Conflict points around the world involve government forces fighting terrorist groups. In this type of warfare, there is a danger that counterterrorist efforts may backfire, providing ammunition for additional cycles of violence. We study this issue focusing on selective and indiscriminate house demolitions employed by Israel during the Second Intifada. We exploit the temporal and spatial variation of this policy to assess its impact on Palestinians’ political views. We find that the civilian population does not react to punitive house demolitions, a selective form of counterterrorism. On the contrary, Palestinians are more likely to adopt more radical political opinions in response to precautionary house demolitions, an indiscriminate form of counterterrorism. We also show that political radicalization induced by indiscriminate counterterrorism leads to an increase in future terror attacks. Overall, our analysis provides explicit empirical support to the mechanism behind the positive correlation between indiscriminate counterterrorism and future levels of violence.
Research
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Defense and the Economy in Israel, 1990-2016”. In The Israeli Economy in the Last Twenty Years: Lights and Shadows in a Market Economy, New York: Cambridge University Press , p. 168-202.
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What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS?”. Terrorism and Political Violence 32 (7) : 1458-1481.Abstract
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Party Hacks and True Believers: The Effect of Party Affiliation on Political Preferences”. Journal of Comparative Economics 47 ( 3) : 504-524.Abstract
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On Public Opinion Polls and Voters' Turnout”. Journal of Public Economic Theory 20 (2) : 239-256.Abstract
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Is Centralization a Solution to the Soft Budget Constraint Problem?”. European Journal of Political Economy 45 (1) : 57-75.Abstract
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The Long-Run Effect of 9/11: Terrorism, Backlash, and the Assimilation of Muslim Immigrants in the West”. Economic Journal 126 (597) : 2064-2114.Abstract
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Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evidence from House Demolitions”. Journal of Politics 77 (1) : 27-43.Abstract
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Can Militants use Violence to Win Public Support? Evidence from the Second Intifada”. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59 (3) : 528-549.Abstract
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Can Higher Bonuses Lead to Less Effort? Incentive Reversal in Teams”. Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization 97 (1) : 72-83.Abstract
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Representativeness and Efficiency in Local Government. Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute.
. 2013.
The Impact of the Economic Costs of Conflict on Individuals' Political Attitudes”. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 18 (2) : Article 4.Abstract
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