Neyman A. Finitely Repeated Games with Finite Automata. Mathematics of Operations Research. 1998;23 :513--552.Abstract

Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.

Neyman A. Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games. International Journal of Game Theory. 1997;26 : 223--227.Abstract

Any correlated equilibrium of a strategic game with bounded payoffs and convex strategy sets which has a smooth concave potential, is a mixture of pure strategy profiles which maximize the potential. If moreover, the strategy sets are compact and the potential is strictly concave, then the game has a unique correlated equilibrium.

Neyman A. Cooperation, Repetition and Automata. In: sergiu hart, Mas-Colell A Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches, NATO ASI Series. Vol. 155. ; 1997. pp. 233--255. nato34.pdf
Neyman A, Sorin S. Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: The Deterministic Symmetric Case. Kluwer Academic Publishers . 1997 :129--131.
Games and Economic Theory: Selected Contributions in Honor of Robert J. Aumann
Neyman A, sergiu hart. Games and Economic Theory: Selected Contributions in Honor of Robert J. Aumann. Michigan : The University of Michigan Press; 1995.
Neyman A. Values of Games with a Continuum of Players. In: Mertens J-F, Sorin S Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis. Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishers ; 1994. pp. 67--79.
Value of Games with a Continuum of Players. Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis. 1994;77 :67--79.
Dubey P, Neyman A. An Axiomatic Approach to the Equivalence Phenomenon. In: Mertens J-F, Sorin S Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis. Vol. 77. Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer Academic Publishers ; 1994. pp. 137--143.
Neyman A, Dubey P. An Equivalence Principle for Perfectly Competitive Economies. Journal of Economic Theory. 1994;75 :314-344.Abstract

Four axioms are placed on a correspondence from smooth, non-atomic economies to their allocations. We show that the axioms categorically determine the (coincident) competitive-core-value correspondence. Thus any solution is equivalent to the above three if, and only if, it satisfies the axioms. In this sense our result is tantamount to an "equivalence principle." At the same time, our result implies that the three solutions themselves are determined by the axioms and so serves as an axiomatic characterization of the well-known competitive (or core, or value) correspondence.

Neyman A. The Positive Value of Information. Games and Economic Behavior. 1991;3 :350-355.Abstract

It has been remarked that in rational interactions more information to one player, while all others' information remains the same, may reduce his payoff in equilibrium. This classical observation relies on comparing equilibria of two different games. It is argued that this analysis is not tenably performed by comparing equilibria of two different games. Rather, one is compelled to perform the analysis in an interaction without complete information, and to compare equilibria of two interactions that are embedded in some compounded game. It is then shown that the player whose information is unilaterally refined cannot be worse off at equilibrium. 

Neyman A, Ezra.Einy. On Non-Atomic Weighted Majority Games. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 1990;19 :391-403.
Game Theory and Applications
Neyman A, Ichiishi T, Tauman Y. Game Theory and Applications. Academic Press. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,; 1990.
E.Einy, Neyman A. Large Symmetric Games are Characterized by Completeness of the Desirability Relation. Journal of Economic Theory. 1989;148 :369-385. large.pdf
Neyman A. Uniqueness of the Shapley Value. Games and Economic Behavior. 1989;1 :116-118.Abstract

It is shown that the Shapley value of any given game v is characterized by applying the value axioms -- efficiency, symmetry, the null player axiom, and either additivity or strong positivity -- to the additive group generated by the subgames of v.

Neyman A, sergiu hart. Values of Vector Measure Games: Are They Linear Combinations of the Measures?. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 1988;17 :31-40. Paper
Neyman A. Weighted Majority Games have an Asymptotic Value. Mathematics of Operations Research. 1988;13 :556-580. weighted.pdf
Neyman A, Dubey P. Payoffs in Non-Atomic Games: An Axiomatic Approach. The Shapley Value, A. Roth (ed.), Cambridge Univ. Press. 1988 :207-216. Paper
Neyman A, Monderer D. Values of Smooth Non-Atomic Games: The Method of Multilinear Approximation. The Shapley Value, A. Roth (ed.), Cambridge Univ. Press. 1988 :217-234. Paper
Aumann RJ, Kurtz M, Neyman A. Power and Public Goods. Journal of Economic Theory. 1987;42 :108-127. power.pdf
Forges F, Mertens JF, Neyman A. A Counter-Example to the Folk Theorem with Discounting. Economic Letters. 1986;19 :227-229. folk_theorem.pdf