *Anti-Authoritarian*. In other words, individuals show, on average, relatively higher support for democratic values in countries with high GDP/capita. The effect of the GDP/capita retains its magnitude even when micro-level covariates are added to the analysis, such as respondents' education level (see model 4). The Freedom House measure was incorporated at the country-year level, with the result that each country-year has a score on that measurement. Results show that the effect is positive (though not significant), meaning that respondents in fully democratic countries demonstrate high levels of support for *Anti-Authoritarian* compared to those in countries with low scores on the Freedom House measure.

At the individual level (model 4), respondents with higher education display stronger support for *Anti-Authoritarian*. Respondents with middle-level education

are expected to raise *Anti-Authoritarian* by 2.1 and those with higher educa-
tion—by 5.3 points, relative to respondents with low-level education. A respond-
ent's age has a positive, albeit small, effect on *Anti-Authoritarian*: The
Anti-Authoritarian of a 70-year-old respondent is expected to be 2.13 points
higher than that of an 18-year-old. However, it has a non-linear effect on
support for *Anti-Authoritarian*. Finally, women manifest lower support for
Anti-Authoritarian than men.

Model 5 provides a robustness test for our findings. We found that the effect of
the EUAge covariates stays more or less the same, and is statistically significant. In
Model 5 we partition the data, analyzing only consolidated democracies (Freedom
House Index greater than 4) to show that the EUAge covariates are still at work
when only democracies are included in the sample. Results confirm our hypotheses
regarding a EUAge effect on support for democratic values even when only con-
solidated democracies are concerned.

In Table 3 we offer alternative model specifications to the data: a country
fixed-effect model and a marginal model with a first-order autoregressive com-
ponent, both of which confirm the robustness of the results reported in Table 2.
As opposed to the models displayed in Table 2, which examine the effect of
EUAge both within and between countries, the country fixed-effect model
is designed to study the effect of EUAge only *within* countries. This model is
motivated by two considerations. First, the EUAge variable incorporates both
the cross-sectional and the longitudinal effect (see Figure 1). We wanted to sep-
arate these two effects so as to check, *inter alia*, whether a *within-country effect* of
EUAge exists at all. Second, we sought to avoid the endogeneity problem, which
could have resulted from the conditions for the EU membership: only countries
that meet specific criteria of democracy and functioning democratic institutions
can join the EU. We controlled out a possible between-country effect, anticipat-
ing criticism on the grounds that the results obtained can be attributed to unob-
served country-level characteristics.

Since a country's mean level of support for democratic values at a certain time
point (t) is expected to correlate positively with that registered previously ($t-1$), we
also devised a marginal model with a first-order autoregressive component. Results
confirm that, over time, member states move up the scale of support for democratic
values, and also show this effect of the EUAge to be robust under different esti-
mation techniques. Similar tests were performed for the remaining three demo-
cratic values (see the Online Appendix). Findings reveal that EUAge has a
positive effect on support for all democratic values.

As only countries that meet basic democratic criteria are eligible for the EU
membership in the first place, one might argue that socialization to democratic
values occurs by virtue of factors other than belonging to the EU. This causal
uncertainty was resolved using the following three strategies. The first is a differ-
ence-in-difference approach (Figure 2), in case in point, comparing average change
over time in the support for democratic values among the group of EU members to
such change among different groups of non-EU countries, including a group

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Table 3. A robustness check.

Model/Measure	Fixed effect model	Marginal modeling
Fixed-effects		
EUAge variables		
EUAge	0.292*** (0.015)	0.047*** (0.003)
Lag I		0.115*** (0.002)
Time (1994 = 0)	−0.595*** (0.063)	−1.053*** (0.033)
GDP/capita	−0.047 (0.025)	0.288*** (0.004)
Democratic institutions		
Freedom House Index (Combined Index)	−0.197* (0.077)	0.495*** (0.027)
Individual level controls		
Middle education (Lower = 0)	2.183*** (0.077)	1.994*** (0.078)
Upper education (Lower = 0)	4.972*** (0.091)	4.728*** (0.093)
Gender (female = 1)	−0.204*** (0.062)	−0.147* (0.066)
Working class	−0.455*** (0.092)	−0.929 (0.087)
Age	0.129*** (0.010)	0.123*** (0.010)
Age*Age	−0.001*** (0.000)	−0.001*** (0.000)
Intercept	66.35*** (0.515)	52.66*** (0.281)
N	275,121	261,215
R^2 (within group)	.13	.11
F-statistic	404	3132
$p > \chi^2$	.000	.000

Note: The table reports findings of two robustness tests to the models presented in the paper. The Fixed-Effect Model accounts for country-specific effects where we specify a fixed-effect (within) regression estimator. The Marginal Model includes a first-order autoregressive component (Lag 1). Both models show that the effect of EUAge is positive and significant at the .001 level.

of wealthy developed European democracies which are not part of the EU (Abadie, 2005; Robinson et al., 2009). These groups were found to display varying longitudinal trends in supporting democratic values. Second, the analyses include a linear time effect to preclude the possibility of finding a longitudinal correlation due to common trending alone. Third, we rule out alternative hypotheses. Thus, the possibility that our results merely reflect the fact that support for democracy is normally the highest in consolidated democracies is eliminated by controlling for the countries' democracy level (Robinson et al., 2009).

All in all, even when factors at the country and individual levels are controlled for, EUAge was found to have a significant positive coefficient. In other words, years of membership in the EU affect citizens' support for democratic values. This effect is present when comparison is drawn both between and within countries.

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Discussion and conclusion

While, in academia, institutions have traditionally been regarded as important agents of socialization, they have only recently been linked to mass values. Moreover, most research in this regard has been conducted at the national level. At the supranational level, scholars have emphasized the socializing effect of institutions, notably the EU, on the attitudes and behavior of the elites—but not of ordinary citizens. By contrast, the hypotheses set forth in this article focus on the effect of the EU on rank-and-file Europeans. It is proposed here that the longer a country has been a member of the EU, the stronger its citizens support the EU values. This hypothesis was tested both cross-sectionally and longitudinally.

Studying the socialization effect of the EU is important not only from an academic standpoint: it also benefits EU practitioners, who seek to promote EU values so as to '[reinforce] European identity and the importance of shared values within the Union' (European Commission, 2001). The present research has isolated four different democratic values which exhibit structural similarity across all countries and periods: general/specific support for democracy, minorities' rights, and attitudes towards anti-democratic political situations (labeled *Anti-Authoritarian*). In this article, we examined extensively the effect of EUAge on support for *Anti-Authoritarian* based on different models. We have subsequently provided a robustness check for the remaining three democratic values. The models used in our analyses were multilevel, allowing for variation in respondents' values based on both individual characteristics and the social context.

The multilevel regression models adduce evidence in favor of the socialization hypothesis, according to which membership in the EU fosters adherence to EU democratic values among citizens of the member states. The analysis has revealed a significant effect of EUAge which endures when other factors are taken into account: contextual ones, such as GDP/capita and democratic institutions, and individual-level ones, such as education or income. This effect has been shown to persist when comparison is drawn cross-nationally, that is, between old members and new or non-members, as well as longitudinally, within countries.

How do these findings align with the facts attesting to the EU's legitimacy deficit? It should be recalled that democratic values are not European in essence or origin, nor are they associated exclusively with the EU. Therefore, any skepticism toward the EU does not automatically undermine its attempt to promote these values. But then, to the extent that democratic values are general in nature, what does the EU gain by promoting them at all?

It is suggested here that the EU's identity-building rationale can become more comprehensible if approached through the individual-level perspective adopted in this paper. In fact, we may be witnessing a very clever move on the part of the EU, which is attempting to set democratic norms concomitantly with building supranational institutions. This might be seen as the first phase of integration which lays the ground for subsequent steps. Rather than becoming a battlefield rife with struggle among conflicting and often incompatible collective identities, the EU

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seeks to unite its citizens under the normative umbrella of the democratic ideology. This strategy allows the Europeans to retain their identities while setting up the normative rules which enable these multiple identities to co-exist. Promoting legalistic values, such as the *Anti-Authoritarianism*, weakens conflicting particularistic identities, on the one hand, while strengthening the citizens' willingness to accept EU institutions, on the other.

More research is needed to explore this issue at length. Theoretical thought and empirical examination are in order to probe the differences in the effect of the EU membership duration among the member states. Is the socializing effect more pronounced during the first years of membership, tapering down with time? Are there any moderating effects at the country level that may interact with the socializing effect? Are the neighboring countries influenced by the EU so as to experience the socialization effect as well? And finally, do political or economic shocks have the power to offset or hinder the socialization effect of the EU?

This article paves the way for such and other future research by demonstrating—for the first time in a systematic study—that the length of membership plays a role in socializing European citizens to support democratic values promoted by the EU. In this sense, the research reported here provides evidence that a core of democratic values shared among EU citizens is in the making.

Notes

1. We examine only 27 MSs and exclude Croatia, the last country to join the EU.
2. We have excluded few countries from the second and fourth World Values Survey because the survey notes that the sampling frame was specifically not representative of the entire country and no compensatory sampling weights are provided. These countries are: Bangladesh (1994–1999), Chile (1994–1999, 2005–2007), Dominik Republic (1994–1999), Egypt (1999–2004), India (1994–1999), Nigeria (1994–1999), and Pakistan (1994–1999).
3. Items were reverse coded so that higher values denote greater support for democracy.
4. Correlation between factor scores and the constructed scales was found to be high ($r > .94$) and significant.
5. The Online Appendix lists the overall means and SD of the attitude scales.
6. A likelihood ratio test indicated a three-level model to be superior to a two-level model (individuals are nested within country-years).

7. Albania, Azerbaijan, Andorra, Bosnia, Belarus, Croatia, Georgia, Iceland, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Norway.
8. See the Online Appendix for each country's membership duration score (in years). Countries scoring above zero are included in the EU group; others are included in the non-EU group.
9. In Table 2 we present the variance instead of the standard deviation.

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Online Appendix

Table A1. EU Member States who were surveyed in the EVS and WVS.

Wave/ Country	1994-1999	1999-2004	2005-2007	2008-2010
Austria		√		√
Belgium		√		√
Bulgaria	√	√	√	√
Czech r.	√	√		√
Cyprus			√	√
Denmark		√		√
Estonia	√	√		√
Finland	√	√	√	√
France		√	√	√
Germany	√	√	√	√
Great Britain	√		√	√
Greece		√		√
Hungary	√	√		√
Ireland		√		√
Italy		√	√	√
Latvia	√	√		√
Lithuania	√	√		√
Luxemburg		√		√
Malta		√		√
Netherlands		√	√	√
Slovakia	√	√		√
Poland	√	√	√	√
Portugal		√		√
Romania	√	√	√	√
Slovenia	√	√	√	√
Spain	√	√	√	√
Sweden	√	√	√	√

Table A2. Standardized Factor Loadings for the Four Value-Dimensions.

	Questions	CFA Standardized Factor Loadings			
		Demo-Specific	Anti-Author	Demo-General Principles	Minorities' Rights
E120	In democracy, the economic system runs badly	**0.743**			
E121	Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling	**0.694**			
E122	Democracies aren't good at maintaining order	**0.740**			
E114	Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections		**0.712**		
E115	Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country		**0.417**		
E116	Having the army rule the country		**0.573**		
E117	Having a democratic political system			**0.729**	
E123	Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government			**0.667**	
A124_0 2	would not like to have as neighbors – People of a different race				**0.673**
A124_0 5	would not like to have as neighbors – Muslims				**0.627**
A124_0 6	would not like to have as neighbors – Immigrants/foreign workers				**0.743**
Tests of Model Fit					
CFI	0.982				
RMSEA	0.033				
SRMR	0.019				

Note. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (N=96,587).

Table A3. Overall Means and Standard Deviation of the Attitude Scales.

Attitude scale	overall mean	SD
Anti-Authoritarian	71	17.8
Demo-General Principles	82.4	16.5
Demo-Specific	65.8	17.1
Minorities' Rights	81.4	32.5

Table A4. Values for each Country-Year on the EUAge Variable.

Wave/ Country	1994- 1999	1999- 2004	2005- 2007	2008- 2010	Average EUAge
Austria	0	4	10	13	6.75
Belgium	43	48	54	57	50.5
Bulgaria	0	0	0	1	0.25
Czech R.	0	0	1	4	1.25
Cyprus	0	0	1	4	1.25
Denmark	21	26	32	35	28.5
Estonia	0	0	1	4	1.25
Finland	0	4	10	13	6.75
France	43	48	54	57	50.5
Germany	43	48	54	57	50.5
Great Britain	21	26	32	35	28.5
Greece	13	18	24	27	20.5
Hungary	0	0	1	4	1.25
Ireland	21	26	32	35	28.5
Italy	43	48	54	57	50.5
Latvia	0	0	1	4	1.25
Lithuania	0	0	1	4	1.25
Luxemburg	43	48	54	57	50.5
Malta	0	0	1	4	1.25
Netherlands	43	48	54	57	50.5
Slovakia	0	0	1	4	1.25
Poland	0	0	1	4	15.5
Portugal	8	13	19	22	0.25
Romania	0	0	0	1	1.25
Slovenia	0	0	1	4	1.25
Spain	8	13	19	22	15.5
Sweden	0	4	10	13	6.75

Table A5. *Anti-Authoritarian* Scores for all Country-Years for Member-States.

Country-year	EUAge	*Anti-Authoritarian* scores
Romania (1999)	0	57.46
Romania (2008)	1	57.78
Romania (2005)	1	58.69
Bulgaria (2008)	1	60.58
Bulgaria (2006)	0	61.38
Bulgaria (1997)	0	64.42
Bulgaria (1999)	0	66.02
Poland (2005)	1	66.28
Portugal (1999)	13	67.08
Latvia (1999)	4	67.26
Lithuania (1997)	0	67.74
Poland (1999)	0	68.22
Cyprus (2006)	1	69.13
Slovakia (1998)	0	69.25
Lithuania (2008)	4	69.73
Romania (1998)	0	70.15
Lithuania (1999)	4	70.38
Poland (2008)	4	70.44
Hungary (2008)	4	70.79
Latvia (2008)	4	71.32
Portugal (2008)	22	71.93
Slovenia (1999)	4	72.56
Finland (1996)	0	72.58
Latvia (1996)	0	72.69
Slovakia (1999)	0	72.88
Hungary (1999)	0	72.94
Slovenia (1995)	0	73.22
Belgium (1999)	48	73.35
Hungary (1998)	0	73.36
Slovenia (2008)	4	73.58
Spain (1995)	8	74.36
Slovak republic (2008)	4	74.47
France (1999)	48	74.56
Czech republic (1998)	0	74.75
Luxembourg (1999)	48	74.76
Slovenia (2005)	1	74.77
Estonia (1996)	4	74.96
Netherlands (2006)	54	74.96

Czech republic (1999)	4	75.26
Finland (2000)	4	75.84
Netherlands (1999)	48	76.05
Estonia (2008)	4	76.10
Ireland (1999)	26	76.48
Great Britain (2009)	35	76.90
Finland (2005)	10	76.94
Spain (1999)	13	77.02
Northern Ireland (1999)	26	77.16
Germany east (2006)	54	77.23
Great Britain (2005)	32	77.31
Belgium (2009)	57	77.39
Spain (2007)	19	77.58
Luxembourg (2008)	57	77.59
Malta (1999)	4	77.72
Spain (2000)	13	78.11
France (2006)	54	78.18
Estonia (1999)	0	78.18
France (2008)	57	78.38
Great Britain (1998)	21	78.44
Germany East (1997)	43	78.52
Czech republic (2008)	4	78.85
Austria (1999)	4	78.94
Great Britain (1999)	26	79.13
Spain (2008)	22	79.22
Sweden (1999)	4	79.37
Germany East (1999)	48	79.43
Sweden (1996)	0	79.84
Netherlands (2008)	57	80.07
Italy (1999)	48	80.31
Italy (2009)	57	80.47
Germany west (1999)	48	80.48
Austria (2008)	13	80.55
Germany east (2008)	57	80.75
Italy (2005)	54	80.91
Ireland (2008)	35	80.92
Finland (2009)	13	81.02
Sweden (2006)	10	81.60
Germany west (2008)	57	82.21
Germany west (1997)	43	82.76
Germany west (2006)	54	83.28
Sweden (2009)	13	83.31
Malta (2008)	4	83.52

northern Ireland (2008)	35	84.24
Cyprus (2008)	4	85.70
Denmark (1999)	26	86.18
Denmark (2008)	35	86.44
Greece (1999)	18	89.40
Greece (2008)	27	89.48

Table A6. Variable Description.

| Variable	Description
Support for EU values	*Anti-Authoritarian* Index: composite of three items: 'For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? (1) Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections (2) Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country (3) Having the army rule the country.'
	Demo-Specific Index: composite of three items: (1) In democracy, the economic system runs badly (2) Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling (3) Democracies aren't good at maintaining order.
	Demo-General Principles Index: composite of two items: (1) Having a democratic political system (2) Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government.
	Minorities' Rights Index: composite of three items: would not like to have as neighbors (1) People of a different race (2) Muslims (3) Immigrants/foreign workers.
EUAge(jk)	Number of membership years a country has in the EU. For example, France in the first wave has 43 years, in the second, third and fourth waves its scores on the variable are 48, 54, and 57 respectively. Non-members and countries that were surveyed before accession scored 0.
Education(ijk)	A categorical variable, taking the value of zero for low education and positive values of 1 and 2 for middle and high education levels respectively. These categories were coded as dummy binary variables.
Working Class(ijx)	A dummy variable taking the value of one if respondents belong to the working class category. The variable is derived by a country specific calculation of the three lower echelons of the income distribution.
GDP/capita	GDP per capita, PPP [constant 2005 international $]) divided by 1000.
Freedom House	Political/Civil Rights Index: a reversed and recoded scale from 0 (no democracy) to 6 (full democracy).
	Freedom House Index: a unified index (average) of the Political and Civil Rights indices.
Age	Age of respondents in years.
Age*Age	Age squared.
Year	Linear effect for time, wherein the first wave is set as the reference category (1994=0).

Table A7. Longitudinal and Cross-sectional Multilevel Models for three Democratic Values.

Model/Measure	Demo-General Principles	Demo-Specific	Minorities' Rights
	6	7	8
Fixed-effects			
EUAge Variables			
EUAge Average	0.145*	0.131*	0.097
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.128)
De-Meaned EUAge	0.230**	0.099	0.395*
	(0.084)	(0.093)	(0.163)
Time (1994=0)	-0.078	0.041	-2.199***
	(0.209)	(0.230)	(0.418)
Democratic Institutions			
Freedom House Index	-0.350	-0.533	2.567***
(Combined Index)	(0.280)	(0.323)	(0.559)
Individual Level Controls			
Middle Education	2.351***	2.262***	3.421***
(Lower=0)	(0.076)	(0.094)	(0.146)
Upper Education	5.667***	6.287***	6.585***
(Lower=0)	(0.089)	(0.109)	(0.172)
Gender (Female=1)	-0.786***	-0.764***	0.827***
	(0.059)	(0.073)	(0.115)
Working Class	-0.412***	-1.499***	-0.533***
	(0.099)	(0.136)	(0.190)
Age	0.078***	0.059***	0.061***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.018)
Age*Age	-0.000***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Random-effects			
Country Level Variance	22.8	20.7	87
Country-Year Level Variance	7.5	8.1	30
Individual Level Variance	240.6	259.5	917.3
Intercept	79.765***	65.794***	69.912***
	(1.234)	(1.424)	(2.472)
Log Likelihood	-1,145,733	-823,209	-1,369,392
N	209,254	195,994	283,438
Countries	98	82	95
Country-Years	215	160	210

Note: Entries are Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Coefficients. Standard error is presented in parentheses.

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Figure A1. Actual versus Randomly Generated Eigenvalues.

Note. Factors were extracted using eigenvalues>1, a scree test and parallel

analysis. These three techniques show that four factors are to be retained. According to

the eigenvalue-greater-than-one-rule, only factors that have eigenvalues greater than one

are retained for interpretation. The scree test visualizes and links together in a descending

order the eigenvalues of each factor. That way enables the researcher to determine the

point at which the last significant break takes place. Parallel analysis is a Monte Carlo

simulation which compares the observed eigenvalues with those obtained from

uncorrelated randomized variables. The Figure plots the scree test against the parallel

analysis. It is shown that the broken line for parallel analysis in the graph crosses the

solid EFA line after reaching the fourth factor. The three techniques all together affirm

that four factors are to be retained. At that point, the priority was to ensure that the

concepts targeted by the factors are construed in a similar way across all countries

investigated (Davidov et al., 2008; Davidov et al., 2012). This is important because

comparison of factorial scores across countries presuppose that the instrument measures

the same psychological construct in all countries. This assumption is verified by

uniformity testing. Uniformity refers to the measurement invariance of the measured construct across countries. If this uniformity assumption holds, the country comparisons are valid (Milfont & Fischer, 2010; van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). To examine the cross-cultural uniformity of the above four factors and the generalizability of the factorial structure of the values assessed across the EU and elsewhere, orthogonal procrustes rotation was carried out on different samples of countries. A factor is considered as cross-culturally stable across aggregation levels if its structure is invariant across countries. The procrustes procedure rotates a factor matrix orthogonally to a specified target matrix, based on Tucker's Phi coefficient of congruence (Tucker, 1951). After all of the above 11 items were factor-analyzed on a split file according to countries, each country's factorial structure was compared to the factorial structure of the pooled data. A low agreement between the pooled data set and a particular country indicates that this country does not belong to the parent population and should be removed from the pooled data set. The coefficient of congruence of the four rotated factor matrices with the pooled data matrix as target varied from 0.84 (for Albania) to 1. To the extent that congruence values above 0.8 have been judged to indicate that the interpretation of a factor is consistent with the pooled data set (Horn, Wanberg and Appel, 1973; Lorenzo-Seva and Berge, 2006), these results support the cross-national robustness of the four factors yielded by the analysis.

A confirmatory factor analysis was used to estimate the results of a six value-dimensions generated by the exploratory factor analysis (see Table A2, Online Appendix). Standardized Factor loadings are presented in the online appendix. In general, our CFA model fits the data well. The root mean square error of approximation

(RMSEA) was lower than the cutoff of 0.08 and the CFI was over the conventional cutoff

of 0.95.

CHAPTER 2

The EU's Mechanism of Differentiated Value-Integration

Odelia Oshri

Professor Shaul Shenhav

This chapter presents a manuscript not yet published in the scientific literature

Abstract

How does the European Union integrate new values into the text of its treaties? A growing body of literature indicates that, in the past three decades, new norms and values have entered the Union's discourse, resulting in what is usually termed "normative power Europe." Yet the research and knowledge to-date about EU's discursive assimilation of new values and norms is surprisingly poor. As any institutional change, such integration has the potential to undermine the coherence of EU's identity and thus also its objective to "speak with one voice." This article explores EU's discursive management of the continuity-versus-change imperative by analyzing the integration of new values into the text of its treaties. This issue is addressed based on a quantitative content analysis on the full texts of European founding treaties between 1950s and 2009. Findings show that the distribution of EU's values in the text is not uniform: while the language of market economy and democracy is pervasive, the values of peace, European identity, rights, and social justice are mentioned less frequently and in restricted linguistic environments. To account for the differences in the integration of values into EU's treaty discourse, the article develops the notion of a discursive mechanism of differentiated value integration (MDVI). This rationale echoes the logic of differentiation in policy implementation employed by the EU. It is claimed here that, applied in the European discursive arena, MDVI allows radically different readings of the same text. This helps the EU to maintain a coherent value-identity while at the same time enabling change.

INTRODUCTION

The European Union's (henceforth, EU) differentiated or flexible adoption and incorporation of new rules and policies has been the focus of intensive scholarly study. Its integration of new values, however, has not merited equal attention, although the importance of values in the formation and preservation of EU has been acknowledged by both scholars and political practitioners. Moreover, according to the growing literature on "normative power Europe," new norms and values that have been gaining ground in EU's discourse in the past three decades (Diez 2005) have invested it with "ideological power" Europe-wide as well as worldwide. Yet this process has been largely underexplored. The present article takes on this challenge utilizing quantitative and qualitative discourse analyses of European founding treaties between 1950s and 2009.

The article sets out to elaborate theoretically three potential discursive scenarios through which international organizations can deal with inside and outside pressures to integrate new norms. Its second objective is to examine whether new norms and values have indeed been imported into the EU discourse over the past three decades. Thirdly, it aims to establish empirically which of the discursive scenarios investigated have been chosen by the EU and account for their rationale and implications for the larger issue of value integration.

The article starts by reviewing the EU's endeavors to promote liberal democratic values. It proceeds to discuss the challenge, faced by EU, of integrating liberal democratic values into its discourse. Three possible discursive strategies to address this challenge are presented next, each reflecting a different approach and rationale.

The three discursive scenarios at the disposal of the EU are tested by empirical analyses of EU treaty texts [henceforth, the text]. The method combines a quantitative computer-based content analysis and a qualitative examination of the text. The results show that the EU has adopted the strategy of differentiated value integration: Old values that lie at the heart of EU's identity are discursively attached to the EU as such (i.e., the EU entity), while the relatively new values, which found their way into the Union's constitutional discourse from the 1990s on, are associated with other entities within and outside of the EU and, in the text, are positioned at a "safe distance" from the EU entity. Interestingly, this discursive mechanism is similar to the differentiated integration in the context of policy issues, a strategy that enables the EU to retain its member states and deepen their integration while enabling different countries to opt out of specific policy areas such as the

Schengen Area or the Eurozone. The article concludes that such differentiated integration of values allows EU to add relatively new values to its treaty discourse without losing its consolidated identity embodied in its deep-rooted core values.

PROMOTING LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC VALUES

What makes a European identity distinctive? This and related issues have, for decades, figured prominently in discussions and debates regarding the EU. Most studies, however, have focused mostly on what is referred to as "the demand side" (e.g., Kennedy 2013; Oshri et al. 2016) of such an identity, i.e., whether or not a process is underway in which a normative European identity is being formed among the populace, while underemphasizing questions of how this identity is represented by EU institutions in the first place, as well as how it is being (re)constructed, if at all (Exceptions are studies by Risse 2010; and an edited volume by Katzenstein & Checkle 2009). Yet, "the supply side" is crucial in shaping the content and weight of such an identity, as well as the direction in which it is evolving. Hence, this article focuses on the supply side of a European normative identity, probing ways in which EU's discourse, both oral and written, drives its formation.

The idea of a European identity is anchored in liberal democratic values (Jacobs & Maier 1998; McCormick 2010). Promoting democracy and market economy has been a prominent role of the EU since its early days – indeed, championed by EU members-to-be even before its establishment in 1992. In fact, democracy and market economy have been defining aspects of EU's six founding member states. The pivotal role of *democracy* in the establishment of the EU is shown, for example, in the Single European Act: "[The member states are] DETERMINED to work together to promote *democracy* on the basis of the fundamental rights recognized in the constitutions and laws of the Member States" (Single European Act, preamble). The value of *market economy* formed EU's foundation. For example, the Treaty of Rome (1957) notes that "[t]he mission of the European Coal and Steel Community is to contribute to economic expansion, the development of employment and the improvement of the standard of living in the participating countries" (Treaty of Rome, Article 2). Similarly, the Treaty of Paris states that "[t]he Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities" (Treaty of Paris, Article 2).

As of the late 1980s, however, the EU has been openly promoting new norms and values, which have augmented its so-called "normative power" (Manners 2002). The 2001 European Commission's White Paper on European Governance, for example, emphasized the need to reinforce "*European identity* and the importance of shared values in the Union" (Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 27). According to the Declaration of European Identity (1973), the major objective in defining it is to build support for "the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice… economic progress, peace and of respect for human rights" (Declaration of European Identity, 1973: 2).

According to the preamble to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is based upon "universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law" (Lisbon Treaty, preamble). The key role played by these values is evidenced in other EU documents as well. For example, the European Commission's 2001White Paper stresses "the importance of the *European identity* and the importance of shared values within the Union" (Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 27). A set of shared values is seen as one of the distinctive qualities of the EU, which constitutes its soft power – the source of its global influence (McCormick 2009). Indeed, according to Thomas Diez, normative power is a tool "to shape conceptions of the 'normal'" (Diez 2005: 615).

Over the last three decades, the EU has not only been "talking values," in the essentially rhetorical sense, but it has also been acting upon these values.[1] Among the examples is its policy of democracy promotion, introducing human rights clauses in trade agreements, emphasis on encouraging regional cooperation, and focus on strengthening international institutions and empowering the European parliament – the only EU's directly elected body – in the legislative, budgetary and supervisory spheres. According to Schimmelfennig , Engert and Knobel, Dixon, and Risse (Dixon 2008; Schimmelfenning 2002; Schimmelfenning Engert & Knobel 2003), the EU promotes liberal-democratic policies as regards its members and accession countries. Accession countries must meet political and economic criteria before and as a condition for their accession to

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[1] Yet there is now a good bit of evidence that despite EU's normative power talk, it often does not act on the basis of those values (see for example (Erickson, 2011).

the EU. These criteria (known as the Copenhagen criteria), set out in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on EU, require that the candidate country have "achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union" (Presidency Conclusions, 1993, 7.A.iii).

These new values were promoted in the recent three decades mainly to legitimize EU's functional expansion As the EU developed into a new type of political system which not only constantly removes power and sovereignty from the nation state but impinges upon the every-day life of its citizens, it needed different normative underpinnings from which it could draw legitimacy. Expansion to regional or foreign policies needed a new value or set of values underpinning it. Functional expansions of these kind constitute a situation of 'governance without statehood' (Wallace 1996) which requires also reference to citizens and the rights thereof. With more and more functional expansions, the EU needed to reconstruct its identity rooted in its core values. In other words, the Union had to define its ultimate goal(s) in expanding to new policy fields.

Based on the above discussion, the EU discourse is expected to have foregrounded *democratic* and *market-economy* values since its early days. In a similar vein, based on EU's declared intentions to promote liberal values, it could be expected that the values of *social justice*, *peace*, *rights* and *European identity* should have found their way into the EU treaties. But through what process does this discursive change in values and norms occur? The following sections will address this question, first theoretically and then empirically.

BALANCING BETWEEN CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: THREE SCENARIOS OF VALUE INTEGRATION

The scholarship on international organizations has become increasingly interested in studying processes of evolution and change that take place within IOs. In particular, scholars have started asking why and when change occurs (Barnet & Coleman 2005). Yet, while the causes of organizational change have been discussed largely, the problem of identifying different types of change has gone largely ignored. Exceptions are works focusing on the role that bureaucratic culture plays in shaping change (Barnett & Finnemore 2004; Chwieroth 2010; Park 2010; Steffek 2010; Vetterlein 2007; Weaver 2008). According to this body of literature, change in organizations is

always path dependent, slow and incremental. There are however other studies that offer typology as for the types of change in IOs, and when each is most likely to materialize (e.g., Barnett & Coleman 2005; Vetterleina & Moschellaa 2014). In the attempt to extract the common features in these theories, we came up with three generic ways by which IOs can react to constant outside/inside demand for change.

Intergovernmental organizations and global governance institutions are inherently subject to conflict between their role in promoting stability and their capacity to change and innovate, as well as to adapt to and learn from changing circumstances and exogenous stimuli (Duit & Galazm 2008; Haas 1990). On the one hand, institutions tend to be static, path-dependent, and prone to clinging to the status quo and resisting change (North 2005; Thelen 2003; White 2008). They invest considerable resources to maintaining control systems that ensure a degree of homeostasis and routine, which in turn provides continuity and identity to the organization. On the other hand, "change is recognized as an ordinary part of institutional life," (Peters 1999: 147). Inasmuch as institutions respond to the changing environment through learning and adaptation (Barnett & Finnemore 2004; Olsen 2009), a phenomenon termed in the literature as "organizational adaptive stability." The upshot is a perpetual trade-off between the need for institutional stability and the imperative for change, which generates a dynamic equilibrium between inertia and the force that drives change (Chreim 2005).

Experiences such as the European Union's permit us to use the history of a key international organization as diagnostic device for testing when and how an organization changes its discourse. As a multilevel governance system, the EU is constantly changing, not just in numbers, but also through the addition of new policies and areas of cooperation. On the one hand, there is a need to include more members, while on the other, not all members are able, or willing, to cooperate in all policies. EU's drive to encompass all members in its policies and to absorb new members, along with the imperative to expand the areas of cooperation, has generated a remarkable adaptive capacity to balance between inclusiveness and coherency. In that respect, EU's challenge of integrating new values into its treaty discourse can be seen as homologous to institutional challenges facing it, especially widening and deepening integration: Both discursive and institutional aspects are subject to immanent tension between coherency and inclusiveness. To the extent that any organizational change starts out as a discursive practice (Boje et al. 2004) the analytical emphasis of this article is on

the text. In line with the literature on institutional changes, three potential scenarios representing EU's discursive strategies are explored.

Three discursive scenarios of value integration

The incorporation of new value-dimensions into EU's constitutional discourse may follow three theoretical discursive mechanisms, or scenarios. One such scenario is simply to refrain from integrating new values into the constitutional discourse, or at least not to call attention to these notions – that, despite a declared intention to do the opposite. Adhering to and promoting only the old values of *democracy* and *market economy* would have enabled the Union to maintain a coherent value-identity. This discursive strategy resonates with the emphasis contemporary institutional analysis puts on institutional stability, in line with its focus on structural constraints and continuity. It seems, however, to rest on deception in that it contravenes the declared policy. Either the declaration was untrue or the discourse veils an important policy element. This scenario is therefore termed here the *deception strategy*.

Alternatively, the new values could be discussed in the EU discourse on par with its core values of *democracy* and *market economy*. Put differently, new values could be fully integrated into the EU treaty discourse and manifested similarly to the old values. This scenario resonates with the logic of institutional change. Whether in response to outside stimuli or inside pressures, the EU has declared its commitment to and fully integrated new values into its treaty discourse. This scenario is termed the *full integration strategy*.

The third scenario for integrating new values into the EU treaty discourse can be seen as a middle-path alternative – between all (full integration) and nothing (no integration): New values are incorporated into the treaty text but addressed and treated differently than the old values. Specifically, new values do figure in the discourse, but are discursively differentiated from the EU core values by not being associated with the EU as such. If the old values are mentioned or discussed in clear association with the EU entity, the new values will be associated with other entities in the text such as regions, citizens and international organizations. Put differently, although the new values will have been integrated into the discourse, they will not be attached directly to EU, which is flagged exclusively by old values. We call this scenario the *mechanism of differentiated value integration* (henceforth, MDVI), for two reasons. First, it differentiates between the new and the old values; and

second, it results in a modular structure, in that, in the text, certain entities are associated with certain values, in a recurrent pattern. Thus, the reader will have no trouble dissociating old values from new ones, as they consistently flag different entities.

Graphical representation of the three scenarios

The following is a graphical representation of the three scenarios. Semantic differences are expressed as proximity measures between a value and an entity to which it is attached.

Figure 1(a) shows the expected outcome of the *deception strategy*. Despite EU's declared commitment to fostering important new values, the EU treaties – the main platform of the EU discourse – contain no trace of them.

Figure 1(b) shows the expected outcome of the *full integration strategy*, where textual proximity between the EU entity and values, both old and new, is more or less the same. This strategy of *full value integration* echoes the notion that institutions adapt to the pressure of external expectations.

Figure 1(c) represents the *mechanism of differentiated value integration*, in which new values are incorporated into the treaty text, but are attached to entities other than the EU, such as member states, European regions, third countries, international organizations, or European citizens. This scenario enables the integration of new values into the EU discourse but positions them at a "safe distance" from the EU as a textual entity, thus differentiating between the established and the new values. The MDVI hypothesis presupposes a mechanism that mediates between two opposing forces: change and continuity. It also resonates with EU's strategy to deal with further integration in policy matters – differentiated integration.

Under differentiated integration, member states do not share in all EU activities in equal measure. Similarly, according to the MDVI hypothesis, new values are shared out among different entities within and outside the EU, such as regions and citizens. Whether or not it is implemented out of awareness, the MDVI mechanism is very similar to the differentiated integration in policy areas. As with the latter strategy, which allows the EU to grow and at the same time to deepen the cooperation among its members, the MDVI path enables the EU to speak with one voice and to present a coherent identity by adhering to the two most prominent values of *democracy* and *market economy* throughout all treaty texts, on the one hand, while on the other, to bring in new values by distributing them among various other entities. The MDVI creates a welcoming environment for

new values, which are not fully integrated yet not completely overlooked. Therefore, the same discourse allows two different readings: On the one hand, EU's identity is perceived as stable because, throughout the treaty text, EU is consistently flagged by its constitutive values of *democracy* and *market economy*. On the other hand, from one treaty to the next, one cannot but acknowledge textual changes that introduce new norms and values, thus remolding Europe's normative image.

[Figure 1 about here]

DATA & METHODS

Data: EU founding treaties

The three discursive scenarios described above are tested based on the full text of fundamental EU treaties (1951-2008),[2] whose texts form the bedrock of European integration.[3] The 1950s, which is the first decade of European integration, was marked by the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community and of the European Economic Community (EEC). The single major revision of the EEC treaty was carried out in the Single European Act (SEA), which was followed by the Merger, Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon treaties. In an attempt to capture the spirit of the times, this study analyzes the non-consolidated versions of these treaties. In other words, we examine the treaties as drafted at the time of their ratification and entry into force and not the latest (And altered) versions of these treaties.[4] The treaties lay out EU's core and focal objectives, values, norms, conceptions and practices, making it possible to trace the consolidation of its identity over time, in light of and in response to change.

These treaties are EU's primary legislation, thus containing formal and substantive provisions for implementing the policies of the European institutions. On the other hand, the

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[2] These Treaties are: The Treaty of Paris (ToP), Treaty of Rome (ToR), Merger Treaty, the Single European Act (SEA), Treaty establishing the European Union (TEU), Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA), Treaty of Nice (ToN), The EU Constitution Treaty (EUCT) and the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL).

[3] We focus on primary law to the exclusion of accession treaties.

[4] Since each treaty in time t makes changes in earlier treaties, we would have caught the changes made in time t in earlier treaties had we used the consolidated versions.

provisions and goals they include are laid out in broader terms than in other legislative documents, which are more detailed and bureaucratic. The greater generality of the discourse serves the purpose of the textual analysis undertaken here, as the focus is on values, notions that are fairly abstract. Changes to EU treaties are negotiated in intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) and must be signed and ratified by all member states. These changes generally advance integration. For instance, the Maastricht treaty (TEU) introduced the co-decision procedure while the Lisbon treaty extended it to cover more policy areas. Both these changes boosted the role of the European parliament in the legislative process. Thus, analyzing treaties afford insights into the political processes that drive changes in discourse patterns focusing on EU values. Since treaties not only encompass the substantive content of European values (Mayer & Palmowski 2004) but also reflect the interactive processes by which values are conveyed, the analysis takes into account contextual information such as where, how, why and by whom a treaty was signed.

Textual analyses

As noted, relying on the literature and on the 1973 White Paper, in which the EU declared its constitutive values, we decided ex-ante to target six liberal-democratic EU values: *democracy*, *market economy*, *rights*, *European identity*, *social justice* and *peace*. The examination of the different patterns and emphases put on values throughout all treaty text was carried out using a dictionary technique, which is a variant of the "bag-of-words" method (Monroe & Schrodt 2008; Young & Soroka 2012). Lists of words or expressions are compiled that convey the meaning of a certain value-domain, for example «democracy». The presence of that value in the text is indicated by the presence of words or expressions listed for it. Dictionaries were also built for entities that correspond to the different levels of authority operating in and outside the EU space (Hoogh & Marks 2003), e.g., *European Union*, its *member states*, *international organizations*, *third countries*, *citizens* or *regions*. To extract values from the text, the bag-of-words procedure was chosen over alternative techniques, e.g., data redaction or automated text analysis (Grimmer & Stewart 2013), for two main reasons: Discourse on values in legal documents such as treaties uses only a small subset of the lexicon (less than 5 percent); and the patterns targeted are well represented and accurately gauged by a simple list of key words. Thus, a dictionary technique, accompanied by a close reading of the text and by a textual demonstration, adequately serves the purpose of this investigation.

The quantitative analysis is based on computerized methods. Content analysis software has become a mainstay of empirical research of political and legal documents (See for example Bäck Debus & Müller 2014; Beck Drori & Meyer 2012; Laver & Garry 2000; Proksch & Slapin 2010). An advantage of this method is that it makes it possible to analyze massive textual information such as party manifestos, legal speeches and constitutions, and to compare between different texts. The assumption behind dictionary techniques is that words may count as data that can be quantified and that can reveal patterns targeted. This study used WordStat 6.0 Software.[5] As noted above, dictionaries of key words were built for the different values and entities in and outside the EU,[6] and utilized for the analysis of the European founding treaties. Dictionary-based automated content analysis treats words as units of observation, and vocabulary choices as the primary indicator of latent content. Thus search-terms that are part of the custom dictionary are construed as indicators pointing to the treaties' subject-matter. Words in each dictionary are semantically related (Klebanov 2006). Iteration of words or word combinations such as «market economy» would signal the subject matter discussed or the issue debated.

Utilizing lexical tools such as WordNet, spelling dictionaries and English thesauri, we chose synonyms, hypernyms, hyponyms, coordinate terms, holonyms and meronyms for each category (values/entities). Dictionaries were compiled via a recursive process: First, words were allocated to each category, and then a dictionary was computed for the new lexicon constructed in the previous step for a given value or entity. For example, for «democracy», *Wordstat's* lexical tools listed three definitions: (1) the political orientation of those who favor government by the people or by their elected representatives; (2) A political system in which the supreme power lies in a body of citizens who can elect people to represent them and; (3) The doctrine that the numerical majority of an organized group can make decisions binding on the whole group. As all the three meanings were deemed relevant to the value of *democracy* as discussed in the treaties, synonyms, metonyms, hyponyms etc. were obtained for each. As the second step, the newly-created lexicon for the value of *democracy*, representing a semantic field for this concept, was used for the computation of a comprehensive dictionary comprising related terms, as detailed above, for the lexical items listed. Such a recursive process of building the dictionaries enabled the inclusion of new items using a

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[5] http://orm.sagepub.com/content/early/2010/03/24/1094428109356713.short
[6] Dictionaries are annexed to the appendix.

semi-automated method: The software automatically provided synonyms etc., but only those deemed relevant for the category were manually selected. This filtering was performed manually according to the lexical definitions supplied by the software. The same recursive procedure for dictionary building was employed for each of the entities and values investigated.

To increase reliability, two parallel lists of synonyms were compiled via the same process by two different human coders and subsequently merged so as to include only the items recorded by both. This procedure generated a final overall list of 352 words.[7] Using the software, stop-words (words with low semantic value such as pronouns and conjunctions) were excluded from the analyses. The problem of lexical ambiguity, which is a core drawback of dictionary techniques, was solved by using the keyword-in-context (KWIC) analysis. The context was recovered for all ambiguous words, and each case was dealt with separately. We then stipulated rules for disambiguating words occurring in the dictionaries constructed. For example, the word «demand», which had been relegated to the «market-economy» category, could have different meanings in the text. A rule was included that, to be considered as relevant, this item must adjoin certain other expressions such as «supply», «decline» etc.

For the liberal-democratic values and the entities flagged by them, the quality of the custom dictionaries was tested using two consecutive inter-coder reliability tests: (1) Comparing the coding of two human coders; and (2) Comparing the coding of the human coders to the automated textual analysis.

Following extensive training, two coders identified independently values and entities that were mentioned and/or discussed in a paragraph, which was set as a unit of analysis. Overall, 400 randomly chosen paragraphs (10 percent of the total number) were analyzed. Inter-coder reliability, tested on 25 percent of the coding items, resulted in a mean (using Alpha Krippendorf) of .93, and no lower than 0.86. Comparison between the automated and human coding showed that the dictionary met the standards of human coding (all the results are presented in the online appendix). On a scale of 0–1, the average precision was calculated as 0.813 and the average accuracy as 0.875,

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[7] These words weren't evenly distributed across all categories because some categories were straightforward and did not need much elaboration, while others were more abstract and vague, and hence more words were included to delimit them.

attesting to the high level achieved in categorizing the documents for custom dictionaries for all the values and entities.

This study used the qualitative examination mainly to validate the computerized analysis. In the authors' view, neither dictionary-based analyses, nor analyses based on textual proximity between values and entities (see below), can replace the actual reading of the text. Therefore the presentation of the main findings below is followed by examples of textual analysis.

FINDINGS: FROM MDVI TO FULL INTEGRATION

The three discursive scenarios discussed above assume different textual relations between old and new values, on the one hand, and political entities, on the other, in EU treaties. The *deception strategy* scenario assumes that, despite EU's declared intentions to promote new values, no such values would figure in the treaty text, on account of certain qualities of institutional life that ensure endurance and stability. This scenario would be validated if the old values, i.e., *economy* and *democracy*, were present in the text to the exclusion of any new values.

The relative salience of EU values throughout the treaty text is presented in Figure 2. The left-hand panel documents the rise of new values in the EU discourse since the 1990s, namely, *social justice*, *peace*, *rights*, and *European identity*. Starting out close to zero in the 1951 treaty, their total share rises to over 30 percent in the 2008 treaty. These findings refute the *deception strategy hypothesis*, which predicts that no mention of new values would be made in the EU treaty text. The right-hand panel traces the changing salience of *democracy* and *market economy*, the two most dominant values in the European treaties. A pattern clearly emerges in which the salience of *democracy* rises concomitantly with the declining salience of *market economy*. Nevertheless, these two values clearly dominate the text (94 percent in ToR and 69 percent in the ToL).

[Figure 2 about here]

These findings confirm that EU (then the EEC) did not use the *deception strategy* but rather honored its declared intention to integrate new values into its constitutive treaties. Accordingly, we proceeded to test the two remaining discursive scenarios, *full integration* and the *mechanism of*

differentiated value integration (MDVI). As already stated, both these scenarios assume that new values will be integrated into the treaty text, albeit via two different mechanisms. The *full integration* hypothesis posits that new values will be associated with EU on par with established ones. The MDVI hypothesis states that old values will remain associated with EU while new values will be attached to other political entities. These two scenarios were studied quantitatively using proximity analysis.

Proximity or similarity measures, such as squared Euclidean distance or cosine similarity, are important indices in text clustering. They have been used to measure the affinity of media messages between countries (Sheafer et al., 2014) and to gauge the relationship between actors and concepts within affiliation networks. It is expected that the distance between objects within a cluster would, on average, be less than between objects in different clusters (Leifeld 2013). Thus, the greater the proximity between an entity and a value, the higher the chance that they belong to the same cluster. For example, the following quotation includes two entities: *European citizens* and *member states* (bolded). Since the "right to vote" (italicized) is more proximate to *citizens* then to *member states*, it is assumed to be conceptually associated with *citizens* to a greater degree than with *member states*. "Every **citizen of the Union** has *the right to vote* and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament in the **Member State** in which he or she resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State" (Article 19 TEU, emphasis added). By contrast, inasmuch as the next quotation mentions only one entity, the EU, all the values that figure in it are construed as being associated with the EU. "The **Union** is founded on the values of *respect for human dignity*, *freedom*, *democracy*, *equality*, the *rule of law* and *respect for human rights*, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities [emphasis added]" (Article 2 TEU, emphasis added). To sum up, values that co-occur with entities are assumed to be associated with them.

To tap associations between entities and values, a matrix of proximities in the form of [Value X Entity] was generated for all the entities and values investigated. Table 1 displays that matrix, with the Jaccard similarity coefficient representing the proximity between entities and values. Analysis was carried out on the pooled data (nine treaties altogether). We calculated the probability for the co-occurrence of each value(V)–entity(E) pair (the Jaccard coefficient), by limiting the textual window to 50 words. The Jaccard coefficient between V and E is:

$$\propto (V, E) = \frac{V \cap E}{V \cup E}$$

The numerator represents cases in which both the entity and the value occur inside the 50-word window, while the denominator represents cases where one item is found but not the other. Equal weight is given to matches and non matches. Results presented in Table 1 show that, across the entire treaty text, on average roughly 30 percent of the cases in which *EU* and *democracy* or *EU* and *market economy* appear in the text, they appear together, that is, inside the window. Thus, the proximity between these two values and the EU entity is significantly high. In fact, none of the other values targeted gets even close to that degree of proximity with the EU entity. It seems, therefore, that in the text the *EU* entity is flagged by the values of *democracy* and *market economy.*

A very different picture emerges as regards the new values: these are linked in the text with entities other than EU. *Peace*, for example, is mostly attached to *member states* and entities outside EU such as *international organizations* or *third countries*. The value of *peace* is sometimes attached to the *EU* entity as well, but to a much lesser extent. *Rights* and *European identity* are attached to *citizens*, while *social justice* – to *regions*.

[Table 1 about here]

Results presented in Table 1 appear to confirm the MDVI hypothesis: New values are dealt out among different entities rather than being attached to EU (see Fig. 1c). By contrast, the *full integration* hypothesis was not validated (see Fig. 1b).

These findings are substantiated by the qualitative examination of the treaty text. An example for the proximity relations between the *EU* entity, in case in point signified as "the community" (bolded), and the value of *market economy* (italicized) can be observed in the following quotation: "**The Community** shall have as its task, by establishing a *common market* and an *economic and monetary union* and by implementing common policies or activities" (Article 130c ToR, emphasis added).

Below are examples for proximity between new values and different entities in the text. The first quotation exemplifies the entity-value relationship between *regions* and *social justice*, while the second – between the *member states* and *national identity*. Emphasis in the quotation is added by the authors.

"The European *Regional Development Fund* is intended to help to redress the main regional imbalances in the Community through participation in the development

and structural adjustment of **regions** whose development is lagging behind and in the conversion of declining industrial regions" (Article 130c ToR, emphasis added).

"The **Union** shall respect the equality of **Member States** before the constitution as well as their *national identities*, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government" (Article 4 TEU, emphasis added).

So far, the analysis has yielded rather clear indications in favor of the discursive MDVI hypothesis. In a way, the EU discourse mirrors the mechanism deployed by EU to further the integration and to foster cooperation in more policy areas at the cost of differentiation or divergence (Holzinger & Schimmelfennig 2012). The modular structure resulting from such differentiation of values vis-à-vis entities in the text is homologous to differentiated integration of policies: the EU offers its member states integration *à la carte*, as it were, enabling countries to opt out of certain policy implementations.

While the analysis of the pooled data supports the discursive MDVI hypothesis, it offers no insight into the ways by which differentiation is enacted in the discursive dynamic. In order to determine whether new entities were integrated into the treaty text simultaneously with new values, we performed an additional proximity analysis treaty by treaty. Moreover, as already explained, the entity-value proximity data was bolstered by a qualitative examination.

Figure 3 plots proximity matrices for entities and values for each of the nine treaties separately. Values are positioned in relation to entities on the maps, which were produced using multidimensional scaling (MDS) and which represent the geometric proximities between values and entities for each treaty. Each category is represented as a node: values as circles and entities as diamonds. Categories (entities and values) that tend to co-occur in the text appear close together on the map and are connected by a thicker line, while categories that are not proximate in the text are sketched far apart and are connected by a thinner line. Categories that, in the text, were not found to be interrelated or to co-occur are located on the map far apart and are not connected by a line.

[Figure 3 about here]

Importantly, the maps show that, in the integration process, new values entered the treaty discourse concomitantly with the formation of new players in the socio-political arena. In the 1950s and 1960s – corresponding to ToR, ToP, and Merger – the only entities mentioned in the text are *member states* and *EU* (then named the European community). The panels for these three treaties show close proximity between these two entities, on the one hand, and the values of *democracy* and *market economy*, on the other. The entities *[European] citizens* and *regions* appear in the discourse much later (in the 1986 and 1992 treaty, respectively) and therefore do not figure in ToR, ToP, and Merger – and, notably, neither do the values of *social justice*, *rights* or *European identity*. *Rights* are discussed in the first three treaties, albeit not in the context of human or minority rights but as the four freedoms,[8] i.e., in relation to *market economy*. Moreover, these economic rights failed to pass the 5 percent threshold stipulated in the analysis and hence are not marked on the first three maps.

This stands to reason, as ToR, ToP, and Merger reflect a sectorial and functionalist approach; *social justice*, *European identity* and *peace* were not of primary concern to their creators. The Treaty of Paris, which established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was concerned solely with the coal and steel industries. Such a sectorial approach gained prominence after the failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1954. The EEC Treaty as well as the ECSC and the Euratom (1957) covered well-defined economic spheres.

The proximity maps for subsequent treaties (SEA, 1986 and TEU, 1992) reveal a different picture. Not only that the entities of *citizens* and *regions* had found their way into the treaty text, but they are also attached to the newly surfaced values of *rights* and *social justice*. EU seems to have integrated new values concomitantly with the emergence of new entities on the scene, but – notably – it shuns them textually, as it were. Indeed, the *EU* as an entity in the text or, to use Epstein's terminology, a "speaking subject" (Epstein, 2013), is not closely associated with these values, which are instead attached to other, more recently introduced entities. The two quotations above illustrate this point [with emphasis added].

In the preamble to the 1986 Single European Act, the EU treaty text includes, for the first time, a statement regarding the promotion of *democracy* on the basis of fundamental *rights*: "[the EU is]

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[8] Under the 1957 Treaty of Rome, goods, services, capital and people are supposed to be able to move freely across the Union's internal borders.

DETERMINED to work together to promote *democracy* on the basis of the *fundamental rights* recognized in the constitutions and laws of the **Member States**" (SEA preamble, emphasis added). Note that "the fundamental rights" in the quotation are framed as a prerogative of those who are subject to the constitutions and laws of the member states. The entity which is the closest to the *rights* based on the Jaccard proximity measure, and which is, consequently, associated with this value textually, are "the Member States," which are listed as the signatories of the treaty earlier in the preamble.

The entity-value configuration in MDVI is not static. Thus, in the SEA (1986), *rights* are proximate to *citizens* but remote from *EU* and other textual entities, while in the TEU (1992), this value becomes associated with the entities of *EU* as well as *member states* (see the respective maps). Textual analysis of the TEU (1992) supports this conclusion [emphasis added]:

> "[**t]he Union** shall respect *fundamental rights*, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of *Human Rights* and *Fundamental Freedoms* signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the **Member States**, as general principles of Community law" (TEU, 1992, Article 6(2), ex Article F.2, emphasis added).

The closest entity to the value of *rights* in this TEU passage is *EU*, and not the *Member States*. An in-depth reading of these lines suggests that the EU is presented as more committed to rights than in the SEA (1986). This stands to reason, as the TEU institutionalized the EU citizenship, granting citizens a series of general rights such as the free movement of goods and services, the right to vote and stand as candidate in municipal elections and in elections to the European Parliament, and the right to petition the European Parliament and apply to Ombudsman. EU citizenship was introduced precisely in an attempt to create a closer bond between the Europeans and the EU institutions (Closa 1992; Shaw 1997; Weiler 1996).

The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) clarifies Article 6 (formerly Article F) of the Treaty on European Union by stating unequivocally that the EU is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law – i.e., tenets

that are shared by the member states. It also amends the preamble to the EU Treaty, confirming the member states' commitment to fundamental social rights as defined in the 1961 European Social Charter and the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. And finally, the treaty of Lisbon (2008) guarantees the enforcement of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and gives the EU a mandate to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, *rights* are related not just to *citizens* and *EU*, but also to countries beyond the EU, and to other values, such as *peace*. Thus, Article 2 states [emphasis added]:

> "In its relations with the **wider world**, the **Union** shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its **citizens**. It shall contribute to *peace*, *security*, the sustainable development of the Earth, *solidarity* and mutual *respect among peoples*, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection *of human rights*." (TEU, Article 3(5), emphasis added).

The dynamics shown above point to a gradual process of integration, in which the MDVI might be a temporary strategy for integrating new values into the treaty text. Possibly, such integration starts with the MDVI scenario, but over time moves to *full integration*.

It appears that, of all the new values introduced relatively late into the treaty discourse, the value of *peace* was the foremost to be embraced by EU. This is evidenced by the relatively high and gradually increasing incidence of this value in the treaty discourse (Figure 2) and by its growing proximity to the EU entity since 1992 (Figure 3). Indeed, although *peace* does not figure extensively in earlier treaties, and never in association with the EU entity, keeping peace in the European region was one of the major motives for the creation of the EU at the outset. *European identity*, on the other hand, was introduced to the treaty discourse attached to such entities as *citizens* and *countries* beyond EU. On no occasion, however, in any treaty, is it attached to the EU entity. This appears to be a conscious and ingenuous strategy on the part of the EU, given that European identity is a highly politicized concept, whose boundaries and content are not straightforward or easily defined.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE BUILDING OF THE EU ETHOS

Integrating new norms and values presents a discursive challenge for any organization. This article explored EU's strategies to solve this dilemma. Based on the literature on institutional change, three hypotheses are suggested regarding the mechanisms that have hitherto been at EU's disposal for assimilating new values to its constitutive text: *deception*, *full integration*, and *MDVI*. All these hypotheses assume that the challenge of discursively accommodating change triggered by external and internal stimuli is homologous to the dilemmas in policy decisions faced by EU institutions.

Our findings support the *MDVI* hypothesis, which posits that different values are incorporated into discourse via different trajectories. Specifically, while well-established values are proximate in the text to the EU entity, new values are associated with other entities in and outside the EU. It is argued that this kind of differentiating mechanism for value integration enables the EU to manage, respond and adapt to change, while keeping intact its value-identity, which is rooted in the core values of *democracy* and *market economy*. The MDVI scenario allows different readings of the treaty texts: On the one hand, EU's identity is perceived as stable because it is almost invariably associated with *democracy* and *market economy*. On the other hand, new norms and values are introduced through textual changes, thus remolding Europe's normative image. This sophisticated discourse structure can be construed as being accepting of new values yet keeping them at bay so as not to compromise EU's core values. Furthermore, it creates a hierarchy of values, such that a conflict is always resolved in favor of an old value: e.g., if *market economy* clashes with *social justice*, the former prevails. A recent example is the Greece debt crisis, where the EU imposed neoliberal policies on Greece while ignoring uneven geographical development, thus downplaying or downright overlooking questions of sociospatial justice (Hadjimichalis 2011). Findings also show that, while new values are initially textually marginalized, i.e., located far from the EU entity, they are subsequently integrated more dynamically: they appear more frequently in the text and are positioned in greater proximity to the EU entity as well as to other entities and values.

In a broad sense, this analysis examines a practice by which the EU builds its own image in its constitutive text through gradual assimilation of new norms and values. This process aligns with the Aristotelian conception of *Ethos*, defined as "the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible" (Aristotle, 350 BCE, book 1, part2). Such a theoretical

framework accounts for the rhetorical rationale behind EU's self-representation in discourse. The EU is in the business of constructing its own character as an evolving political entity by constantly updating its set of norms and values while at the same time upholding its staple principles of market economy and democracy. In this process of ethos construction, the Union as a "speaking subject" shapes, constructs and reconstructs its image as a prudent reformer. This could be attributed to a number of reasons and motives. For one, the EU may be striving to maintain continuity in the way it is perceived as a political entity. Furthermore, some of these norms have been contested within EU, as well as outside it – as was especially the case three decades ago, when these values were first introduced into the EU text.

As argued previously, the discursive solution elaborated above may be a corollary of EU's endeavor to solve its policy dilemma of whether to expand or deepen integration – striving for a compromise that would enable countries to opt out of certain policy implementations. As in its policy decisions, faced with a discursive predicament of integrating new values while maintaining coherence and "speaking with one voice," the EU seems to have adopted the MDVI logic, which allows gradual and judicious change.

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Tables and Figures

Value / Entity	EU	Countries	Beyond the EU	Citizens	Regions
Democracy	0.315	0.163	0.147	0.038	0.016
Market economy	0.273	0.148	0.027	0.011	0.021
Peace	0.124	0.182	0.130	0.012	0.01
Rights	0.050	0.087	0.054	0.115	0.012
European identity	0.023	0.067	0.053	0.101	0.061
Social justice	0.026	0.010	0.027	0.067	0.100

Table 1. Heat-map Plot of the Relationship between Values (rows) and Entities (columns).

Note. The table shows each value's probabilities to co-occur with entities (jaccard coef.). The darker the cell is, the higher the probability that values and entity co-occur. Results show that democracy and market economy are most likely to appear in paragraphs related to the EU (probabilities of .31 and .27 respectively) while the talk on rights will appear proximate to discourse on EU citizens and discourse on European identity is more dispersed but appears more frequently when talking on citizens.

Figure 1(a). Deception strategy

Figure 1(b). Fully integrative strategy

Figure 1(c). Differentiated mechanism of value integration

Figure 1. A graphical representation of three hypothetical scenarios of value-integration. New values are marked in light grey circles, old values are dark greyed.

Figure 2. Proportion of Values-to-Values in the European Founding Treaties and the Changing Patterns Thereof.

Note. The right-hand panel presents the changing patterns of the two most prominent values in the European treaties: democracy and market economy. Over time, the salience of democracy intensifies while declines for market economy. Nevertheless, these two values represent the core of European values in constitutional text. The left-hand panel shows the changing tone for four other values: European identity, peace, social justice and rights. As from the fourth Treaty (SEA, 1986) the relative importance of these values increases.

Treaty of Paris (1951)   Treaty of Rome (1957)   Merger Treaty (1965)

Single European Act (1986)   Maastricht Treaty (1992)   Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)

Treaty of Nice (2001)   Treaty of Lisbon (2008)   Treaty establishing Constitution for Europe (2004)

Figure 3. Multidimensional scaling of proximity matrices for Entities and Values.

Note. Categories (entities and values) that appear close together on the plot tend to occur together and have a shorter and thicker line connecting them, while categories that exhibit a remote proximity between them are sketched far apart and have a longer and thinner line connecting them. Each category is represented as a node; circles represent values, diamonds – entities.

Online Appendix

1. Measure of inter-coder reliability (N = 100/400 paragraphs)

Value/Entity	Krippendorffs Alpha	LL95% CI	UL95% CI
Democracy	1.00	0.60	1.00
Market economy	1.00	0.59	1.00
Social justice	0.93	0.43	0.98
Rights	0.93	0.47	0.97
European identity	0.96	0.44	0.99
Peace	0.92	0.36	0.98
EU	1.00	0.80	1.00
Member States	0.92	0.48	0.97
Regions	0.86	0.18	0.96
Citizens	0.96	0.52	0.98
Third countries/org	0.89	0.36	0.96

2. Acronym Key of the European Founding Treaties

ToR – Treaty of Rome (1951)

ToP –Treaty of Paris (1957)

SEA – Single European Act (1986)

Merger – Merger Treaty (1965)

TEU – Maastricht Treaty/Treaty of the European Union (1992)

ToA – Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)

ToL – Treaty of Lisbon (2008)

EUCT – European Union Constitutional Treaty (2004, never approved)

3. Custom Dictionaries for Values and Entities

- **DEMOCRACY**
  - ACCOUNTABLE
  - CONSENSUS
  - CONSENT
  - CONSTITUTIONAL
  - CONSULTATION
  - CONSULTATIONS
  - DELIBERATES
  - DELIBERATING
  - DELIBERATION
  - DELIBERATIONS
  - DEMOCRACY
  - DEMOCRATIC
  - DEMOCRATICALLY
  - DIALOGUE
  - GOVERNANCE
  - JUDICIAL
  - JUDICIARY
  - LEGITIMACY
  - LEGITIMATE
  - PARTICIPATION
  - PARTICIPATIONS
  - PARTICIPATORY
  - RATIFICATION
  - REPRESENTATION
  - REPRESENTATIONS
  - REPRESENTATIVE
  - REPRESENTATIVE_DEMOCRACY
  - REPRESENTED
  - REPRESENTING
  - RULE_OF_LAW
  - SOVEREIGNTY
  - TRANSPARENCY
  - TRANSPARENT
  - **PROCEDURAL_DEMOCRACY**
    - BALLOT
    - CANDIDATE
    - DEBATE
    - ELECT
    - ELECTED
    - ELECTION
    - ELECTIONS
    - GOVERN
    - GOVERNING
    - LAWFUL
    - LEGAL
    - LEGALLY
    - LEGISLATE
    - LEGALITY
    - LEGISLATION
    - LEGISLATIVE
    - LEGISLATIVE_PROCEDURE
    - LEGISLATOR
    - LEGISLATURE
    - OMBUDSMAN
    - PARLIAMENT
    - PARLIAMENTARY
    - PARTICIPATE
    - PARTICIPATES
    - PARTICIPATING
    - PETITION
    - POLITICAL_PARTIES
    - RE-ELECTED
    - REFERENDUM
    - REPRESENTATIVES
    - SEAT
    - SENATE
    - VOTE
    - VOTED
    - VOTES
    - VOTING
- **SOCIAL_JUSTICE**
  - COHESION
  - CONSOLIDATION
  - CONVERGENCE
  - EQUITY
  - EUROPEAN_REGIONAL_DEVELOPMENT_FUND
  - EUROPEAN_SOCIAL_FUND
  - JUSTICE_OF_THE_EUROPEAN
  - JUSTICE_OF_THE_EUROPEAN_COMMUNITY
  - JUSTICE_OF_THE_EUROPEAN_UNION
  - REGIONAL_DEVELOPMENT
  - SOCIAL_EXCLUSION
  - SOCIAL_JUSTICE
  - ASSIST_A_MEMBER_STATE
  - SOCIAL_POLICY
  - SOLIDARITY
  - STRUCTURAL_FUNDS
  - WELL-BEING
- **MARKET_ECONOMY**
  - AGRICULTURE
  - AMOUNT
  - ASSETS
  - ATOMIC_ENERGY_COMMUNITY
  - AUDIT
  - BALANCE
  - BANK
  - BANKING
  - BANKS
  - BENEFIT
  - BILL
  - BUDGET
  - BUDGETARY
  - BUDGETARY_DISCIPLINE
  - BUDGETS
  - BUSINESS
  - CAPITAL
  - CASH
  - CENTRAL_BANK
  - CENTRAL_BANKS
  - CHARGE
  - COAL_AND_STEEL
  - COIN
  - COMMERCIAL_POLICY
  - COMMON_CUSTOMS_TARIFF
  - COMMON_MARKET
  - COMPENSATION
  - COMPETITION
  - COMPETITIONS
  - COMPETITIVE
  - CONDITIONS_OF_COMPETITION
  - CONSUMERS
  - CONSUMER_PROTECTION
  - CONSUMPTION
  - COOPERATE
  - COST
  - CREDIT
  - CREDITED
  - CURRENCY
  - CUSTOMS_UNION
  - DEMAND
  - DEVELOPMENT
  - DEVELOPMENTS
  - DRAFT_BUDGET
  - ECONOMIC
  - ECONOMIC_DEVELOPMENT
  - ECONOMIC_EXPANSION
  - ECONOMIC_GROWTH
  - ECONOMIC_PROGRESS
  - ECONOMIES
  - ECONOMY
  - EFFICIENCY
  - EMPLOYMENT
  - ENERGY

- EURO
- EUROPEANCENTRALBANK
- EUROPEAN_CENTRAL_BANK
- EUROPEAN_INVESTMENT
- EUROPEAN_INVESTMENT_BANK
- EUROPEAN_REGULATION
- EUROSYSTEM
- EXCHANGE_RATE
- EXPORT
- FINANCE
- FINANCES
- FINANCIAL
- FINANCING
- FISCAL
- FISCAL_NATURE
- FREE_MOVEMENT_OF_GOODS
- FUND
- FUNDING
- FUNDS
- GOODS
- GROWTH
- IMPORT
- INCENTIVE
- INCOME
- INDUSTRIES
- INDUSTRY
- INTEGRATION
- INTEREST_RATES
- INTERNAL_MARKET
- INVESTING
- INVESTMENT
- INVESTMENT*
- JOB
- LABOR
- LABOR_FORCE
- LABOR_MARKET
- LIBERALIZATION
- MANAGEMENT
- MARKET*
- MARKET_ECONOMY
- MARKET_ECONOMY_WITH_FREE_COMPETITION
- MAXIMUM_RATE
- MONETARY
- MONETARY_POLICY
- MONETARY_UNION
- OPEN_MARKET_ECONOMY_WITH_FREE
- MONEY
- PAY
- PAYMENT
- PRICE_STABILITY
- PRODUCTION
- PRODUCTIVITY
- PROGRESS
- PROPERTY
- PROSPERITY
- PURCHASE
- REFUND
- RESOURCES
- REVENUE
- SALARY
- SAVINGS
- SERVICE
- SERVICES
- SINGLE_CURRENCY
- SOCIAL_PROGRESS
- STABLE_PRICES
- SUPPLIES
- SUPPLY
- TARIFF
- TARIFF_HEADINGS
- TAX
- TRADE
- TRANSACTIONS
- TRANSACTIONS
- TRANSFER
- TRANSPORT
- TREASURY
- WEALTH
- WELFARE
- WITHDRAW
- WORK
- WORKING
- WORTH

📁 EUROPEAN_IDENTITY
- ANTHEM
- CIVILISATION
- CIVILIZATION
- CIVIL_SOCIETY
- CLOSER_UNION_AMONG_THE_PEOPLES
- COHERENCE
- COHERENT
- COHESIVE
- CREATING_AN_EVER_CLOSER_UNION
- CULTURAL
- CULTURAL_HERITAGE
- CULTURE
- CULTURE*
- CULTURES
- DIVERSITY
- EUROPEAN_IDENTITY
- EUROPE_DAY
- FLAG
- HARMONIZATION
- HERITAGE
- HISTORY
- IDENTITIES
- IDENTITY
- INHERITANCE
- MOTTO
- NATIONAL_IDENTITIES
- PLURALISM
- REUNITED
- SYMBOLS
- VALUES
- UNITED_IN_DIVERSITY

📁 RIGHTS
- @PROTECTION_INDIVIDUAL [PROTECTION BEFORE INDIVIDUAL* /S 5]
- @RIGHT_PROTECTION [RIGHT* NEAR PROTECTION /S 5]
- ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
- ASYLUM
- AUTONOMY
- CITIZENSHIP
- CITIZENSHIP_OF_THE_UNION
- COMBAT_DISCRIMINATIOî
- DIGNITY
- EQUALITY
- EXPRESSION
- FREEDOM
- FREEDOMS
- FREEDOM_OF_MOVEMENT
- FREELY
- FREE_MOVEMENT
- FUNDAMENTAL_FREEDOMS
- FUNDAMENTAL_RIGHTS
- HUMAN
- HUMANIST
- HUMANITARIAN
- HUMANITY
- HUMAN_DIGNITY
- HUMAN_RIGHTS
- IMMIGRATION
- INALIENABLE
- INVIOLABLE
- LIBERTY

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- MINORITIES
- MUTUAL_RESPECT
- NON-DISCRIMINATION
- NON-DISCRIMINATORY
- RESPECT_FOR_HUMAN_RIGHTS
- RIGHTS
- RIGHTS_OF_THE_CHILD
- RIGHT_TO
- SOCIAL_PROTECTION
- SOCIAL_SECURITY
- TOLERANCE
- UNIVERSAL_VALUES_OF_HUMAN_DIGNITY

📁 PEACE
- ALLIANCE
- ALLIED
- ASSENT
- CONCILIATION
- CONFLICT_PREVENTION
- COOPERATION
- EXTERNAL_ACTION
- EXTERNAL_ACTION?
- EXTERNAL_ACTIVITIES
- EXTERNAL_RELATIONS
- EXTERNAL_REPRESENTATION
- FIGHT_AGAINST_TERRORISM
- FOREIGN_AFFAIRS
- FOREIGN_POLICY
- GLOBAL_GOVERNANCE
- HUMANITARIAN_AID
- INTERNATIONAL_LAW
- INTERNATIONAL_SCENE
- INTERNATIONAL_SECURITY
- PEACE
- PEACE-KEEPING
- PEACE-MAKING
- 📁 PEACE_KEEPING
- 📁 PEACE_MAKING
- 📁 PEACEFUL
- 📁 INTERNATIONAL_AGGREMENT
- 📁 INTERNATIONAL_AGGREMENTS
- RESCUE
- 📁 UNIFORMITY
- SECURITY

📁 ENTITY-EU
- COMMON_ASSEMBLY
- CONSULTATIVE_COMMITTEE
- EUROPE
- ECONOMIC_COMMUNITY
- EUROPEAN_ECONOMIC_COMMUNITY
- EUROPEAN_COAL_AND_STEEL_COMMUNITY
- SUPRANATIONAL
- THE_ASSEMBLY
- THE_COMMISSION
- THE_COMMUNITY
- SPECIAL_COUNCIL
- THE_COURT
- UNION
- THE_COUNCIL

📁 ENTITY-COUNTRIES
- GOVERNMENTS_OF_THE_MEMBER_STATES
- HIGH_CONTRACTING_PARTIES
- NATIONAL_PARLIAMENTS
- NATIONAL_SYSTEMS
- NATIONAL_TRIBUNALS
- PARTICIPATING_COUNTRIES
- MEMBER_STATES

📁 ENTITY-BEYOND_THE_EU
- DEVELOPING_COUNTRIES
- EUROPEAN_STATES
- GLOBAL_ORGANIZATIONS
- INTERNATIONAL_ORGANIZATIONS
- INTERNATIONAL_SYSTEM

- NEIGHBORING_COUNTRIES
- OVERSEAS_COUNTRIES
- THIRD_COUNTRIES
- WIDER_WORLD
- UNITED_NATIONS

📁 ENTITY-CITIZENS
- CHILD
- CITIZEN
- CITIZENS
- INDIVIDUALS
- MEN
- PEOPLES_OF_EUROPE
- WOMEN

📁 ENTITY-REGIONS
- REGION*
- LESS_FAVOURED_REGIONS

CHAPTER 3

A matter of identity:

Measuring agenda setting power in a fragmented parliament

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Yair Fogel-Dror

This chapter presents a manuscript not yet published in the scientific literature

Abstract

Speeches are an important tool for legislators to signal their priorities. This raises the questions of who speaks when, and how legislators' different group identities shape their discourse. To answer these, the paper assesses legislators' speeches in the European parliament. It first maps the parliamentary discourse space by automatically topic modeling the discourse in its 6th session and probes the attention given to different discourse dimensions. Secondly, we estimate a discourse-regression-model, in which the net effect on the discourse of different groups is estimated, showing how the political-discourse-space in the parliament is divided by groups, with different groups controlling different agendas. Findings show that the discourse in the EP is aligned not just by EP parties but also by countries, specifically on issues that are pivotal to furthering countries' interests. On the other hand, EP parties do control what we defined as core European issues, i.e., issues that are at the core of the EP mandate. Yet, according to our expectations, niche Eurosceptic parties were found to control a peripheral and contested issue. All in all we reveal that the European parliament, although organized along transnational lines, enables groups with different political affiliations to have their - transnational as well as national – voices heard.

Keywords: European parliament, topic modeling, agenda setting, identity

A matter of identity: Measuring agenda setting power in a fragmented parliament

Introduction

The role of groups in legislation processes is a critical issue for democracy. Nearly all legislation made by democratic parliaments is the work of groups, not single individuals. This is even more so when it comes to the European Parliament (EP). The decision-making process of the EP involves different groups and decisions are almost exclusively reached after discursive group interaction. This is true when looked at from the decision-making perspective (e.g., co-decision procedure, legislative work of the committees) wherein cooperation and interaction are the name of the game, as well as from the standpoint of the legislators themselves, who hold multiple group affiliations and identities. Understanding how discourse in parliaments is structured and which groups control the legislative agenda is key to the study of EU politics.

Who shapes and dictates the discourse in the European Parliament? At the national level, it is well documented that political parties determine the discourse in national chambers. One can correctly predict a legislator's discourse and vocabulary simply by knowing her party affiliation. But can one anticipate the discourse of European legislators if one knows their EP party affiliation? Or maybe it is in fact an MEP's (Member of the European Parliament) affiliation to his/her national party that best predicts their discourse in the EP?

Information about which groups set the EP legislative agenda and why is scarce. This is surprising first due to the fact that MEPs are affiliated to several groups: to a national party and to a European party, thus espousing both a European as well as a national identity. This makes it possible for legislators to toe the line of their European affiliation on certain issues, but on others to espouse their country's interests. Secondly, integration processes have meant that the EP has become an important legislative body where decisions are made on economic, immigration, police, home and foreign issues (Hix 2002; Jensen and Spoon 2010). Thus, scrutinizing the legislative discourse in the EP allows us not only to discern by which group-identity the discourse is aligned or which groups control the discourse, but also to establish who navigates the legislation on European issues. Taking this point further, one might ask whether transnational parties indeed run the EP or if, instead, individual countries determine what goes on in this multilevel chamber.

This paper asks two principal questions, the first of which is whether the discourse in parliament is aligned by national or partisan (national parties or EP parties) groups. On the face of it, one would expect that speeches in the EP are dictated by EP parties and not by other group identities (nationality or national parties). Not only do studies on voting patterns in the EP suggest this to be the case (e.g. Hix et al. 2007; Kreppel 2002), but the EP is organized along transnational party lines and not according to nationality or other group affiliation (Hix 2002; Noury and Roland 2002). Contrary to expectation, however, we found that in debates on topics of high politics – such as security and foreign affairs, *countries* in fact exert a greater influence on the discourse than *national* or *transnational parties*. Further investigation revealed the surprising fact that rather than powerful states dominating the discourse, weak and small states in fact are the dominant players who shape the agenda on these issues.

Next we examined which EP party controls the agenda. Drawing insights from agenda setting and issue ownership literatures, we set forth two hypotheses regarding niche and large parties. Specifically we hypothesized that niche parties control peripheral issues while large ones control core issues discussed in the EP. In line with our expectations, using estimates of legislators' attention to topics, we found that the two largest political groups in the EP control the agenda on core issues such as the economy, trade and customs union. Nonetheless, it was found that the Eurosceptic EP parties set the agenda on more peripheral issues such as European identity.

In summary, this paper assesses legislators' discursive interactions in order to examine groups' agenda setting powers in the EP. First we map the discourse space in the EP by automatically topic modeling the discourse in its 6th session. Secondly, we extract groups' net effect on the discourse, showing how the political-discourse-space in the EP is divided by groups, with different groups controlling different agendas. Finally, we reveal that the EP, although organized along transnational lines, enables groups with different political affiliations to have their - transnational as well as national – voices heard. Whose voice is loudest depends on the issue at hand.

I.   The peculiarities of the European Parliament: The coexistence of multiple identity groups

The European Parliament offers the ideal context for the study of the ways by which elected officials and their respective European and national political groups interact. MEPs

are supposed to represent their transnational political group rather than their member states or national party. In that respect, Noury and Roland (2002) found that one could correctly predict an MEP's voting behavior if her European political group affiliation was known, while knowledge of an MEP's country of origin gave only a 10 per cent chance of a correct prediction. This is surprising given that political groups in the European Parliament are not penalized by the electorate if they are divided on key issues (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007), since their fellow citizen electorate voted for a national and not a transnational party. It is even more surprising in light of the fact that the European Parliament has become highly heterogeneous in terms of the member states and the number of MEPs who participate in it - from 410 MEPs from 10 member states and 51 different national political parties in its first session in 1979, to 785 MEPs from 27 member states and over 180 national political parties in its 6th session, less than 30 years later. Despite the heterogeneity of the European parties and the multiple affiliations of its legislators, the European party has at its disposal alternative 'whips' to enforce party discipline: it controls the allocation of speaking time and financial resources (McElroy 2001). Indeed, Hix, Noury and Roland (2005) noted growing party cohesion at the European level despite increased national and ideological diversity within the EP.

As noted above, most of the 785 MEPs are not organized by nationality, but by affiliation to European political groups, of which there were eight between 2004 and 2009 (see Table 1), representing the range of ideological tendencies in the EP. Some MEPs are not affiliated to any political group and are thus known as "non-attached" members. Political groups have the power to decide which issues will be discussed in plenary. They can also table amendments to the committee reports to be put to the vote. However, no member can be obliged by his group to vote in a particular way. National parties, on the other hand, control the selection of legislators and influence their allocation to committees in the EP (Whitaker 2005). Furthermore, the elections take place in the national setting, with each country deciding on the characteristics and form of its elections. In this respect, national parties can also exert control on their representatives in Europe. Indeed, some studies have shown that it is the national party that controls how MEPs behave, not the European groups. For example, by dividing the cohesiveness feature of voting patterns into transnational and national components, Hix (2002) found that national parties are the main factor behind voting patterns in the EP, and not EP parties as such.

It would seem that the question of national/transnational group power over the discourse in the EP is irrelevant given the fact that national and transnational parties share

similar ideology and policy positions (McElroy and Benoit 2010). Also, the fact that most national parties have joined transnational party groups suggests that these aggregate agents expect that on most issues on the EU agenda, their policy preferences will be closer to parties from the same party family from other member states than to parties from a different party family from their own member state. As can be seen from Table 1, legislators from the Portuguese Socialist Party are expected to be closer in their ideology and consequently, in their discourse, to legislators from the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party than to right-wing Portuguese legislators. Nonetheless, for a number of reasons we think the relationship between the national and transnational party is worth examining: first, defections of national party delegations from party group lines in the European Parliament are likely to occur (Faas 2003; Hix 2002). Second, with the eastward enlargements, the transnational groups now include more party delegations from more countries. This naturally leads to more heterogeneity and to a lesser degree of congruency between the national and transnational groups. Third, as one might expect, with time, political parties at the national level change their policy preferences on multiple dimensions, as well as the importance they ascribe to each dimension. These changes impact the congruency between the national and the transnational parties and might translate into discourse disparities between the two groups on certain issues. Finally, we believe that on specific issues, legislators from the same country will share similar interests and be more proximate in their views to their fellow citizens than to their peers from the same transnational political group.

Indeed, it is fair to assume that legislators originating from the same country share similar interests on certain issues. Member states in the EU differ in their status as net contributor or net receiver of EU money; they have a different length of membership in the EU – some only a few years while others were founding members of what was initially the 'coal and steel community'. This, in turn, might lead to different levels of identification with the EU (Oshri et al 2016). Member states also hold different identities and interests when it comes to how they perceive membership in the EU. For example, countries with a maritime border benefit more from EU subsidies for fisheries than those without. From a structural point of view, seats in the EP are allocated on the basis of the population of each member state. In other words, each country-member has different "power" in the EP. It is likely that these differences, regardless of a legislator's transnational or national party affiliation and regardless of ideology, will split representatives along national lines and be reflected in legislative talk. We foresee this happening specifically on issues where

the state is still an important and independent actor, or when debates concern issues on which the state wishes to retain its autonomy.

In sum, there are strong reasons to believe that transnational parties are the significant group and the dominant players leading discourse in the EP, though we also presented solid argumentation for individual countries exerting power on the agenda in situations where they want their voice to be heard. We entitled this section *the peculiarities of the EP* because uniquely, the contestation between these three groups over discourse actually takes place inside the *legislator's mind*. Each legislator has three affiliations, wears three hats from which he chooses one in each discursive interaction. Are there any rules for choosing between the different hats?

II.   Political agenda-setting in the EP

We examine two different questions with regard to the broader question of who dictates the discourse in the EP. The first question we put forward is which group in the EP influences the discourse. As indicated above, we examine the three groups: countries, national political parties and European political groups which interact and debate with each other over policy issues. We can conceptualize these debates as including a *within legislators' variability* in which legislators choose to identify with one of the three groups (nationality or transnational/national party) depending on the context and the issue that is being debated in parliament. We can thus determine which of the three identity groups is more salient in a legislator's speech. As mentioned above, we study the speeches of the same people wearing different hats when engaging with different topics. Specifically we ask - is discourse in the EP a derivative of transnational party lines? And if so, how much of the debate in the EP is controlled by EP groups?

We can also think of these debates as including a *between legislators' variability* if each of the three groups is viewed separately (transnational political groups/national parties/countries). For example, if one focuses on the debates of legislators from the prism of their affiliation in transnational parties, one could learn which party (out of all parties) controls the debate. On the other hand, if focusing on countries, we can ask which country (out of 27 member states) debates more on which issue. Note that this kind of contestation is public and not inside the legislator's mind. Back to the example of party contestation, this contestation between parties as agenda-setters is carried out in public since it is part

and parcel of the parliamentary game. Hence, the second question we pose is which of EP groups sets the agenda? And which party determines the agenda on which topic?

As for the first question which focuses on identity-groups and asks which of the three identity-groups influences more on legislators' discourse in EP, we hypothesize that transnational groups trump. Why? Because the EP is organized in such a way that conflict will arise around transnational political groups, and not around other group belonging (Hix et al. 2007). We follow the literature on voting behavior, according to which voting patterns in the EP fall, by and large, within EP party lines. In other words, the transnational group is the principal group around which parliamentary work takes place. Yet, the peculiar character of the EP in which legislators have at least three, at times conflicting, group identities, complicates the investigation of which group controls the agenda. It is plausible that countries control the agenda on topics of importance to them. Countries also enjoy an institutional advantage over the other groups when it comes to issues with low EP mandate, i.e. issues traditionally decided upon in the Council, such as security and foreign affairs.

We offer one hypothesis on group-identities and their influence on legislators' discourse in the EP:

H1. *The institutional power*: EP parties are the most dominant players to influence the discourse in the EP and not other group-identities (nationality, national parties)

Digging further into which transnational political parties control the agenda (our second research question), we turn to the literatures on political issue ownership and agenda setting. We rework the theses on political agenda-setting and issue ownership, traditionally aimed at the national setting, to make it apply to transnational parties operating within the EP. An agenda is a "hierarchy of issues" in the sense that some issues are more important than others. Agenda-setting is therefore a process by which there is competition for attention among different issues (Dearing and Rogers 1996). The goal of issue ownership is to explain party competition at the national level. The thesis is encapsulated in the idea that parties compete by politicizing and selectively emphasizing issues advantageous to themselves (Petrocik 1996) and not by a direct confrontation with or by assuming diverging positions on these issues (e.g., Vliegenthar and Walgrave 2011). Politicization can be a matter of saliency, i.e. the issue is high on the agenda of political parties as well as of the electorate. This literature, however, offers conflicting answers as to which parties in the EP set the agenda. Some studies found that large and mainstream political parties, as the central actors at the party level (e.g., Gailmard and Jenkins 2007), controlled the agenda

; other studies credited opposition or niche parties with the power to set the agenda since they enjoy a structural advantage over government parties that are constrained in their issue foci (e.g., Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2009).

We utilize these contradicting findings at the national level to hypothesize about the supranational level: According to issue ownership literature, parties politicize issues they consider beneficial to themselves (Petrocik 1996). For instance, social democratic parties have often owned welfare state issues. We apply this logic of issue ownership theory to the EP context to hypothesize that the two largest parties in the EP, the center-right European People's Party (EPP) and the center-left Party of European Socialists (PES) would control the agenda on issues pertinent to EP activity. These two parties form what is known as the "grand coalition" – an alliance of common interest and power to create internal organizational structures within the EP that historically benefited these two party groups (Kreppel, 2002; Kreppel and Hix 2003). Despite originating from competing party families, by cooperating with each other they have effectively excluded or minimized the role of smaller party groups in the governing structures of the EP over the last decade. We argue that this pact enables the two parties to control most of the important discursive issues in the EP and to exclude small parties who do not share their interests.

H2: *Power to the powerful*: The largest parties in the EP (European People's Party and the European Socialists) exert greater influence on the agenda than do small parties when it comes to discourse on core European topics.

H3: *Small and niche parties set the agenda on peripheral issues* Given that niche parties, by definition, confine themselves to a limited set of issues, sometimes even to a single-issue (Mudde 1999), we hypothesize that they would control the agenda on peripheral issues in the EP.

To conclude based on literature on voting behavior in the EP, we expect European political groups to be the dominant groups leading the discourse in EP (not countries or national parties). Also, drawing on insights from the literatures on political agenda-setting and issue ownership, we hypothesize that the two largest parties set the agenda on issues that are pertinent to the EP's work, while niche parties control the discourse on peripheral issues.

The following section introduces the structure of debates in the EP, the electoral fortunes of EP parties in the 2004 elections and broad-brush descriptive statistics of the breakdown of speeches by group.

III.   Speeches in the European Parliament

The EP's plenary discussions take place every month for a week in Strasbourg/Brussels (for a distribution of speeches by Commission, Council and legislators in each plenary discussion see Figure A1 in the appendix). Plenary discussions represent the culmination of the legislative work done in committee and in the political groups. Speeches can be given on legislative but also on non-legislative reports. In plenary discussions MEPs express their standpoint vis-à-vis the Commission and Council and take part in EU decision-making. For many years the EP was a consultative body but with treaty changes it has acquired the status of equal partner in co-decisions with the Council in most areas of EU legislation (e.g., economic activities, energy, transport, immigration and the environment). However, in specific cases the Parliament has only a consultative role (the 'consultation procedure'). A Member of the European Parliament, working in one of the parliamentary committees, draws up a report on a proposal for a 'legislative text' presented by the European Commission, the only institution empowered to initiate legislation. The parliamentary committee votes on this report. When the text has been revised and adopted in plenary, Parliament has adopted its position. This process is repeated, depending on whether or not agreement is reached with the Council.

Table 1 presents the political groups, their ideology and number of seats in the 6th European Parliament. The two largest political groups are the conservatives (EPP group) and the socialists (PES group), who together hold more than 60 percent of the seats. The 6th plenary session had two presidents (in rotation) – Josef Borell (Spain) who came from the PSE political group and was the incumbent from 2004 to 2007, and Hans-Gert Pöttering (Germany), from the PPE-DE group, who was the incumbent from 2007 to 2009. This rotation between presidents in the same parliamentary session is a consequence of a deal made by the two largest groups of the EP to establish a grand coalition. Niche parties, Eurosceptic radical left and right parties, whose vote shares in the 6th session are the lowest, are the *Independence and Democracy* group, the *Non-attached Members*, the *Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty* group and the *Union for Europe of the Nations*.

Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the speeches in the 6th European Parliament. The total number of speeches given in the plenary between 2004 and 2009 is impressive. More than 56,000 speeches nested in 318 daily discussions were documented. Council and Commission representatives also debate in the EP. These discussions are omitted (20,975, see Figure A1). On average, each European group gave 4,796 speeches (Table 2), while the median value stands at 2,630 speeches. The most active group, in terms of number of speeches, is the largest party - the *PPE*, while the most inactive is the anti-European *Independence and Democracy* party. If looked at from the country-level perspective, mean speeches per country amounted to 1,734, with Great Britain the most talkative member and Northern Ireland the least, at only 72 speeches. Looking at the data from the perspective of national parties, we find that the mean number of speeches per party is 215, while the PSOE yielded the greatest number of speeches, and Plaid Cymru the least. The average number of speeches per MEP is 44.5, with Mr. Josef Borrel (President of the EP) delivering the greatest number.

IV.   Text as data: Classifying the text into coarse topics

This paper joins a growing body of literature that uses text as data in the study of parliaments (e.g., Laver and Benoit 2003; Martin and Vanberg 2008; Proksch and Slapin 2010; Proksch and Lo 2012) instead of more traditional data material such as vote records and surveys (Ceron 2015; Hix 2002). One of the pitfalls of vote records is the paucity and selectivity of roll-call votes in the EP. Text, on the other hand, encompasses an MEP's total verbal output. Furthermore, text as data is more nuanced than vote records; instead of measuring whether an MEP supports or opposes a certain policy, we quantify their discourse and salience of discourse on different issue matters. High salience of a specific issue indicates that this issue has been put forward and debated by an MEP. In fact, since decisions are made by strategic calculations and an obligation to toe the party line, using text instead of voting patterns enables a more fine-tuned and reliable measure of an MEP's stance on important matters.

One of the main ways of understanding politics inside the EP is to investigate the shape of the policy space, i.e., the broad topics that are being discussed in it. The number of policy dimensions that are debated, the salience (weight) of each in the parliamentary discourse, as well as how legislators divide their attention across dimensions and which groups lead the legislative discourse determine, inter alia, which actors are pivotal and hence the possibility and direction of policy change. Indeed, lately we are witnessing a

growing academic interest in estimating actors' ideal positions, be they legislators or parties. This is done by utilizing various methods, such as scaling of roll-call voting data (Poole 2000), hand coding of party manifestos (Budge et al. 2001; Lo, Proksch and Slapin 2014), surveys of expert opinions of party positions (Bakker, Jolly and Polk 2012; Gerrish and Blei 2011, Huber and Inglehart 1995; Laver and Hunt 1992), or computer coding of political statements (Laver 2001; Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003). This article differs from previous work in that it does not wish to locate MEPs or their respective groups on an ideological scale (e.g., left-right), but to pinpoint what discursive themes different groups put on and push to the agenda.

Our first analytical step was classifying the text (MEPs speeches) into coarse themes. To classify the legislative text into topics we used a modified version of a probabilistic topic modeling algorithm –Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003; Blei, 2012; Grimmer and Stewart, 2013; Lucas et al., 2015; Roberts et al., 2014). Topics are identified by an unsupervised method of topic modeling in political science. By "unsupervised" we mean that these models infer the content of a corpus's topics from the corpus itself rather than defining the topics ex-ante and allocating coded documents into these topics (e.g., Laver, Benoit and Garry 2003). The algorithm is a mixed-membership model in the sense that it assumes the existence of a distribution of topics in the *same* document. This differs substantially from non-mixed methods where a given document belongs to exactly one topic and is then classified into groups of documents that belong to the same topic. It follows that in mixed-membership models a topic is, in effect, a distribution of words[1] which is estimated using the co-occurrences of words across documents.

To increase the ratio of signal to noise we removed stop words (Blei, 2012), speeches with fewer than 30 words and reduced words to their stems. After training the LDA model on a subset of the corpus, and with a predefined number of topics which stood at 15, the model was used to classify the topics discussed in *all* the speeches comprising the corpus. As Quinn et al. (2010) argue, unsupervised models require less work when estimating the topics of discussion, but then require more substantial investment to interpret their content. To begin interpreting and validating the model output, we first reviewed the most frequent words in a topic and a small number of articles

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[1] For example, words ranked high on the *foreign affairs* topic are 'Russia' 'agreement' 'security' 'peace' 'country' and 'Palestinian' compared with 'economic' 'policy' 'development' and 'growth' which ranked high in *economic affairs*.

where the topic proportion was relatively high. We then labeled every topic, indicating the main theme discussed. We were able to recognize 13 out of the 15 topics generated by the procedure. These topics and their share in the EP's total discourse are presented in Figure 1. Not surprisingly, these topics match most of the standard categories of EU policy. Also, they are similar to academic work that was performed on the EP's 5th session (e.g., Proksch and Slapin 2009)[2]. The two most salient topics are procedural, focusing on voting and question time and decision-making procedures. Next there are the discourse on enlargement and economic issues, such as internal market and the Eurozone. European identity, on the other hand, is a peripheral topic which amounts to only five percent of all debates.[3] Following Quinn et al. (2010), in the appendix (Figure A3) we validate the LDA output and the human labeling by examining variations in the prevalence of topics over time. By contrasting discourse with real events we show that spikes in attention correspond with major EU events.

To give substance to and to illustrate the method, Table 3 lists representative sentences for several topics. These sentences include a high proportion of the topics' most frequent words and thus help in labeling the topics. Table 4 is an example of one such topic. It lists the most frequent words within the second topic of our LDA model which was labeled *foreign affairs* (e.g., Russia, agreement, international, etc.). The next section introduces our data, model, and approach to estimating groups' agenda-setting roles in the EP.

V.   Data structure, estimation strategy and methods

We analyze data at the level of the speaker-discussion, of which there are 56,756. Put plainly, the unit of analysis is a single speech of a specific MEP, delivered at a specific point in time. As indicated, we removed speeches delivered by non-legislators (Commissioners, Council representatives, etc.) and were left with a total of 35,781 speeches. Each of the 13 topics generated by our LDA analysis is a dependent variable in our regression models. These are continuous variables, ranging from 0 to 1, which measure the part of speech (in decimal fraction) for each legislator in every speech that belongs to that topic. For instance,

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[2] To the exclusion of the salience of topics. Enlargement for example is highly salient in our data, and less so in others' findings. We hypothesize that this is because expansion eastwards took place during the 6th parliamentary session.

[3] In an article on the 5th parliamentary session by Proksch and Slapin (2009), European identity was not discussed at all

in a specific speech given by Mr. Josef Borell (a row in our data), we may find that it is composed of 0.2 on the topic of environment and agriculture, 0.6 – decision-making, and 0.2- procedural issues. Our regression models gauge these proportions of topics by group (country, national party, EP party), to examine which group controls the agenda. Our variables of interest in our analysis are legislators belonging to the three groups. We incorporated in our regression models measures tapping these groups' characteristics.

Independent variables: Four measures classifying national parties

To test our first hypothesis, and specifically to measure the effect of national parties on the discourse, we implemented four measures tapping national party characteristics. We rely on the ParlGov data[4] to compose one measure of national party size and three measures of national party positioning on European integration, ideology (left-right scale) and liberty-authority scale. Party size is measured by parties' vote share for the 2004 EP elections. Support for or opposition to further European integration, a highly politicized issue on which national parties diverged, has been the focus of much of the literature on the EU (Marks and Steenbergen 2002; Tsebelis and Garrett 2001). It has been argued that as the EU increasingly makes policies in domestic areas traditionally decided upon by the nation state, such as social and environmental policies and economic and trade issues, we should expect a "left-right" dimension to emerge in EU politics. These measures are generated by using three different sources: the Chapel Hill expert survey (2010), Benoit/Laver 2006 and Ray 1999. These surveys contain questions on how parties position themselves on European integration, the general left/right, and 'libertarian/authoritarian' dimension. These three measures range between 0-10. In the appendix we report the results of a kernel density histogram on which we plot these three dimensions. Results show high correlation between the left-right and the liberty-authority scales (see appendix Figure A2).

Classifying countries and EP parties

EP party membership is a dummy variable (one dummy for each EP party), coded 1 if the MEP is a member of the EP party in question and 0 if he is a member of the *Independence and Democracy* party (reference category). Countries are also dummied in our regression models while the omitted category is Germany.

Measuring control of the agenda

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[4] http://www.parlgov.org/data/table/view_party/

As mentioned above, each topic is a dependent variable in our regression models. All of these models are matched with ordinary least squares (OLS). Since each legislator gave several speeches between 2004 and 2009 (number of speeches per MEP ranges from 1 to 1,149, see Table 2), it is fair to assume that these speeches are highly correlated. To address this correlation and control for an MEP's specific characteristics we included legislators fixed effect. We also clustered standard errors by discussion, again, since speeches delivered on the same discussion are expected to be highly correlated. In fact, the problem with the data is that observations are correlated not just by discussion and legislator, but also by the very same groups whose effect on the discourse we aim to measure. We think that our awareness of and attention to these issues enabled us to avoid potential pitfalls.

Our empirical analysis takes place in several stages: first we compare groups' standardized regression coefficients to pinpoint attention given by each group to a topic (DV). Since we control for legislators' group affiliations, these coefficients are the groups' net effect on the discourse. The coefficient of the PSE in the human rights discourse (DV), for example, is the net effect of belonging to that group in the discourse. These results are presented in Table 5 and in Figures 2 and 4. Secondly, based on the results of the regression analysis we calculate legislators' mean (by group) predicted effect on the discourse. These results are displayed in Figure 5. Thirdly, we offer a way to move from estimating the representative legislator (of a group) to estimating groups' predicted discourse share. This estimation takes into account the relative size of groups together with the legislator's propensity to give attention to a topic (see Figure 6).

One point is in order at this juncture. Our regression results (13 models, one for each topic) offer ample information from which to draw conclusions on agenda-setters and group power relationships. Out of the 13 models, we cherry picked what seemed for us the most interesting topics, topics that the EU emphasizes most in its documents. We are aware that one could draw different conclusions based on the choice and analysis of other topics.

VI.   Findings

Group identities' power in the parliament

Tables 5a and 5b present OLS regression results for the 13 topics. According to our first hypothesis, EP parties dominant the discourse in parliament, and not national parties or

countries. Our hypothesis mainly relied on the literature on voting behavior which concluded that voting in the European Parliament has become more 'partisan' and less 'nationalist' or 'intergovernmental' (Hix, Noury and Ronald 2005). Results presented in Table 5a, however, show that EP parties do not always control the discourse. These findings stand out mainly regarding regression models predicting discourse on foreign affairs/security and human rights.

Regression results (DV: foreign affairs/human rights) show that European political parties do not lead the discourse, nor do national parties. It is rather countries who dominant the discourse. Issues of security, foreign affairs and human rights, which traditionally were part of the second pillar of the European structure (Common Foreign and Security Policy), were decided upon in the Council and not in the EP. Hence, the power of the EP to decide upon these issues was limited. Indeed our regression models show that even when discussed in the EP, these subjects were put forward and debated mainly by the countries (see grey cells for a significant effect). Recalling that legislators have three affiliations (country of belonging, party and European group), we know that legislators belonging to countries belong also to party groups (at the European and national levels). These regression findings show, however, that debates on foreign affairs and human rights are structured around and led by country groups.

Figure 2 displays regression coefficients and their CIs (for EP parties) for four topics: foreign affairs, human rights, free movement and economic issues. Results confirm that EP parties have no significant effect on foreign affairs and human rights discourse, but do on free movement and economic issues. The latter two issues have been at the core of EP decision-making since its early days. Issues of the economy, internal market, free movement, trade and customs union can be thematically grouped into the broad issue of the economy. The proportion of speech for these issues amounts to more than 20 percent of total parliamentary discourse (Figure 1). Figure 2 shows that parliamentary groups lead the discourse on such issues. Of course, a few countries also have a significant effect on the discourse (see grey cells, Table 5a), but many countries do not, while most EP parties do.

Figure 3 examines which states control the agenda. To our surprise we found that weak and small states exert greater control over the agenda (measured as regression coefficient) than do strong states. These small states are mainly Eastern European countries that joined the EU only in 2004/2007. An exception is Great Britain that also

exerts control over the agenda on security and foreign affairs. Given the Brexit referendum results and the characteristics of Britain membership in the EU, we speculate that Britain acted as a reluctant member, and though considered a super power, on highly important matters such as security, Britain remained discursively involved.

The literature on small states, and particularly on small states in Europe, offers at least two explanations for why weak or small states discuss major issues (foreign affairs and security) in the organizational forum. The first rests upon their perception of the organization as a platform for and means to enhance their status in the international arena (Jakobsen 2008; Steinmetz and Wivel 2010; Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006). Eastern European countries face security problems and foreign policy dilemmas which differ substantially from those experienced by great powers. Through their organizational membership, these weak states are able to further their security interests by influencing the actions of the great powers on which their security depends. Further, they construct a playing field in which laws and rules prevail, thus making military power less important (Beyer et al. 2006). It is therefore in their utmost interest to assume a meaningful role in setting the agenda on such issues. The second explanation rests on small countries' special needs and interests. Eastern European countries share problems similar to those of Third World countries. They are also more directly and deeply affected by security problems facing countries of the Third World than are great powers such as Germany or France. For some Eastern European countries, Russia is their most important energy supplier; to others the immigration route to Europe starts at the Russian border (Hungary and Greece for example). These weak countries benefit from organizational power in the international arena which provides them with opportunities to voice their concerns (Steinmetz and Wivel 2010; Wivel 2005), reduces the importance of power asymmetries, and facilitates conflict resolution. To conclude, results of the regression models on foreign affairs and human rights show that EP parties do not always control the parliamentary agenda. This is true specifically for discourse not traditionally part of the EP mandate. It also shows that weak states own the agenda on such issues.

Assessing EP parties' agenda-setting powers in the EP

Building on regression results we generated our second measure for estimating groups' agenda-setting power. This measure estimates the mean predicted values for European party groups to discuss economic (core EP) issues and identity (peripheral EP) issues.

Using legislators' observed values and regression coefficients, this analysis first calculates the predicted value of legislators debating the issue at hand. It then averages legislators' predicted values by EP group to generate the mean predicted value of groups debating the issue. This figure can be understood as the prediction for the average legislator discussing the issue at hand. Figure 4 displays the results. It shows the mean predicted values for EP groups discussing identity and economic issues. Results show that legislators originating from the two largest groups (PPE and PSE) are expected to devote more attention to economic issues (see the upward red circle) while Eurosceptic and niche parties (ITS, IND, NI) tend to devote substantially less attention to this issue (see the downward blue circle). It is also evident from Figure 4 that the largest parties (size of parties is presented in grey bars) debate peripheral issues less (see the downward red circle, European identity) while niche parties pay more attention to these issues (the upward blue circle). In fact, Figure 4 shows that niche parties are the ones that push peripheral issues to the agenda, in the sense that they control the discourse, and address the issue of European identity more than any other party.

On the issue of European identity we found that a substantive part of the discourse revolved around the treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and the failure to ratify it. Indeed one of the most representative sentences on this topic is the following (presented also in Table 3):

> "Europe will not shake itself down into a core Europe and a fringe Europe,
> either; on the contrary, without a European Constitution, the European Union
> will degenerate into a patchwork Europe, confusing the public at home and
> destroying Europe's credibility in the eyes of the world"

Eurosceptic parties objected to this treaty and politicized the issue of non-ratification (Crum 2007). Indeed, politicization on the part of Eurosceptic parties is evident in their discourse. Turning back to the raw data we plotted the discourse share on this issue for two parties over time– the PPE, a mainstream party, and the Non-attached Members, most of whom were radical right advocates at the EP's 6th session. Figure 5 presents the results. It reveals that the radical right party almost always leads the discourse on European identity (black line), while the mainstream party pays less attention to this issue (red line). In that respect it has been observed in the literature that the success of radical right parties leads to an increase in established parties' anti-immigrant positions. In this sense, by putting a new issue on the agenda and increasing its salience, niche parties can act as issue

entrepreneurs and pressure established parties to adapt their behavior accordingly. The graph also shows that spikes in the discourse on identity arose around the non-ratification period (June 2005).

Next we offer a third measure of calculating agenda-setting. Contrary to the previous two measures which estimated agenda-setting power at the (representative) legislator level, this measure is calculated at the party level. Specifically, we multiplied mean legislators' predicted values by each party's relative size in parliament. In other words, the predicted discourse of a representative PPE legislator, for example, is multiplied by PPE relative vote share in parliament. The same procedure was carried out for each EP party. Figure 4 sketches results for the second measure, the third procedure takes into account legislator propensity to give attention to an issue together with the size of his respective party (the grey bars). This way, it balances, for example, the relatively high predicted discourse on identity by Eurosceptic parties. In effect, the third measure calculates how much of the total discourse on a topic is contributed by each party.

Figure 6 plots the expected discourse share on identity and economy for each EP group. Comparing results displayed in Figure 6 against results presented in Figure 4 we acknowledge that Eurosceptic groups (NI, IND and ITS) do not contribute more than mainstream parties to the discourse on identity; in fact, quite the opposite. While the two mainstream parties together contribute 3.5% of the 5% discourse on identity in the parliament, the three Eurosceptic parties together contribute less than 1% to the discourse. Summing up the discourse proportion on this topic across parties, we obtain a total proportion of about 6%, which means that 6% of parliamentary talk is predicted to be delivered on identity issues. This value is similar to the share of speeches on this topic that was found in the raw data (see Figure 1). To conclude, though PPE/PSE legislators have less propensity to give attention to the European identity topic, their party as a whole contributes the most discourse to it.

Which of the three measures is preferable? It depends on what exactly one wishes to measure in agenda-setting. As pointed out, the first (regression coefficient) and second (mean predicted discourse) measures estimate agenda-setting power at the level of the discrete legislator, while the third measure estimates the party's expected discourse share as whole. All in all, our findings refuted the first hypothesis according to which EP parties dominate discourse in parliament. Instead we found that countries exert greater control on the agenda of high politics, but with low EP mandate. Our second and third hypotheses

were confirmed with regard to issue ownership of mainstream and large parties on the one hand, and of niche parties on the other. Specifically we show that large parties control the discourse on economic affairs (this was established by all three measures), while niche parties own the discourse on peripheral issues (this was established by the first and second measures). On this latter point, the third measure confirms what the literature already established – that niche parties, especially right-wing radical parties, have the power to arrange the parliamentary discourse to their benefit, making mainstream parties pay discursive attention to issues that niche parties own.

VII. Conclusion

This article focused on the European Parliament with two main objectives, the first of which is identifying the prime group-identities that shape and dominate the discourse and the second is investigating which EP party controls which agenda in the EP. We analyzed European legislators' speeches (~35,000) delivered at the EP's sixth session (2004–2009). As European legislators belong to transnational party groups but are also members of national parties, and originate in different countries, this paper sought to analyze the links between their different group-belongings, attributes and affiliation and the prevailing discourse in the parliament.

Why should we care about how, and according to which groups' lines the discourse is structured in EP? First, the EP has become a powerful institution - decisions on most of the issues in the European Union are subject to its legislation and approval. And second, whereas the EP is a supranational body which decides and votes on European issues, the legislators operating in it are nationals, in the sense that they are elected within the platform of the national party and are citizens of their country.

This article joins a growing body of literature on parliamentary activity and parliamentary legislative discourse. We gathered legislators' speeches from the 6th session and indexed these to generate the relevant information on group affiliation for each legislator. From a theoretical perspective, this article draws on and reworks the literatures on political agenda-setting and issue ownership, literatures that are traditionally designed for the study of political parties operating in national chambers, to propound hypotheses relevant to the supranational fora.

We mapped the parliamentary discourse space and probed the attention given to different discourse dimensions. Next we estimated a discourse-regression-model, in which the net effect on the discourse of different groups was estimated. From a methodological standpoint, the article offers three measures for estimating legislator and group attention to discourse by aggregating discourse quantities to different group levels such EP parties and counties. The first two measures for agenda-setting are at the level of the legislator, while the third is at the party level. These measures and the subsequent analysis refuted our first hypothesis, and confirmed our second and third hypotheses. We found that EP parties do not control all topics in the EP. Countries also exert control on specific issues that are pivotal to furthering their interests. On the other hand, EP parties do control what we defined as core European issues, i.e., issues that are at the core of the EP mandate. Yet, according to our expectations, niche Eurosceptic parties were found to control a peripheral and contested issue (European identity).

Interestingly, the fact that legislators hold different group-identities is reflected by the *party contestation* in the European parliament. The findings that large parties push core EP issues, i.e., issues that deal with further European integration, into the agenda, while Euroskeptic parties dominate discourse on European identity – a contested issue that is far from promoting further integration, echoes the situation of a fragmented parliament in which different group identities are operating in it. All in all, we show that the supranational assembly, though organized along party lines, includes voices from different groups and political orders. And though legislators operate in supranational contours, the nation-state speaks out loud and clear on matters of importance to it. We show that discourse in the European parliament is after all a matter of identity in which different topics are raised and put in the agenda by groups from different political orders.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1. Political groups in the 6th European Parliament

Party	Ideology	Num of seats	Abbrev.
European People's Party–European Democrats	Conservatives	288	PPE-DE
Party of European Socialists	Socialists	217	PSE
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	Liberals	104	ALDE
Union for Europe of the Nations	Natioanls	40	UEN
Greens–European Free Alliance	Greens	43	Verts_ALE
European United Left–Nordic Green Left	Radical left	41	GUE_NGL
Independence and Democracy	Anti Europeans	22	IND_DEM
Non-attached Members	Independents	30	NI
Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty Group	Anti Europeans	21	ITS

Source: European Parliament[5]

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[5] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/map.html

Table 2. Summary statistics of the speeches in the 6th European Parliament (2004-2009)

	Mean	Median	Max	Min
Speeches per European group	4,796	2,630	13,542 (PPE-DE)	165 (IND_DEM)
Speeches per country	1,734.9	1,149.5	5,571 (GB)	73 (NIE)
Speeches per national party	215.1	88.5	2,441 (PSOE)	1 (Plaid Cymru)
Speeches per MEP	44.5	27	1,149 (Josep Borrell)	1
Total number of speeches			35,781	
Total number of discussions			318	
Number of national parties			181	

Table 3. Examples of sentences representing topics

Labeled topic	Quote
Foreign affairs	"So far as the European Union's political and security dialogue with its Mediterranean partners is concerned, the Hague ministerial meeting confirmed the progress that has been made with cooperation in counter- terrorism, regional security and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as European security and defense policy"
Foreign affairs	"Following the G8 Summit of Heads of State or Government, at which agreement could not be reached in relation to Kosovo, the EU Presidency called on participating parties to intensify their efforts in order to adopt a new UN Security Resolution at the earliest possible juncture"
European identity	"Europe will not shake itself down into a core Europe and a fringe Europe, either; on the contrary, without a European Constitution, the European Union will degenerate into a patchwork Europe, confusing the public at home and destroying Europe's credibility in the eyes of the world"
European identity	"Thanks to Solidarity, many people in Western Europe came to understand that the fundamental values revived by Solidarity had to become part of the fabric of the reorganised and reunited Europe"
Human rights	"Mr President, I would like to propose the following oral amendment: 'Calls upon the Chinese authorities to reveal the whereabouts of human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng and to release him unless he is to be charged with a recognised criminal offence; similarly calls for the release of Chen Guangcheng, who has helped citizens in their attempts to sue their local authorities for carrying out forced abortions and sterilisations, and of Bu Dongwei, who has been assigned to two and a half years of "Re- education through Labour" (RTL) and who is detained at an undisclosed location; therefore urges the authorities to ensure that all human rights defenders can carry out peaceful and legitimate activities without fear of arbitrary arrest, torture or ill-treatment and that they be given access to proper legal representation in the event of arrest"
Human rights	"The Commission follows the human rights situation in Russia very closely and, through the EU's political dialogue with Russia, as well as the regular human rights consultations, we are able to raise issues relating to democracy, human rights and the rule of law with Russia."
Regions	"It should be noted that the development of the Trans-European Networks Transport remains a priority for Lithuania as it was already put in their draft NSRF (National Strategic Reference Framework) of June 2006 that define the priorities on which cohesion instruments (Cohesion Funds, European Regional Development Funf and European Social Fund) should be spent during the 2007-13 programming period."
Regions	"If the proposal being presented on the new European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, with a funding of EUR 11 000 million per year, is accepted, we would have to deduct 20% of that sum in order to fund a substantial proportion of the cost of Natura 2000."

Enlargement	"I direct two questions to this Body and the present European Commission: First, on what legal grounds does the European Commission carry out European Union accession negotiations with candidate countries on behalf of the European Union? Second, is the European Commission authorised to express political opinions on critical issues for the selection or non-selection of a candidate country during interim, nonetheless, decisive stages of the negotiation procedure?"
Enlargement	"Mr President, in contrast to one of the earlier speakers, I regard enlargement as an instrument not of external policy, but rather of European domestic policy; that is why the process of enlarging the EU must not be allowed to burst the bounds of Europe through the accession of a large country like Turkey, which is either only partly European or not European at all."
Economy	"As well as the confidence problem, we have a problem of disparity of situations, which, since we have decided to have a single monetary policy, presents us with a challenge on which both the Commission and the Council and, in particular, the Eurogroup, are working: how to respond, within a context of budgetary discipline - we are going to discuss the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact in this Parliament in a few days time - and on the basis of coordination of economic policies, of the broad economic policy guidelines, to that disparity of situations in such a way that, by applying recommendations adapted to the specific circumstances of each of the national economies, the whole of the euro zone and the whole of the European Union can coordinate their economic policies and we can all achieve a better result."
Economy	"The question I would like to ask very briefly is, if we are facing the interest rate rise that the European Central Bank is promoting, and you have explained that again this morning, firstly, why does the market not believe that interest rates are on the rise in the long term, over ten years? Why are long-term interest rates so stabilised if we are really facing the risks that you have laid out this morning in your speech and in your text? If there is an expectation in Europe of solid growth and significant job creation, why is the market so stabilized in the long term, Mr President?"

Table 4. Most frequent words in the topic labeled *foreign affairs*

Most frequent words	%	Most frequent words	%
EU	0.014	Political	0.009
Union	0.014	Security	0.008
Country	0.014	Support	0.008
Russia	0.013	Cooperation	0.008
European	0.013	Relation	0.008
Agreement	0.012	Peace	0.007
International	0.011	Palestinian	0.007

Table 5a. OLS models predicting discourse on different topics, with country and party dummies, legislators fixed effect, errors are clustered by discussion

|		Foreign affairs		Enlargement		Economy		Regions		Human rights		Free movement		Public health	
European Political Groups	ALDE	-0.01	(0.02)	-0.02**	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.02)	0.01*	(0.01)	0.01***	(0.00)
	GUE_NGL	0.02	(0.02)	-0.02*	(0.01)	0.01*	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.02	(0.02)	0.03***	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.00)
	ITS	-0.03	(0.02)	0.04	(0.02)	-0.00	(0.01)	-0.02	(0.01)	0.01	(0.02)	0.04**	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
	Non-attached Members	-0.02	(0.02)	0.00	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.02)	0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.00)
	PPE-DE	-0.01	(0.02)	-0.02***	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.00)	0.01**	(0.00)	-0.02	(0.01)	0.01	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)
	PSE	-0.00	(0.02)	-0.03***	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.02)	0.02***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)
	UEN	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)	0.02*	(0.01)	-0.03*	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.01)	-0.01*	(0.00)
	Verts_ALE	-0.00	(0.02)	-0.04***	(0.01)	0.01*	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.02	(0.03)	0.02**	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.00)
Countries	BU	0.04***	(0.01)	-0.06***	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.06)	0.09	(0.13)	0.16***	(0.01)	-0.03***	(0.01)	0.02	(0.02)
	AT	-0.01***	(0.00)	-0.01*	(0.00)	-0.01	(0.00)	0.02**	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)
	BE	0.00	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.01**	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.00)
	NIE	0.02	(0.01)	-0.05***	(0.01)	-0.03	(0.01)	0.04*	(0.02)	0.00	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)
	CY	0.02***	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.02***	(0.01)	-0.03***	(0.01)	0.11***	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
	CZ	0.07***	(0.00)	0.05***	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)
	DK	-0.03***	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.02***	(0.01)	0.05***	(0.01)	-0.03**	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
	EE	0.05***	(0.00)	-0.01	(0.02)	0.00	(0.02)	0.02	(0.02)	0.10***	(0.00)	0.02*	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)
	FI	0.01	(0.00)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.04***	(0.01)	-0.03***	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)
	FR	-0.00***	(0.00)	0.01	(0.01)	0.03	(0.05)	0.03***	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.01)	-0.01***	(0.00)
	GR	0.01***	(0.00)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)	0.04***	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)
	HU	-0.01***	(0.00)	0.04***	(0.01)	0.02*	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.00)	0.03***	(0.01)	0.00	(0.00)
	IE	0.00	(0.00)	-0.04***	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.01)	0.01**	(0.00)	0.03***	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.00)
	IT	0.01	(0.00)	0.01	(0.01)	0.02**	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.00)	0.01	(0.00)	-0.01**	(0.00)
	LT	0.04***	(0.01)	0.04**	(0.02)	0.06**	(0.02)	0.04*	(0.02)	0.00	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
	LIT	0.06***	(0.01)	0.04***	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.02**	(0.01)	-0.01*	(0.01)
	LU	-0.05***	(0.00)	-0.01	(0.01)	0.08***	(0.02)	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.03***	(0.00)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
	MT	-0.01	(0.01)	0.06***	(0.02)	-0.00	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.02**	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.00)
	NL	0.01**	(0.00)	-0.01	(0.00)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.00)	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.00)	0.01*	(0.00)
	PL	0.01	(0.01)	0.02**	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.00)	0.01*	(0.00)
	PT	0.00	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.01)	0.05***	(0.01)	0.05***	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.00)	-0.01	(0.00)
	RO	-0.02***	(0.01)	-0.02	(0.02)	-0.05***	(0.01)	-0.05***	(0.01)	-0.03***	(0.01)	-0.03***	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.00)
	SK	-0.02	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.05***	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)	0.02**	(0.01)
	SL	0.03***	(0.01)	0.04***	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)	0.03*	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.01)
	ES	0.00	(0.00)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01**	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)
	SE	-0.01*	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)	0.01	(0.00)	-0.02*	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)	0.01***	(0.00)
	GB	0.02**	(0.01)	-0.01*	(0.01)	-0.01**	(0.00)	-0.01*	(0.00)	0.03**	(0.01)	0.01	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)
National Political Parties	Gender (Male)	0.02*	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)	-0.03***	(0.00)	-0.04***	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)
	Vote share	0.00	(0.00)	-0.02*	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.00)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.02	(0.02)	0.02***	(0.01)	0.00	(0.00)
	Left/right	0.00	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)	-0.00*	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	-0.00***	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)
	EU anti/pro	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	0.00***	(0.00)	0.00**	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)	-0.00***	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)
	Liberty/authority	-0.00	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)	0.00*	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)	0.00***	(0.00)	0.00***	(0.00)
	Constant	0.06*	(0.02)	0.09***	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.04**	(0.01)	0.07*	(0.03)	0.06***	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
	Observations	35,467		35,466		35,466		35,466		35,467		35,466		35,466	

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.00$. Reference and omitted category for countries: Germany; for European groups: IND_DEM

Table 5b. OLS models predicting discourse on different topics, with country and party dummies, legislators fixed effect, errors are clustered by discussion

|		Custom union		Environment and Agriculture		EU identity		Voting time		Decision making		Procedural issues	
European Political Groups	ALDE	0.01	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.00)	-0.04***	(0.01)	0.02**	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.01)	0.02**	(0.01)
	GUE_NGL	0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.04***	(0.01)
	ITS	0.02	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.02)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.02	(0.03)	-0.04	(0.02)
	Non-attached Members	0.01	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.00)	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.00)	-0.03***	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
	PPE-DE	0.02**	(0.01)	-0.01*	(0.00)	-0.05***	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.00)	0.01	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.01)
	PSE	0.01	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.00)	-0.04***	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.00)	-0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
	UEN	0.02**	(0.01)	-0.01*	(0.00)	-0.04***	(0.01)	0.01**	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)	0.02*	(0.01)
	Verts_ALE	0.02**	(0.01)	0.00	(0.00)	-0.02*	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.03***	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
Countries	BU	-0.05***	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.01)	-0.02	(0.03)	-0.05***	(0.01)	0.03	(0.04)	-0.09	(0.11)
	AT	0.01**	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)	-0.01*	(0.00)	-0.01*	(0.00)	0.00	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)
	BE	0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.04***	(0.01)
	NIE	0.03	(0.02)	0.02	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.04***	(0.01)	-0.03	(0.02)	-0.03	(0.03)
	CY	-0.04***	(0.01)	0.05***	(0.01)	0.01*	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.02**	(0.01)	-0.12***	(0.01)
	CZ	0.00	(0.01)	-0.01*	(0.00)	0.00	(0.01)	-0.01*	(0.01)	-0.02	(0.01)	-0.10***	(0.01)
	DK	0.02	(0.01)	0.00	(0.00)	-0.03***	(0.01)	0.02*	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	-0.03**	(0.01)
	EE	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.01*	(0.00)	0.04	(0.02)	-0.02**	(0.01)	-0.04*	(0.02)	-0.18***	(0.02)
	FI	0.06***	(0.01)	0.01**	(0.00)	-0.01	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.01)	-0.07***	(0.01)
	GR	0.03***	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.01)	-0.15***	(0.01)
	HU	0.02**	(0.01)	0.01*	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.01)	-0.02***	(0.00)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.16***	(0.01)
	IE	0.03***	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.00)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.02**	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.09***	(0.01)
	IT	0.01	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.00)	0.03***	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.07***	(0.01)
	LT	0.01	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.00)	0.02	(0.02)	-0.03***	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.17***	(0.01)
	LIT	0.04***	(0.01)	0.01**	(0.00)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.03***	(0.00)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.18***	(0.01)
	LU	0.04***	(0.01)	0.00	(0.00)	0.01	(0.01)	0.03**	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.01)	-0.07***	(0.01)
	MT	-0.01	(0.01)	0.02*	(0.01)	0.04**	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.08***	(0.01)
	NL	0.02***	(0.01)	0.00	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.01)	-0.03***	(0.01)
	PL	0.02**	(0.01)	0.00	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.01)	-0.15***	(0.01)
	PT	0.02**	(0.01)	0.01***	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)	0.01	(0.00)	0.04***	(0.01)	-0.18***	(0.01)
	RO	-0.04***	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)	-0.04***	(0.01)	-0.04***	(0.00)	-0.07***	(0.01)	-0.25***	(0.01)
	SK	0.02	(0.01)	0.00	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.16***	(0.01)
	SL	0.01	(0.01)	0.01*	(0.00)	0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02**	(0.01)	0.02	(0.02)	-0.17***	(0.01)
	ES	0.01	(0.00)	0.01***	(0.00)	0.01*	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.08***	(0.01)
	SE	0.05***	(0.01)	0.01***	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.00)	0.00	(0.01)	-0.09***	(0.01)
	GB	0.00	(0.01)	0.01**	(0.00)	-0.01	(0.00)	0.00	(0.01)	0.01*	(0.01)	-0.09***	(0.01)
	Gender (Male)	0.00	(0.00)	-0.00**	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	-0.01**	(0.00)	-0.01***	(0.00)	0.02***	(0.00)
	Vote share	0.02***	(0.00)	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.03***	(0.01)	0.02**	(0.01)	-0.02	(0.02)	0.03***	(0.01)
National Political Parties	Left/right	-0.00***	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)
	EU anti/pro	-0.00	(0.00)	-0.00**	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	-0.00***	(0.00)	0.00***	(0.00)	0.00**	(0.00)
	Liberty/authority	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	0.00*	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)
	Constant	0.06***	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.01)	0.09***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.01)	0.09***	(0.02)	0.24***	(0.01)
	Observations	35,466		35,466		35,466		35,466		35,466		35,466	

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.00$. Reference and omitted category for countries: Germany; for European groups: IND_DEM

**Figure 1. Speeches by topics, 6ᵗʰ European Parliament (2004-2009)**

Note. This Figure shows topics identified by our LDA model from 56,756 speeches given in the 6ᵗʰ European Parliament. The two largest categories are voting and decision making procedures. The category of enlargement is also salient. This is of course logical given the fact that two enlargements took place during the parliament's 6 session.

Figure 2. The effect (displayed as regression coef.) of European groups on discourse in the EP (2004-2009)

Notes. The effects and CIs are taken from Table 5a and represent regression coefficients of European groups on different discourse themes. The reference category in these regressions is the IND_DEM European group. It is shown that while European groups have no effect on the discourse on foreign affairs and human rights, they do have an effect on economic issues.

Figure 3. The effect (displayed as regression coefficients) of countries on the discourse on foreign affairs and security issues

Notes. Germany is the omitted category. The black lines indicate two standard error intervals around the estimates. By and large, results show that East European countries lead the discourse on Foreign affairs and security while old member states effect less or refrain from the discourse on these issues. Debates in the EP on foreign affairs include issues such as the European Security and Defense policy, the Mediterranean region and chiefly among it the Barcelona process, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, relationship with Russia, conflict prevention in Kosovo, Darfur and Iraq, ACP-EU cooperation (Cotonou Agreement), immigration and neighborhood policy.

Figure 4. Predicted (mean) values for European party groups to discuss issues on identity (x) and economy (circle)


Notes. Fig. 4 displays the predicted discourse, and CIs for the mean legislator for each party. Results show that economic issues (presented in circles) are more discussed among the two biggest parties in the EP (PPE and PSE), while identity issues (presented in x) less so. It is also evident that identity is more discussed among the three Eurosceptic parties and among nonaffiliated legislators (NI, IND, and ITS) while economic issues less so. Grey bars represent party relative size in parliament.

Figure 5. Proportion of the identity topic by EPP and NI parties over time

Notes. Fig.5 is a time series plot of the proportion of identity discourse by the EPP and NI European groups. Black line represent the discourse for the NI party, red line represents discourse for PPE party.

Figure 6. Expected discourse share on economic and identity issues by party

Notes. Fig. 6 presents the expected discourse share on economic (dark grey bars) and European identity (bright grey bars) for each European party. Expected discourse share is calculated by multiplying mean legislators' predicted values by each party's relative size in parliament. In other words, the predicted discourse of a representative PPE legislator is multiplied by the PPE relative vote share in parliament.

Appendix

Table A1. Correlation Matrix

	Liberty/authority	Left/right	EU anti/pro
Liberty/authority	1		
Left/right	0.6747*	1	
EU anti/pro	-0.2303*	0.0839*	1

Note. Table A1 is a matrix of bivariate correlations between three party classifications. It demonstrates that the liberty-authority measure and the left-right scale are closely correlated but the left-right and EUantipro measures are barely correlated. This is due to the fact that Eurosceptic parties are radical right but also radical left parties.

Figure A1. Histogram of speeches given in the European Parliament by time, 2004-2009
Notes. Black bars represent speeches delivered by MEPs (total of 35,781 speeches) while grey
bars represent speeches delivered by council or commission representatives (20,975). This article
analyses MEPs speeches only.

Figure A2. Kernel density plot of the three measures for national parties' ideology: left/right. Liberty/authority and EU anti/pro scales.

Notes. The X axis is the scale (0-10) of the three measures. The Y axis represents the proportion of parties. The two measures of left/right and liberty/authority show strong correlation between them, while the EU anti/pro measure of parties shows low correlation with the other two measures.

Figure A3. Predictive validity for three selected topics

Figure A3. Plots the percent of speeches given each day on three topics: Decisions making procedures (top plot), enlargement (middle plot) and foreign affairs (bottom plot), with the date plotted on the horizontal axis. The three plots in Fig. 3 show that external events predict swings in the attention MEP's give to that topic. For example, surrounding the time of the enlargement to the East and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU, debates in parliament focused on the topic of enlargement. In the case of parliamentary debates on foreign affairs and security related issues, the bottom plot shows that discourse fluctuates up at times of terror attacks in Europe. This procedure of contrasting and scrutinizing discourse against real events enables validating the topic, specifically in cases where external events explain sudden increases in attention to a topic (Grimmer 2010; Quinn et al. 2010). This is also a way of validating our LDA model and the human labeling of topics.

Figure A4. Proportion of discourse on identity and economic issues, plotted by different national parties

In red are radical right and extreme left parties, in black are left and right mainstream parties (CD=Cristian democratic parties; C=conservative parties; S= social democratic parties). Fig.A4 shows that mainstream parties are more prone to give their attention to economic issues, and less so to identity ones. However, extreme left and right parties focus their attention more on identity issues, and less on economics.

CONCLUSION

The scholarly focus of "United we Stand: Divided Voices in European Identity" is on the European Union (EU), a fascinating laboratory for the study of political identities. On the one hand, the EU embraces twenty-eight member states that share not just an internal market, but also cooperate in other fields such as justice and home affairs. However, despite what appears in the EU to be an increasing convergence among its member states on cardinal collective issues, calls are increasingly being heard for the process of cooperation among members of the EU to be curtailed. While these voices were evident already in the 1993 Maastricht treaty deliberations, and during the financial crisis of 2009, they were recently translated into action by the 'leave' vote in the Brexit referendum.

This dissertation focuses on the complex European political landscape. It asks questions such as: *What is the causal mechanism of socialization and how can institutions influence individuals through it? How do such institutional influences mold individuals' identities and interests? Why do socialization processes not yield the same results in different member states?* And finally, *how are institutional identities conveyed to European citizens by the institutions themselves*?

European identity is studied among the European peoples (chapter 1), among the legislators operating in the European Parliament (chapter 3) and in the EU itself as an emerging multi- and supra-national organization (chapter 2). Thus, this PhD gathers up diverse voices on European identity from among the different entities that make up the European Union. The author postulates that identity is a multidimensional construct in which every facet illuminates a different layer of it. This is especially true when it comes to a multi-level polity such as the EU. By the examination of identification process among different units of analysis, and by utilizing diversified methodological tools to do so, this PhD offers- and pushes to the scholarly agenda- a comprehensive perspective on European identity.

This dissertation also shifts the analysis from searching for identity as a fixed entity to analyzing identification processes (Bucher and Jasper 2016). Perceiving identity as something that explains, and ontologically precedes action, as identity scholarship tends to, leads empirical research to blur the relationship between actors' identities and the social environment in which they operate. Identity in this dissertation is perceived as a dynamic and relational process that continually develops and displays different sides of

itself depending on where the actors are situated. Particularly, identity is subject to change with the unfolding of time and by means of interactions (Adler and Barnet 1998). Each of the three studies composing this dissertation focuses on a situation in which identity is likely to be manifested or changed. While the first and second chapters trace identity over time, and examine the "demand" (people's identity, chapter 1) and "supply" (organizational identity, chapter 2) sides of it, the third examines identity from the perspective of discursive interactions among European legislators.

In the framework of this perception of identity, agents (citizens, the organization, or legislators) are constitutively embedded within societal interdependencies. These interdependencies are the very thing that define and constitute them as a "self". For example, by means of analyzing discursive interactions among legislators from different groups, the third chapter discerns acts of identification. This means that not only can we grasp how legislators relate to other legislators, but also the ways by which they relate to and perceive themselves as group members. Specifically we show that in a certain discursive interactions, legislators see themselves as representatives of their countries, but in other interactions they perceive themselves as (political) party members and as party representatives. These different versions of the self are possible only when identity is studied within complex networks of social interdependencies.

The three chapters look at identity through the lens of theories originating from three disciplines: sociology (Social Identity Theory), organizational studies (organizational change), and political communication (issue ownership and political agenda-setting). In each chapter these theories are intertwined with the literature and history of the EU. In the first chapter I explore the role of the European Union in socializing its member states in liberal democratic values. In contrast to preceding research which sought to detect the rise of specifically "European" values, this chapter argues that liberal democratic values are a better representation of European identity since they are specifically advocated by EU institutions. Relying on Social Identity Theory, I hypothesize that residents of older member states are likely to express greater support for democratic values than those of newer or non-EU members since they have been more profoundly socialized in EU democratic norms. Drawing on public opinion surveys and employing multilevel models, this research posits that membership duration in the EU is closely associated with citizens' adherence to liberal democratic values. As such, the

longer a country has been a member of the EU, the stronger its citizens' support of EU values.

The second chapter concentrates on the EU as a political actor and supranational organization. Its main objective is to probe the ways in which the EU integrates new values into its constitutive treaties and to delineate how these affect the coherence of the EU's identity. Drawing on insights from theories of organizational change, I offer three strategies by which the EU could implement change in its discourse. One of these strategies, which I call *discursive mechanism of differentiated value integration*, resembles the logic of differentiation in policy-making. This discursive mechanism aims at preserving a core center of fundamental values and securing a common identity to which new values can be added, allowing some change without affecting the heart of the EU's identity. The chapter discusses how employing and utilizing a mechanism of differentiated value-integration provides the EU with a vital tool by which it can permit change to take place in its discursive realm, while maintaining a coherent value-identity.

The closing chapter in the dissertation focuses on the European Parliament with the main objective of identifying the prime groups that shape and dominate the agenda in the EP by analyzing legislators' speeches given between 2004 and 2009. Drawing on insights from issue ownership and agenda-setting literature, and using various techniques to gauge the attention legislators devote to specific topics, I show that the EP, though organized along transnational lines, enables different groups to have their voices heard. In doing so, the EP encompasses the transnational voice as well as national voices. Whose voice is the loudest depends on the issue at hand.

Taken together, these studies depict how and to what extent different actors reflect, construct and talk about European identity. If until the 1970s it was common to think of European integration and its progress as dependent on national elites, or as a process with the qualities of spillover, what in the literature is termed "permissive consensus", it is now known that the masses also have a critical impact on European integration and its trajectory. Furthermore, with the many crises and challenges recently befall on the EU, identification with Europe is now a more contested issue than in the past. Thus, it is imperative to study European identity from variegated perspectives, in different situations and in different interactions of the self with the "other". Indeed, this dissertation offers a more integrative theoretical and methodological framework for

thinking about European identity and in so doing seeks to bring identification processes and their political implications to the forefront of contemporary EU political analysis.

This project will appeal to three main audiences. Firstly, scholars who study the EU broadly speaking. These may be scholars focusing on the EU, and identity-building in the EU, but also a much wider audience interested in the social and political consequences of social interactions in Europe. This audience might also be interested in the role that I attribute to discourse and discursive interactions as both constituting actors' identity and serving as a prism for exploring it. This research project encapsulates actors' identities (legislators and the EU as an organization) by a systematic examination of discursive interactions among legislators, and through the constitutive texts of the EU, both of which the author views as the fundamental building blocks of EU institutions.

The second potential audience includes those who are interested in values. By analyzing values from the perspective of the written word and by utilizing diverse texts to do so, this study contributes to the rich literature on values (e.g., Hofstede, Schwartz) who predominantly rely on public opinion data (surveys and interviews) to gauge individual as well as societal values. The additional value in studying values through texts is the massive amount of data available. No matter how detailed the survey, text as data is always more nuanced. This point is stressed in our third chapter in which we analyze legislators' discourse in parliament. Instead of measuring an MEP'S binary response - whether they support or oppose a certain policy by using vote records - we quantify their discourse and salience of discourse on different issues. We explain our choice of data in that since decisions on how to vote are made by strategic calculations and a need to toe the party line, using text instead of voting records enables a more fine-tuned measure of MEPs attitude to important matters.

The third potential audience includes scholars studying the fast-emerging field of parliamentary activity. This project collected data from almost 60,000 speeches given in the European Parliament during its 6th session. This data was then indexed, whereby for each speech I correlated data on the speaker's attributes and group affiliations.

The construction of identity is undoubtedly a complex process. Indeed, there are still open questions for further research. For example, in the same three decades during which accelerated interaction and cooperation was witnessed among member states and peoples, its counter phenomenon - the rise of radical right parties, an aversion to

globalization, xenophobia and anti-immigrant attitudes was also seen. These are all inherent parts of the dynamics of change. Accelerating interactions with the "other"– aside from breeding identification processes– can also stimulate feelings of hostility and fear. Looking ahead, I am developing a project that will focus on the counter-reaction to European integration and on the "missing Europeans" - those who did not go through processes of identification with Europe. This project will further explore the interplay between sub-national, national and supranational identities and will probe the relationship between national pride and supranational identification.

Aside from subsequent work on European identity, the three chapters of this PhD dissertation emphasize the complexity of studying this new form of identity. In order to fully grasp its fundamentals, we have to study it from different aspects, among the different levels that make up the EU, and by utilizing diversified methodological tools. On the whole, this dissertation demonstrates that the EU is not only about economic and political integration, but also about an ideational one. Each of the three chapters show the EU's role in- and power exerted to construct, transmit and convey European identity.

תקציר

האיחוד האירופי הוא מעבדה מרתקת לחקר זהויות פוליטיות. מצד אחד, הוא מונה 28 מדינות שחולקות לא רק שוק כלכלי משותף, אלא גם משתפות פעולה בתחומים אחרים כגון משפט ועניייני פנים. למרות מה שנראה לכאורה כהעמקת שיתוף הפעולה בין המדינות החברות בעניינים חשובים, תופעה הפוכה תופסת תאוצה, כזו שבאה לביטוי בקולות הנשמעים באירופה להגביל את שיתוף הפעולה בין המדינות החברות באיחוד. תופעה זו ניכרת בסקרי דעת קהל שנערכים באיחוד, בקשיים לאשר את אמנות האיחוד בקרב המדינות החברות, בצמיחתן של מפלגות ימין קיצוני ומפלגות אירוסקפטיות באירופה והגיעה לשיא במשאל העם בבריטניה שבה הוחלט לצאת מהאיחוד. מחקר זה מתמקד בסביבה פוליטית מורכבת זו, שבמסגרתה פעולות זהויות שונות המתעצבות מחדש ומשתנות כתוצאה מתהליכים חברתיים מורכבים. המחקר בוחן שאלות כגון: מהו המנגנון הסיבתי של תהליכי חֲבֵרוּת באירופה וכיצד מוסדות האיחוד האירופי יכולים להשפיע על יחידים? מדוע אין לתהליכי חֲבֵרוּת אותן התוצאות בכל המדינות החברות באיחוד? ולבסוף – כיצד זהות אירופית מועברת לאזרחים אירופים באמצעות מוסדות האיחוד?

עבודת הדוקטורט מורכבת משלושה פרקים מרכזיים כשכל פרק מהווה מאמר בפני עצמו (אחד פורסם בכתב העת European Union Politics והשני נמצא בתיקון לקראת הגשה חוזרת לכתב עת מוביל במדע המדינה). הפרקים עושים שימוש בכלים מתודולוגיים שונים, הכוללים בין השאר, מודלים היררכיים וניתוח תוכן ממוחשב. שלושת הפרקים עוסקים בתהליכי חֲבֵרוּת ובבניית זהות באיחוד האירופי, תהליכים שלפעמים נקראים בספרות Europeanization. נקודת המוצא המחקרית שלי הייתה שזהות היא רב מימדית, דינאמית ותלויית אינטראקציה חברתית ופוליטית. לכן היה לי חשוב שהפרויקט כמכלול יאמץ פרספקטיבות שונות לניתוח האיחוד ואזרחי האיחוד. שלוש הרמות העיקריות שבהן מטפלת העבודה כולה הן האיחוד האירופי כמסגרת פוליטית רב מדינתית, הפרלמנט האירופי, ואזרחי האיחוד. שלוש הרמות הללו באות לידי ביטוי במאמרים הנכללים בעבודה.

הפרק הראשון "קהילה של ערכים: גיבוש זהות דמוקרטית באיחוד האירופי" (אושרי, שפר ושנהב, 2016), מתמקד ברמה האנליטית של הפרט, כלומר - אזרחי האיחוד האירופי, ובמיקרו-יסודות של קבלת נורמות מוסדיות, תוך שימוש בתיאוריית הזהות החברתית (SIT). לפי תאוריה זו, קבוצות מייצרות בדרך כלל ליבה של נורמות וערכים משותפים. יחידים השייכים לקבוצה נוטים לקבל נורמות אלו כחלק מרצונם להרגיש חלק מהקבוצה ולזכות בהערכה עצמית חיובית. בהתבסס על סקרי דעת קהל ושימוש במודלים רב רמתיים, הממצאים המרכזיים של מחקר זה הם שמשך החברות באיחוד האירופי קשור קשר הדוק עם תמיכת האזרחים בערכים דמוקרטיים. מאחר והם עברו תהליכי חברות ארוכים יותר לתמיכה בערכים אלו, אזרחים של מדינות ותיקות באיחוד האירופי צפויים להביע תמיכה רבה יותר בערכים דמוקרטים מאזרחים במדינות עם פחות ותק באיחוד או אזרחים במדינות שאינן חברות באיחוד האירופי. וכך הממצא המרכזי במחקר זה הוא שככל שמדינה חברה זמן רב יותר באיחוד האירופי כך תמיכת אזרחיה בערכים דמוקרטיים תהיה חזקה יותר.

הפרק השני "מנגנון מובחן של אינטגרציה ערכית" (אושרי ושנהב, בתהליך תיקונים) מתמקד באיחוד האירופי כשחקן פוליטי וארגון על לאומי ובסוגיית מפתח נוספת המלווה את האיחוד, אך רלוונטית, למעשה, להתפתחות של כל מוסד או ארגון פוליטי (למשל, מפלגה, תנועה רעיונית,NGO) שמרחיב את התחומים שבהם

הוא עוסק. באמצעות ניתוח תוכן ממוחשב של האמנות המכוננות של האיחוד האירופי משנות ה-50 ועד אמנת ליסבון, מצביע המחקר על מנגנון מורכב של הטמעת ערכים חדשים בשיח של האיחוד. לפי מנגנון זה, האיחוד האירופי מרחיב את הזהות הערכית שלו ומטמיע ערכים חדשים, תוך כדי השמתם בפריפריה הדיסקורסיבית (בשוליים) של הטקסט, זאת תוך כדי שימור ערכי-יסוד ישנים. הטענה במאמר היא שמדובר במנגנון מתוחכם להטמעת ערכים חדשים ולמעשה לשינוי מוסדי, כזה שמשמר את הזהות הקיימת של המוסד, המתבטאת בערכים הישנים, תוך כדי הטמעת שינוי באופן זהיר והדרגתי. מנגנון זה דומה בהגיון שלו לאינטגרציה מובחנת במדיניות. הוא מתוחכם מפני שהוא מאפשר שינוי מוסדי אך יש בכוחו למנוע התנגדות לשינוי. מנגנון שיח כזה מספק לאיחוד כלי חיוני המאפשר הטמעת שינויים בטקסט ובמקביל שמירה של זהות-ערכית קוהרנטית.

הפרק השלישי בעבודת הדוקטורט "עניין של זהות: הכוח לקבוע את סדר היום בפרלמנט משוסע" (אושרי ופוגל-דרור) מתמקד בפרלמנט האירופי במטרה לזהות את הקבוצות המרכזיות שמעצבות וקובעות את סדר היום השיחי בפרלמנט האירופי, זאת באמצעות פירוק ובחינה של אינטראקציות שיחיות. מחקר זה מנתח נאומים (57,000~) שנישאו בקדנציה השישית (2005-2009). מאחר ומחוקקים אירופיים שייכים למפלגות אירופיות אבל גם למפלגות לאומיות וגם למדינות האם שלהם, מחקר זה מבקש לבחון את הקשר בין הזהות הקבוצתית המגוונת שלהם ובין השיח שלהם בפרלמנט. הממצאים במחקר זה מראים שבנושאים מסוימים, במיוחד נושאים שחשובים מאוד לריבונות המדינה – המדינות ולא המפלגות, הן אלו ששולטות בשיח. בחינה נוספת של ממצאים אלו גילתה שדווקא מדינות חלשות וקטנות שולטות בשיח זה. ממצא זה מפתיע שכן הדיעה הרווחת היא שמדינות ציר ומדינות חשובות יעצבו את סדר היום בנושאים חשובים. לסיכום, אנו מראים שהפרלמנט האירופי, על אף היותו מאורגן לפי קווים מפלגתיים, מאפשר לקבוצות שונות (מפלגתיות ומדינתיות) להשמיע את קולן. בעשותו כן, הוא מכיל לא רק קולות על לאומיים, אלא גם אידיאולוגיים ומדינתיים בתוכו. איזו קבוצה מדברת בקול החזק יותר? אנו מראים כי זה תלוי בנושא המדובר.

כלל המטרות והממצאים שמוצגים בעבודת דוקטורט זו מדגישים נדבכים שונים של זהות אירופית שהולכת ומתגבשת בקרב גופים שונים באיחוד האירופי. לצד המסקנות הספציפיות של כל פרק, עבודה זו מציירת תמונה רחבה יותר על התפקיד המורכב של זהויות פוליטיות בתהליכי אינטגרציה שמתרחשים באיחוד האירופי. אם נהוג לראות באיחוד האירופי כפרויקט שיש לו השפעה עצומה על כלכלה, מסחר ומשפט, עבודה זו מלמדת על התפקיד ההיסטורי של האיחוד כשחקן בתחום הזהות בעל מנגנונים רבי עוצמה לשינוי זהות ברמת האינדיבידואל (פרק ראשון) הארגון (פרק שני) והקבוצות הפוליטיות (פרק שלישי). עבודה זו הראתה שמנגנונים אלה מאוד אפקטיביים. זו אחת הסיבות לכך שהם מעוררים התנגדות רבה.

עבודה זו נעשתה בהדרכתם של פרופ׳ שאול שנהב ופרופ׳ תמיר שפר

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