Mirman LJ, Neyman A. Diagonality of Cost Allocation Prices. Mathematics of Operations Research. 1984;9 :66-74. diago.pdf
Dubey P, Neyman A. Payoffs of Non-Atomic Markets: An Axiomatic Approach. Econometrica. 1984;52 :1129-1150. neydub84.pdf
Neyman A. Representation of Lp-Norms and Isometric Embedding in Lp-Spaces. Israel Journal of Mathematics. 1984;48 :129-138. Paper
Neyman A. Semi-Values of Political Economic Games. Mathematics of Operations Research. 1984;10 :390-402.Abstract

The class of continuous semivalues is completely characterized for various spaces of nonatomic games.

Kohlberg E, Neyman A. Convergence in Hilbert's Metric and Convergence in Directions. Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications. 1983;93 :104-108.
Mirman LJ, Neyman A. Prices for Homogeneous Cost Functions. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 1983;12 :257-273.Abstract

The problem of allocating the production cost of a finite bundle of infinitely divisible consumption goods by means of prices is a basic problem in economics. This paper extends the recent axiomatic approach in which one considers a class of cost problems and studies the maps from the class of cost problems to prices by means of the properties these prices satisfy. The class of continuously differentiable costs functions used in previous studies is narrowed to the subclass containing non-decreasing, homogeneous of degree one and convex functions. On this subclass it is shown that there exists a unique continuous price mechanism satisfying axioms similar to those assumed in previous studies.

Aumann RJ, Kurtz M, Neyman A. Voting for Public Goods. Review of Economic Studies. 1983;50 :677-693.Abstract

It is shown that when resources are privately owned, the institution of voting is irrelevant to the choice of non-exclusive public goods: the total bundle of such goods produced by Society is the same whether or not minority coalitions are permitted to produce them. This is in sharp contrast to the cases of redistribution and of exclusive public goods, where public decisions depend strongly on the vote. The analytic tool used is the Harsanyi-Shapley non-transferable utility value.

Gale D, Neyman A. Nim-Type Games. International Journal of Game Theory. 1982;11 :17-20. nim.pdf
Neyman A, Hildenbrand W. Integrals of Production Sets with Restricted Substitution. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 1982;9 :71-82.Abstract

It is well known that the set of all zonoids (integrals of line segments) in R" (n>2) is a closed and nowhere defise subset in the space of all compact, convex and centrally symmetric subsets of R". We generalize this result to sets which are the integral of k-dimensional convex sets, k <n.

Neyman A. Renewal Theory for Sampling without Replacement. Annals of Probability. 1982;10 :464-481. Paper
Mertens JF, Neyman A. Stochastic Games have a Value. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 1982;79 :2145-2146.Abstract

Undiscounted nontenninating stochastic games in which the state and action spaces are finite have a value.

Mertens J-F, Neyman A. Minimax Theorems for Undiscounted Stochastic Games. Game Theory and Mathematical Economics. 1981 :83-87.
Neyman A. Decomposition of Ranges of Vector Measures. Israel Journal of Mathematics. 1981;40 :54-64.
Kohlberg E, Neyman A. Asymptotic Behavior of Nonexpansive Mappings in Normed Linear Spaces. Israel Journal of Mathematics. 1981;38 :269-275.Abstract

Let T be a non expansive mapping on a normed linear space X. We show that there exists a linear functional f, with ||f|| = 1, such that, for all x in X, the Iimit, as n goes to infinity, of  f(T"x/n) equals the limit of IIT"x/nll=a, where a=inf_{y}IITy-yli. This means, if X is reflexive, that there is a face F of the ball of radius a to which T"x/n converges weakly to F for all x  if X is strictly convex as well as reflexive, the convergence is to a point; and if X satisfies the stronger condition that its dual has Frechet differentiable norm then the convergence is strong. Furthermore, we show that each of the foregoing conditions on X is satisfied if and only if the associated convergence property holds for all nonexpansive T.

Kohlberg E, Neyman A. Asymptotic Behavior of Nonexpansive Mappings in Uniformly Convex Banach Spaces. American Mathematical Monthly. 1981;88 :698-700. Paper
Neyman A. Singular Games have Asymptotic Values. Mathematics of Operations Research. 1981;6 :205-212.Abstract

The asymptotic value of a game v with a continuum of players is defined whenever all the sequences of Shapley values of finite games that "approximate" v have the same limit. In this paper we prove that if v is defined by v(S) = f( p(S)), where p is a nonatomic probability measure and f is a function of bounded variation on [0, I] that is continuous at 0 and at I, then v has an asymptotic value. This had previously been known only when v is absolutely continuous. Thus, for example, our result implies that the nonatomic majority voting game, defined by v(S) = 0 or I according as p(S)  less than or equal to 1/2 or p(S) > 1/2, has an asymptotic value. We also apply our result to show that other games of interest in economics and political science have asymptotic values, and adduce an example to show that the result cannot be extended to functions f that are not of bounded variation.

Mertens JF, Neyman A. Stochastic Games. International Journal of Game Theory. 1981;10 :53-66.Abstract

Stochastic Games have a value.

Neyman A, Dubey P, Weber RJ. Value Theory without Efficiency. Mathematics of Operations Research. 1981;6 :122--128.Abstract

A semivalue is a symmetric positive linear operator on a space of games, which leaves the additive games fixed. Such an operator satisfies all of the axioms defining the Shapley value, with the possible exception of the efficiency axiom. The class of semivalues is completely characterized for the space of finite-player games, and for the space pNA of nonatomic games.

Neyman A. Asymptotic Values of Mixed Games. Game Theory and Related Topics. 1979 :71-81. Paper