Neyman A, Bavly G
. Online Concealed Correlation by Boundedly Rational Players
. Center for the Study of Rationality, DP336. 2003 :DP-336.Abstract
In a repeated game with perfect monitoring, correlation among a group of players may evolve in the common course of play (online correlation). Such a correlation may be concealed from a boundedly rational player. The feasibility of such online concealed correlation'' is quantified by the individually rational payoff of the boundedly rational player. We show that ``strong'' players, i.e., players whose strategic complexity is less stringently bounded, can orchestrate online correlation of the actions of ``weak'' players, in a manner that is concealed from an opponent of ``intermediate'' strength. The result is illustrated in two models, each captures another aspect of bounded rationality. In the first, players use bounded recall strategies. In the second, players use strategies that are implementable by finite automata.
Gossner O, Hernandez P, Neyman A
. Online Matching Pennies
. Center for the Study of Rationality, Discussion Paper 316 . 2003.Abstract
We study a repeated game in which one player, the prophet, acquires more information than another player, the follower, about the play that is going to be played. We characterize the optimal amount of information that can be transmitted online by the prophet to the follower, and provide applications to repeated games played by finite automata, and by players with bounded recall.