Peleg EE, Bezalel.
Coalition-Proof Communication Equilibria. Discussion Papers. 1992;(9).
AbstractWe offer a definition of coalition-proof communication equilibria. The use of games of incomplete information is essential to our approach. Deviations of coalition are introduced after their players are informed of the actions they should follow. therefore, improvements by coalition on a given correlated strategy should always be made when their players have private information. Coalition-proof communication equilibria of two-person games are characterized by "information efficiency". Several examples are analyzed, including the Voting Paradox.
Jose-Luis Ferreira, Itzhak Gilboa MM.
Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play. 1992;(5).
AbstractWhenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, one has to take into account that priorities of the participants 5 change during the conflict. In this paper we propose an extensive-form game model to handle such situations and suggest and study a solution concept, called credible equilibrium, which generalizes the concept of Nash equilibrium. We also discuss possible variants to this concept and applications of the model to other types of games.
Sergiu Hart AM-C.
Egalitarian Solutions of Large Games: II. The Asymptotic Approach. 1992;(2).
AbstractThis is the second of two papers developing the theory of Egalitarian solutions for games in coalitional form with non-transferable utility (NTU) and a large number of players. This paper is devoted to the study of the egalitarian solutions of finite games as the number of players increases. We show that these converge to the egalitarian solution of the limit game with a continuum of players as defined in our previous paper. The same convergence holds for the underlying potential functions.
Linial N.
Games Computers Play: Game-Theoretic Aspects of Computing. Discussion Papers. 1992;(6).
AbstractThis is a survey of some connections between game theory and theoretical computer science. The main emphasis is on theories of fault-tolerant computing. The paper is largely self-contained.
Winter E.
Mechanism Robustness in Multilateral Bargaining. Discussion Papers. 1992;(7).
AbstractWe describe a non-cooperative bargaining model for games in coalition form without transferable utility. In this model random moves determine the order by which the players take their actions. the specific assignment of probability distributions to these chance moves is called the mechanics of the bargaining. Within this framework we examine the relation between the property of mechanism robustness, and coalition stability of the bargaining outcome, by showing that these two properties boil down to be the same.
