How reputation regulates regulators: Illustrations from the regulation of retail finance | Sharon Gilad

How reputation regulates regulators: Illustrations from the regulation of retail finance

Gilad, Sharon, and Tamar Yogev. 2012.“How reputation regulates regulators: Illustrations from the regulation of retail finance”. Pp. 320-340 in Oxford Handbook of Corporate Reputation. Oxford University Press.

Last updated on 11/04/2015

Recent Publications

Alon-Barkat, Saar, and Sharon Gilad. 2017. “"Compensating for Poor Performance with Promotional Symbols: Evidence from a Survey Experiment"”. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 27 (4):661:675.

Gilad, Sharon, and Michaela Assouline. Forthcoming. “Citizens' Choice to Voice Concerns with Administrative Burdens”. International Public Management Journal.

Gilad, Sharon, Saar Alon-Barkat, Nitzan Faibish, and Sarah Goldberg. 2022. “Leveraging City Officials’ Professional and Social Identities to Facilitate Affordable Housing”. Political Geography 94.

Developed by Gizra